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CHAPTER I. 
INTRODUCTION.* 
POL~TICAL  ECONOMY  is at  once a science and 
an art.  The value of the  science has for its 
etfirient cause and measure,  its subserviency 
to  the art.t 
According  to the principle  of  utility  in 
every branch  of  the art of  legislation,  the 
object or end in view should he the produc- 
tion cf the maximum of happiness in a given 
time ill the cornniunity in question. 
In the instance of  this branch  of  the art, 
the ohjcct or end in view should be the pro- 
duction of that maximum of happiness, in so 
far as this more general end is promoted  by 
the production of the  maximum of wealth and 
the maximum of population. 
The practical questions, therefore,  are - 
Iiow far the measures respectively suggested 
oy these  two branches  of  the common  end 
agree?-how  far they differ,  and which  re- 
quires the preference ?-how  far the end  in 
view is best promoted  by individuals acting 
for themselves? and in what cases these ends 
!nay  be  best promoted  by the hands  of  go- 
vernment ? 
Those cases in which, and those measures 
or operations by which, the end is promoted 
by  individuals  acting  for  themselves,  and 
without  any  special  interference  exercised 
with this special view on the part of govern- 
ment,  beyond  the  distribution  made  and 
maintained,  and the protection  afforded  by 
the civil and penal branches of  the law, may 
be said to arise sponte acta. 
What the legislator and the minister of the 
interior have it in their power to  do towards 
increase either of wealth or population.  is as 
nothing in comparison with what is done of 
course,  and without  thinking of it, by the 
judge, and hisassistant the minister of police. 
The cases in which.  and the measures bv 
the hands of  government,  may  be termed 
agenda. 
With the view of causing  an increase to 
take place in the mass of national wealth, or 
with a view to  increase of  tbe means either 
of  subsistence or enjoyment, without  some 
special reason,  the general rule is,  that no- 
thing ought to  be  done or attempted by go- 
vernment.  The motto,  or  watchword  of 
government, on these occasions, ought to  be 
-Be  quiet. 
For this quietism there are two main rea- 
sons : -  l.  Generally  speaking,  any mterfe- 
rence for this purpose on the part of govern- 
ment is needless.  The wealth of  the wl~ole 
community is composed  of the wealth of the 
several individuals belonging to it taken to- 
gether.  But to increase his particular por- 
tion is,  generally speaking,  among the con- 
stant objects of  each  individual's  exertions 
and care.  Generally speaking, there is no one 
who knows what is for your interest, so well 
as yourself-no  one who is  disposed with so 
much ardour and constancy to pursue it. 
2.  Generally speaking, it  is moreover likely 
to  be pernicious,  viz.  by being unconducive, 
or even obstructive, with reference to the at- 
tainment of the end in view.  Each individual 
bestowing more time and attention upon the 
meansof preserving and increasinghis portion 
of wealth,  than is or can be bestowed by g0- 
vernmeat,  is likely to  take a  more effectual 
course than what,  in his instance and on his 
behalf,  would be taken by government. 
It  is, moreover,  universally and constantly 
pernicious  in another way,  by the restraint 
or constraint  imposed on the free agency of 
the individual.  Pain is the general concomi* 
tant of  the sense of such restraint,  wherever 
it is experienced. 
Without being productive .of such coercion, 
and thereby of such pain -  m  a way more or 
less direct -  more  or less  perceptible,  with 
this or anv other view.  the interposition  of 
ti&l Economy.-Ed 
t  To Adam Smith, the Vience  the dlrect and constant object In 
the collateral and occasional one. 
-  -  .  arts of the followin  work 
I  coercion be not. applied to  the  very individual 
merlr rbEshed  as the founh go&  of  the work 
entit e  Rationale of  Reward: -  ther are now 
inserted  in the places  they were orignally de- 
signed to occupy in Bentham's  Manwrl of  Pdi- 
whose conduct  is  to be  made 
immediately subservient to this  purpose,  it 
is at  any rate applied to  others -  indeed, to 
the whole  comn~u~~ity  taken together. MANUAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY. 
the field of coercion is vastly more extensive. 
Encouragements are grants of money or mo- 
ney's  worth, applied  in  some shape or other 
to this purpose.  But for this, any more than 
any other purpose, money is not raised but by 
taxes,  and taxes are the produce of coercive 
laws applied to the most coercive purpose. 
This would not be the less true, though the 
individual pieces of money thus applied hap- 
pened to come from a source which had not 
been fed b  any such means.  In all commu- 
nities, by dr  the greatest share of the money 
disposed of by government being supplied by 
tnxes, whether this or that particular  portion 
of  money so  applied, be  supplied from  that 
particular source, makes no sort of difference. 
To estimate  the good expected from the 
application of any particular mass of govern- 
ment monev,  compare  it always  with  the 
mischief  p&duced  by  the  extraction  of an 
equal sum of money by the most burthensome 
species of tax ;  since, by forbearing to make 
application of that sum of money, you might 
forbear levying the amount of that same sum 
of  money by that tax,  and thereby forbear 
imposing  the mass of  burthen that results 
r---  :A 
fection with reference to tlie  production of 
any effect  operating in addition to the mass 
of wealth on the part of the members of the 
community taken  respectively  in their indi- 
vidual capacities,  it will  be  produced with- 
out the interference of the government;  and 
as this interference is never a matter of  pure 
indifference, -never  otherwise than hurtful 
when  it is' not beneficial,  these  cases  are 
among  the cases in which  that interference 
is not desirable. 
In the cases where any one of these requi- 
sites is deficient,  insomuch that for want of 
it the effect cannot  he  produced, -in  such 
case the interposition of government  may be 
desirable or not, according to the state of the 
account -  according  as the  inconveniences 
attached to the measures  in which the inter- 
position of government consists, preponderate 
or fail of  preponderating  over the advantage 
attached  to the effect which  it is proposed 
should be produced. 
If the effect fnil of being produced without 
the interposition  of  government  for want of 
any one or more of  these requisites,  it is by 
the supply of  the requisite  or requisites  so 
wanting that the action of government  may 
A1  UIll  lb. 
It  would,  however,  be a gross error,  and 
an extremely mischievous one, to  refer to  the 
defalcation thus resulting from the mass of 
liberty or free agency,  as affording a conclu- 
sive objection against. the interposition of the 
law for this or any other purpose.  Every law 
which does not consist in the repeal  total or 
partial, of a coercive law, is itself ;coercive 
law.  To reprobate as a  mischief resulting 
from this or that, law, a property which is of' 
the very essence of  all law,  is to betray  a 
degree of blindness and ignorance one should 
think hardly possible on the  part of  a  mind 
accusto~ned to  the  contemplation  of  any 
branch of the system of laws-a  total unac- 
quaintance with what may be called the logic 
of the laws. 
Yet so imperfect is the state  of legal know- 
ledge, -  marks of this  perfectly surprising, 
as it will one day be,  as well as much to be 
lamented  ignorance,  are to be found among 
the most experienced  pens,  not to mention 
the most loquacious tongues. 
Power,  knowledge  or  intelligence,  and 
inclination:  where these requisites concur on 
the  part of  him on whom the production of 
the desirable effect in question depends, it is 
produced ;  when any one of them is wanting, 
it is not produced. 
When these requisites exist already in per- 
* Knorledy may be considered as a branch 
of  power.  It lsrwer  so far as it de  nds upon 
the mental eon  itlon of  the party wrse Power 
$f~$t~~e~~",'~d~~,"~~~,"~,"~c~~~i~~ 
of  extana*  o\jBjru-objecu  refe- 
rence to  hun. 
ceptihle effect. 
The  two most extensive descriptions of the  SURVEY OP  THE  'IELD  OF 
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display-itself.  Thence,  on  every such occa- 
sion,  these questions present themselves for 
consideration : - 
1. Whether the effect  in question  fail of 
being  produced  in  the  degree  in  which  it 
miqht be prod~~ced? 
2. TO  the want  of what  reqltisite  or re- 
quisites such failure is to be ascribed ? 
3.  What  are  the  menns  by  which  such 
failure may be supplied by governme~lt  at tlle 
least experlse? 
4.  When  reduced to its least dimensions, 
is the expense  necessary for the purpose  in 
question such  that the ndvantage will  pre- 
ponderate over the expense? 
In a gelleral view of the  three requisites, 
inclination  appears  lenst apt to be deficient 
on the part of  individuals.  The ger~eral  mass 
of national wealth  is composed of  the parti- 
cular masses appertaining to  individuals.  On 
the part of the illdivid~tal  there in  seldom any 
deficiency in  respect of  inclination  to make 
addition to  the amount of that particular mass 
of wealth which has fallen to his share. 
It is in respect to the two other requi- 
sites, power and intelligence, that deficiency 
is much more apt to take place. 
To these  deficiencies the abilities of  go- 
vernment are happily adapted.  Inclination it 
could not give -it  has not power to give it 
in the great mass of  cases: -not  by punish- 
ments,  on account of the expensiveness  and 
i.  such cases the  comparative  ineficAy of 
means; -not  by  reward, for want of  a 
sufficient stock of  that  scam and valuable 
matter which is not to be extracted  but by 
taxes -that  is, by p~tnishme~~ts. 
Intelligence and  power may  hc  ndminis- 
tered by government at  a much cheaper rate. 
A mite of  reward,  skilfully applied,  is often 
sufficient to produce an immensity of intel- 
ligence.  In  many  instances,  it  freqt~ently 
requires  nothing more than  the  removal  of 
coercion from one  hand to another,  or even 
the repeal of  it altogether,  in order to con- 
fer the sort and degree of requisite  power ;* 
the  operation,  in either case,  not being at- 
tended, in  the shape  of  pain,  with any per- 
within a small compass :  security nnd freehm 
are all thnt industry requires.  The reqllest 
which  agriculture,  manufactures,  and  corn. 
merce present to  governments,  is modest and 
reasonable  as that which  Diogenes  made to 
Alexander:  "  Stand  out of  my stlnshine."  We 
have no need of favour-  we require only a 
secure and open path. 
'  CHAPTER 11. 
...- 
to interfere for the purpose of'regulat'ing  the 
exertions of  individuals  in respect to the in- 
crease of wealth,  are those in which it is ne- 
cessary to regulate the pursuit of the several 
objects in view,  according  to the  order  of 
their importance :  -in  giving to the matter 
of  wealth  that modification which adapts it 
to the several purposes  of  subsistence  and 
defence-  security in respect of  subsistence, 
md  security in  respect of  defence-in  pre- 
ference to that  which  adapts it to  the mere 
purpose of  enjoyment. 
With few exceptions, and those not very 
consitlcrable ones, the attainment of the maxi- 
mum of  enjoyment will  be  most efFectually 
secured by leaving each individual to pursue 
his own maximum of enjoyment,  in propor- 
tion as he is in possession of the means.  In- 
clination in this respect will  not be wantirlg 
on the part of  any one.  Power, the species 
of power applicable to this case-viz.  wealth, 
pecuniary power-  could not be given by the 
11a11d  of government  to one,  without  being 
taken from another ;  so that by such  inter- 
ference there would not be any gain of power 
upon the whole. 
The gain to be produced in this article by 
the  interposition  of  government,  respects 
principally the head  of  knowledge.  There 
are cases in which, for the benefit ofthe pub- 
lic at  large, it may be in the power of govern- 
ment to cause this or that portion of  know- 
lefge  to be  produced  and  diffused, which, 
w~thout  the demand  for  it produced  by go- 
vernment,  would either not  have  been pro- 
duced,  or would llot have beerl diffused. 
We have seen above the grounds on which 
the general rule in this behulf -  Be quiet - 
rests.  Whatever measures, therefore, cannot 
be justified  as exceptions to that rule,  may 
be considcred  as non  agenda  on  the part of 
6o~emmcllt.t The art, therefore, is reduced 
Su  pl  ing capital is supplyin  power.  Capi- 
tal mi&  Ke  aupplid in 811glrnfby taking of, 
uoad hoo  the restraints imposed on the accumu- 
Lion of &iul  by partnership. 
t  Among these several classes  a enda, sponte 
acts. and .on-agenda,  the dish8ution of  the 
innaginable stock of  institutions will differ in a 
very considerable degee, according to the dif- 
FOR  thegenesis of the matter of wealth -the 
causes and mode of  its production under its 
several modifications -  reference may for the 
present be made to  -4dam Smith, who has not 
left much to do, except in the way of method 
and precision. 
The following are the first steps in an ana. 
lytieal survey of the field of political economy, 
showing how to  draw a circle round the sub- 
ject,  and  how  to invent  or  discover  what 
remains to be  invented or discovered in this 
quarter of the field of human knou~led~e. 
On  the part  of the individuals  by whom 
increase of wealth is produced, the productiorl 
of it is either purely spontaneous, or (with or 
without  design  directed  to the increase  of 
it) either promoted or obstructed by the ope- 
rations of government.  The correspondent 
practical division of acts and operations,  the 
effect  of which  is  to exert an influence  on 
tlie  quantity of the notional,  to which  may 
be added the mundane stock of  the matter of 
wealth,  is -  1.  Sponte acla;  2. Agenda;  3. 
Non-agenda. 
In the track of politicaI economy as in any 
other, whatever is done  towards the attain- 
ment of  the object,  must be by creating in- 
clination, or by bestowing power. 
Inclination can  only be  operated upon by 
inducements, as- 
1.  By applications of  a coercive or obliga- 
tory nature, -  which are either injunctions or 
prohibitions. 
fcrent circumstances of the several political com. 
munities.  In regard to defalcations  from general 
opulence for the security of subsistence an ar- 
rangement of  that sort which in one cou&r7 my 
be at once needful  and  racficable,  may m m- 
other be either not need61 or  what is more a t 
be the case* not prmficible:  The greater tRe 
~~f~2$~f~~~2e~~f"0~~~~415~2~71:: 
England.  abuddance of &ful  thine.  are hone 
by ~ndividuals,  which in other countries are done 
elther by government, or not at all.  Docks  har- 
bours, canals, roads; institutions  for relietabinst 
misfortune in a variety of  shapes and from a va- 
rietyof cauaesbodilyaffliction, aeath of  friends, 
fire  hostile captures,  and criminal de  redation. 
In  kuaaia,  under Peter the (frat, tRe  Lt  of 
sponte act@ being a blank, that  of  agenda was  ' 
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2.  By applicntions of an invitative nntl~re, applictl,  it m~~st  be cithcr -  I. U'ith  a view 
or cr~couragen~el~ts,  -which  are eithertlircct 
or illdirect. 
Power may to this purpose be distinguished 
into-1.  -  ..  Legtrl; 2.  Physical; 3.  Intellectual, 
or knowledge. 
1. Lcgl power mav be  conferred -1.  By 
forbearing to i~npose  bn  the party proposctl 
to be  assisted  coercion of  any kind:  2.  By 
coercing otllers in such a manner as  to pre- 
vent  them  from  obstructing his  making use 
of the  power of the preceding kind;  3.  Hy 
conrpellir~g  them to aflbrtl him assistance.  In 
the two first of these cases, power is no more 
than libcrt.y. 
2.  Physical power is conferred by giving to 
a party the physical instroments  requisite to 
the attainment of  the cnd proposed; -viz. 
money,  or so~r~ething  that is to be  bad  for 
money.  This can only be done by legal power 
of orle  or  other  of the three  kir~ds  above 
mentioned. 
3.  Intellectual power is either -  1.  Active 
power;  or, 2.  Knowledge.  If active power 
be given by law.  it can only be in some irldi- 
rect way, through  physical and  thence through 
legal powcr. 
Knowledge is either-  1.  Of the modes~f 
operating towards the end proposed ; -  vlz. 
which  are good,  which bad -  which worst, 
and which  bcst;  or,  2.  Of  matters of fact; 
-  which  be collducive  to this end,  ei- 
uv  out  2. By 
poi~~tir~g  oit lcgal  powcr;  3.  13y  corltluci~~g 
to  physical power or to  intellect~lal  power- 
either as leading to  knowledge  of  the modes 
of operating,  or to other matters of fact more 
leading  such 
Encouragements may be distinguislled into 
-1.  Direct ;  and, 2. Indirect.  Direct consist 
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of  ir~crcasirlg  the quar~tity  of  ir~dustry  in ge- 
neral;  or, 2.  With a view of increasi~~g  the 
relative  quantity of  a  particular branch  of 
industrv. 
The*cnuses of  wealth, or say rather the 
matter of wealth,'  are - 
1. Final-well-being, 
2.  Material-matter  considered in respect 
of its possessi~lg,  or being capable of possess- 
ing  value-viz.  subservency to well-&ing, 
thefinal cause. 
3.  Efficient-viz.  motion. 
The modifications of well-being,  ranged in 
the order of their importance,  are- 
1.  Subsistence,  present. 
2.  Security  in  respect  of  defence -  viz. 
against the  evils to tvhich  hum:~n  nattwe is 
exposed,particularly from theactio~~ofagents 
exterior to a man's  body.  Security in respect 
of future subsistence. 
3.  Enjoyment -  viz. mere enjoyment, d~s- 
tinct  from  the maintenance  of  subsistenrc 
and the contemplation of security. 
Matter, considered with  reference  to the 
final cause,-well-being,  may be termed (such 
parts of it  as by the use made of them become 
subservient  to well-being,  the  final cause) 
matter of wea1th.t 
The  "  matter of 
is  employed  to  prevent 'alnbiylity:  it carries 
withit a reference to quantity.  . There are many 
think-  whicl~  ntay constitute part  of  the matter 
of wealth,  which when  taken  separately,  or in 
!mall  quantities  would hardly be called wealth.   ti.^ :  f~~~~y~~~o~~:~~ 
h~ll  tew wouldF)call wealth. none  however  coUfd 
deny that they might conshtute ;art  of the;natter 
of wealth. 
of rewards,  commonly called in this inst:tnce 
bounties,  given to him who shall exercise his 
industry in  or such a my.  1,,direCt, con- 
sist  in discourwements opposed  in the way of 
others, in the view of restraining them from 
exercising their industry in such or  such  a 
way; i. e.  in such a way as shall prevent  his 
escrcisi~~g  his in the way desired.  If discou- 
ragements  thrown in  the way of  A,  answer 
the  purpose  of  encouragement  to B,  it  is 
because A's  acting in the track he is thus dis- 
couraged from would have tended to discou- 
ripe B from acting in  the track he is meant 
to be encouraged to  act  in, by diminishing the 
reward,  natural or factitious,  he would have 
got ir~  some way by acting in it. 
To the head of  encouragements  may also 
be added operations  the tendency  of which 
is to confer power,  and in particular physical 
power ;  such as the giving or lending money 
or  money's  worth,  to k employed in the 
sllape of  a capital  towards  the carrying on 
brulch of industry meant t,o be encournged. 
-  111  whichever of  the  above  ways  aid is 
~)l)~~lcncc  thou  11.~0  nearly of kin to wea!tl~, 
--and  the rather fir that ver  reason -  re  ulres 
to be distinguished from it.  dpulence is rePative 
wealth, relation being had to population.  Quan- 
tity of wealth being given, the degree of opulence 
is therefore not directly  but i.ue,rely,  as thepc 
pulation;  i. e.  a~  thedehree of po  ~lousness-~~ 
the number of those who are to sKare in i;  the 
fewer the sharers  the larger each one's  shaie. 
Ivealth, coklered as arising at successive 
periods 'is called  income.  That portion  of  it 
~~[~~$,~~l~~~~t~~  giving 
An individual who would in an  manner em. 
ployhimself in theaccumulation ofLealth,oUght 
to Possess -  1.  Materials on which to work;  2 
Tools wherewith to work; 3.  A place in which to 
work; 1.  Necessaries for his subsistence while at 
work.  All these objects me compriseci uncier the 
name of capital. 
In the order of history  labour precdes 
tat:  from land and 1abo1;r  everything proceeds. 
But in the actual order of things there 1s always 
Some  capital already produced  which is united 
with land  and labour  in  tihe  $duction  of new 
vakiF:en  an  article of  the  pduCe  of land  or 
labour, in place of being  consumed or kept  for 
The term,  matter of  wealth,  is applicable 
in colnlnon to - 
1.  Articles or instruments of subsistence; 
2.  Instruments of defence ; 
3. Instruments of enjoyment. 
Articles of  subsistence are either of con- 
stant  or occasional use. 
Articles of cor~stant  use are - 
1. Articles of nourishme~~t  -  viz. food and 
drink,  i. e.  liquid  or solid;  the distinctio~~ 
between  which  is at their point  of  nearest 
approach undeterml~able. 
2.  Articles  serving  for the regulation  of 
temperature and  state of  the air in  respect 
of  moisture.  These are -  either lodging or 
clothing. 
3. Articles of occasional use,  are articles of 
medicine. 
The  evils to  which defence bears reference 
may be considered as having their source  in 
the Rgency  of  irrational  agents  or rational 
agents. 
Defence  against  evils  apprehended  from 
the agency  of  irrational  agents,  is  defence 
against calamities. 
Amme rational agents, those from whose 
to  their use, all articles of subsistcnre ore in- 
struments of enjoynieut likewise.  The dis- 
tinction  is, therefore, not between articles of 
subsister~ce  and instruments of  enjoyment, 
but between articles of  subsister~ce  nr~d  in- 
struments of  mere enjoyment -  viz. that by 
their application to use contril~ute  nothing to 
sulsistence  any more than to defence.t 
The practice of exchange being established, 
each  modification  of  the matter of  wealth, 
to  whichsoever of the above-mentioned  divi- 
sions it belongs,  is in virtue of that practice 
convertible  with  more  or less  facility  and 
certainty into every other.$  The richer a 
community, the Letter secured it is thereby 
against hostility and famine. 
A stock of instrume~~ts  of mere enjoyment 
presupposes,  on the part of  each individual, 
a preassured  stock of the articles of subsist- 
ence.  The stock of articles  of  bubsistence 
capable of  being produced and kept up  in a 
country, in any other view than that of  ex- 
change,  has  its limits:  it can  never extend 
much  beyond  the  stock  necessary  for  the 
subsistence of  the inhabitants -  the stock 
I of instruments of mere enjoyment is without 
agency &il is appreKerer,ded,  are either consi- 
dereil as members of the community in ques- 
tion, or not : in the first case, the defence is 
against delinquency; in the other case, wainst 
hostility. 
A modification of the matter of wealth may 
limit. 
It  is  only in respect  and in virtue of  the 
qua~~tity  of the stock of  irlstrumrnts of mere 
e~~joy~nent,  that one country can exceed  art- 
other  country in wealth.  The quantity of 
wealth is as the quantity of its instruments 
be  referred  t,o that one of the above three 
heads t,o which  it is conducive in the great- 
est degree ; -  for the same article which is 
principally  subservient to one,  may occasion- 
ally be  sul~servient  to either or both of  the 
two  others.' 
Enjoyment being in a  manner inseparable 
from the al)plication of articles of sul~sistence 
the use of  him who has made  it or caused it to 
be made, is offered in exchange  it then becomes 
an  article of commerce-  it is Aerchandise. 
In all cirilizetl  societies, a class of  persons ia 
found  who  urrhase of the  manufacturer,  that 
the  ;ay  sej  to the consumer. 
$he  whole of  the o  erations of  manufacture 
and  of  sale may  be  &scribed  by  the  general 
ternls of production and tmde. 
Thirty years after the conclusion of the seven 
$earsv waqsome ammunition brad  that had been 
aked for the Prussian army at the time of that 
war, was found in  such a state as to have been 
eatable. apieceof it  waseaten for curiosity*s  sake 
bv a pehon whom I knew.  In default of stones, 
which have sometimes for want of iron been used 
as cannon balls  this  ammunition  bread  might 
have been appikd to the purpose of defence. 
Iron is the best matenal for knives and hat- 
chets, though in Otaheite and elsewhere they are 
made of  stones.  A person whom  I knew,  once 
cut  Suffolk  his cheese.  finger  (as  he  told me)  with a piece  of 
Hammocks, articles  of sul)sistencc (or rather 
of custom.ry  luxury  not indislmsably necessary 
to subsistence, for a hussian often slceps upo,~  a 
bench,  or upon  the door,) -articles  of  subsist- 
of er~joymcnt. 
In cases wl~ere,  two articles of subsistence 
contributing in an equal degree to that end, 
one co~~tribotes  in a greater degree to  elljoy- 
ment  (as  is testified  by  the greater  price 
given fbr it,)  it may be  considered  as pos- 
sessedofa compou~~d  value, which by analysis 
may be resolved as it were into two values ; 
ence of  a middle nature between clothing  and 
lodging  are frequently applied to the purpose of 
defencebn shipboard  being stowed in such man- 
ner ax to deaden the itroke of  the shot. 
j-  Instances of instruments of' mere enjoyment 
are abundant:-  tobacco and perfumes n~ay  be 
sufficient for illustration. 
$ It  is in consequence of the interconvertibility 
above mentioned-wealth  in one shape beingcon- 
vertible into every other-that  every instrument 
of mere enjoyment is a pledp of security,  and 
that  national power, so far asdependsupon  wealth, 
is in propartion not to absolute  but only to rela- 
tire opu ence-not  to the abidute quantity of 
the matter of  wealth in a nation,  but to ~ts  ratio 
to the mass of the population.  For of the aggre- 
gate value of the aggregate mass of the matter of 
wealth in a nation,  the part dedicated to enjoy- 
ment is the only part applicable to the purpose of 
defence.  What IS necessary to subsistence must 
be applied to subsistence. or the man must starve. 
Hence the reason why  Frmce, so much superior 
to Britain, not  only in population,  but in abso- 
lute wealth, is yet Inferlor in  ower, except with 
relation to countries  so near tlat the  expense of 
invading them ntay bc more or less ciefhycd by 
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one belonging to it  in its capacity of  an ar- 
ticle of  subsistence, the  other in its capacity 
of an article of mere enjoyment.. 
It  is out of  the fund  for  enjoyment  that 
the port.ion of wealth allotted to  defence,  and 
the portion, if any, allotted to  security in re- 
spect of subsistence,  must be taken :  for out 
of the  portion allotted to  subsistence none can 
be spared. 
But though security increase in proportion 
as opulence increases,  and inequality be  an 
inseparable accompaniment of opulence,  se- 
curity does not increase in proportion as in- 
equality increases.  Take away all the ranks 
in respect of  opulence,  between the highest 
and  the lowest -  the inequality will be in- 
creased,  but t,he degree of  security will be 
diminished. 
Luxury is not only an inseparaole accom- 
paniment to  opulence,  but increases in pro- 
portion  to it.  As men  rise  one  above an. 
other in the scale of opulence, the upper one 
may, without excess, give into expenses which 
those below cannot give into without prodi- 
ga1it.y.  It  is therefore no  more desirable that 
luxury should be repressed,  than  it is that 
opulence should be repressed -  that is, that 
security should  be  diminished.  If it were 
desirable that luxury should be repressed,  it 
could be done no otherwise than either by 
depriving the more opulent  classes of  a part 
of their property in  this view,  or  coercing 
them in the use of it.  It  would be less un- 
reasonable to restrain prodigality wherever it 
is to be found.  than to restrain  the highest 
imaginable  pitch  of  luxury on  the part  of 
!hose  whose expense  does not exceed their 
income. 
The mass of  that matter which is the ma- 
terial cause of wealth, hm for its sources - 
1.  Land -  i. e.  dry land  uncovered  with 
water. 
2.  Water -  i. e.  land covered with water. 
The matter of wealth considered in respect 
of its modifications, may be distinguished,  in 
the first place,  into matter in an unimproved 
state -  in the state in which it comes out ol 
the hands  of  nature ;  and matter in an im- 
proved state, i. e.  modified by h~iman  labour, 
In the character of an article of subsistence. 
a pound of potatoes and a pound  of  pine-apple3 
may stand pretty nearly upon the same level* - 
but asingle pound of pine-apples may sell forihc 
same price as one hundred pounds of  potatoes,- 
the pound of potatoes selling fora haltpenn  and 
the pound  of  pine-apples  for one hundrethalf.  genee. This being the case, out of the hundreC 
alfpence,  which is the price and value of  thc 
pound of  pine-apples  one halfpenny goes to sub, 
sistence, and the rem)aining ninety-nlne  to merc 
enjoymenr  It is the same thing as if the half. 
penny  had  been  employed in  the purchase  ol 
another pound  of  potatoes  and the  remaininl 
ninety-nme in the  urchase'of  perfumed powdel 
for the hair, insd  of being put into the moutt 
for nouriahment 
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for the purpose of its bcing ndaptcd to what- 
ever uses it may be designed for. 
Anv distinruishable   or ti on of the matter 
' 
of w&lth  maYy  be eithkr an article of  imme- 
diate or of subservient use. 
It  is an article of immediate use, when  it 
is  itself applicable  to any one of  the three 
above-mentioned ends, viz. subsistence, secu- 
rity,  or enjoyment. 
It  is an article of  subservient  use, when, 
though it contribute to  some one or more  of 
those ends, it does so not by any immediate 
application of  its powers  to any one of the 
~bove  t,hree ends, but by the instrumentality 
of  some other article which is of  immediat.e 
use.  and which it renders.  or contributes  or 
tends to  render, subservient to that use. 
The  operations by which an increase of the 
matter of wealth  is  oroduced  or orornoted. 
may be enumerated inder the  folloiing prinl 
cipal heads,  viz. - 
1. Discovery-viz.  ofthe source of  the raw 
material, or portion of matter of wealth in an 
unimproved state. 
2.  Discovery  of  this  or  that  portion  of 
land,  considered  as the source  from  which 
portions of  matter in an  unimproved  state 
are extracted. 
3. Extraction-viz.  of the raw material from 
the portion of land which is its source. 
When an increase of wealth  to any given 
amount  takes  place,  it is either by means 
of' an increase of  labour, or witl~out  any in- 
crease. 
When it ta~es  place without any increase 
in the quantity of labour,  it takes place  by 
means of  an  increase  in  the effect,  or say, 
efficie~tcy  of the quantity of labour employed. 
The degree of efficiency in the quantity of 
Iabotlr employed being given, the increase of 
wealth produced by the labour will be as the 
qunritity of  it. 
If the  quantity of  wealth  whicn,  before 
the increase  of  efficiency,  required  a year's 
labour  of  two thousand  men,  be  now pro- 
duced  by a  year's  labour  of  one  thousand, 
there  remains  the year's  labour of  one  of 
the sets of a thousand men, which, when em- 
ployed  in the same way,  or with the same 
degree of  efficiency as that of  the first  set, 
will oroduce a fresh mass of wealth equal to 
the briginal one. 
Reducing by one-half the number of men 
employed  about an individual mass of work, 
the quantity of the work done not being  di- 
minished by such reduction,  is therefore  the 
same thing in effect as doubling the number 
of men  employed with the same  degree of 
efficiency as before. 
But  this supposes that the  number of hands 
tlius rendered unnecessary with regard to  the 
production  of  the given  quantity of work, 
are employed with the same  degree of  cffi- 
ciency,  or at any rate are employed.  If not 
CM. 11.1  ANALYTICAL 
employed at all,  no increase in the quantity 
of wealth will  be brought about by tile in- 
crease in the efficiency of the mass of labour 
which  continues to be  employed : -  if em- 
ployed, but employed with a  less degree  of 
eficiency,  then the fresh quantity of wealth 
thus produced  by  the expelled hands  will 
fail of being  equal  to the quantity produced 
by the hands  retained,  in a  degree  propor- 
tFned to the difference in the degree of e%- 
aency. 
If by means of the introduction of macbi- 
nery, or improvement in the machinery in use, 
a  manufactiirer  be  enabled  with one thou- 
sand  hands  to perform  the  same  quantity 
of work as that which  before the  improve- 
merit required two thousand hands, it might 
seem at  first sight,  from this statement, that 
the natural effect of the itnproveme~~t  would 
be the retaining  the same quantity of  hands 
employed  in  that  branch  of  mnnufactnre, 
and  thence  the doubling  the  quantity  of 
goods  manufactured in the time.  Hut with- 
out an addition to  the mass of  pecuniary ca- 
pital,  which is a circilmstance nccide~ltal  and 
 tot  belonging to the case,  the retaini~~g  of 
the same number of hantls soemployed worlld 
in no instance  be possible ;  for  the produc- 
tion and keeping up of the machinery or other 
auxiliary means would always require a con- 
siderable quantity of labour,  the payment of 
whichwot~ldbeattendedwithaproportionable 
mass of  expense,  by which  a  proportionable 
part of  the capital would be absorbed. 
If  the hands  employed on the machinery 
should be paid atahigher rate than the hands 
employed in the mantifacture, the capital be- 
ing the  same after the improvement as before, 
the number of manufacturinghands would be 
still further decreased on this account. 
Hence it follows, that increase of wealth 
11y  saving of laboiir is not so great as increase 
of wealth  by increase of quantity of laboiir ; 
ortd that, consequently, opposition to maehi- 
nery is well grounded, if no care be taken to 
provide  immediate  employment for the dis- 
charged  hands.  At first, the temporary dis- 
tress  will  outweigh  the temporary  enjoy- 
ment; but,  so far as depends on increase of 
wealth, the increase of  enjoyment is perpe- 
tual. 
The quantity  of  wealth,  or  matter  of 
wealth, existing in a community at  the eodof 
a given space of time  (say  forty years,)  will 
be as the quantity of wealth existing therein 
:it  the commencement of  the  period -plli8 
the quantity of  wealth that has come into it, 
minus the quantity that has gone out of it. 
Hence two modes of  increasing the quan- 
tity of  wealth:-1.  The direct and positive 
mode, increasir~g  the quantity that comes in; 
2.  The indirect and negative mode,  dimii~ish- 
ing the quantity that goes out. 
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Wealth has two sorirces,  to  wvl~ich  corre- 
spond  two modes of  comitig  into a commu- 
nity : -  1.  Home  production ;  2.  Importa- 
tion. 
It has in like manner two correspondent 
modes of going  out: -  1. Consumption ;  2. 
Exportation. 
In the case of importation, the increase is 
only relative,  relation being had to  the com- 
munity in question : ikportation alone  be- 
ing considered,  by so much  as the wealth 
of this community  is increased,  by so much 
is the wealth of  some other community de- 
creased. 
In the like manner,  in the case of  expor- 
tation,  the decrease is only relative :  expor- 
tation alone being considered, by so much as 
the wealth of  this community is  decreased, 
that of  some other is increased : in relation 
to  the world at  large, the quantity suffers not 
in either case any change. 
In general, import, in respect of  one por- 
tion of  wealth, does not take place,  but ex- 
port, in respect to  another and correspondent 
portion,  a portion generally regarded as being 
of equal value takes place at nearly the same 
time ;  the transfer or self-deprivation  having 
the acquisition,  for what in the language of 
English law is called its consideration, and in 
the language of general logic,  its final cause. 
But between community and community, as 
between individuals,  from  matters of fear, 
amity,  or remote  personal  interest,  it will 
sometimes happen that export from this com- 
munity shall t,ake place without a correspon- 
dent import into it from that-import  into 
this cou~~try  without export from it  into that; 
though  import into this cannot take  place 
(unless it be from spots occupied in common 
by the two,  such as tile  greater part of  the 
sea,  and  some  unappropriated  parts of  the 
land) without export from that. 
Consumption, again, takes place in either of 
two ways :-I.  Purposely,  in the way of use; 
or, 2.  Undesignedly,  in the way of deperition 
without use. 
Deperition  is either total or partial:  par- 
tial, is deterioration. 
Deperition  is in  strictness  no otherwise 
true of any portion  of matter than in as far 
as it  respects  furnl,  and value as resultingfrom 
that form-value,  i. e. siibserviency to use. 
An act whereby deperition  is produced, is 
called destruction.  An act whereby deterio- 
ration is pl.oduced, may be termed deteriora- 
tion (the word being used in the active sense) 
or endamagement. 
Acts whereby destrurtion or deterioration 
is  produced,  and thereby  loss without  pre- 
ponderant benefit,  it is the province of  tlie 
non-penal  branch of  the law to define,  and 
of the penal to prevent. 
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it  can ofily be partial in cases where decrease 
to  a greater or less amount is indispensable, 
as in case of taxes. 
Taxes may be  imposed  either to furnish 
means  for future  expenditure,  or to  afford 
compensation to  those who in times past have 
furnished the means  for expenditure whirh 
then was  future : in other words,  for grow- 
ing expenses,  or for discharge of debts. 
The amount of taxes imposed for growing 
expenses, takes from the amount of national 
wealth  in  certain ways,  and  adds to it in 
other ways,  more or less,  according  as it  is 
employed.  It  takes from the means or instru- 
ments ofenjoyment, present or future.  imme- 
diate or more or less remote,  according as it 
would have been spent, lent out, or hoarded, 
had  it not been for the tax.  It  adds to  the 
security of the whole,  in  proportion  as it is 
employed for the purpose  of  national  secu- 
tity, in the way of national defence and other- 
wise.  It  adds to  the subsistence and enjoy- 
ment of a part,  ill proportion  as it is applied 
to  those purposes,  by those among whom it 
is distributed in consideration of the services 
by which they have respectively contributed 
to  that end. 
The amount of taxes imposed in discharge 
of  debt,  of itself neither adds to nor takes 
from the mass of national wealth, but is the 
necessary result of measures of expense,  ne- 
cessury or unnecessary, avoidable or ur~avoitl- 
nble,  beneficial  or  pernicious,  by  which  in 
forrner ti111es a  decrease  in  the  mass of  na- 
tional wealth was produced.  But when, ar~d 
in so far as,  the money  produced  by these 
taxes ie  actually employed  in  discharge  of 
debt, it  adds to capital, and thereby to  grow- 
ing wealth. 
Finance is an appendix and inseparable ac- 
companiment to  political economy.  Taxes  are 
sacrifices made of wealth and opulence at the 
expenseof enjoyment, to security, in respect 
of defence, and security in respect of subsis- 
tence. 
Taxes and other means of  supply for the 
expenses of  government, -  wars with their 
taxes  and their  devastations,  are means by 
whioh,  of necessity, in a certain degree,  and 
too often beyond the extent of the necessity, 
decrease in  the amount of  wealth and popu- 
lation  is produced.  In this way the field of 
political economy il~cludes  within it the field 
ofjinance. 
A tax,  in as far as the thing taxed  is ab- 
stained from,  operates as a  prohibition-as 
a discouragement  to  that branch  of trade or 
production  to which  the thing belongs,  and 
as an encouragement to  rival branches ;  that 
is,  more or less to all other hrnnches.  IIelrce 
another head  of cor~r~cxion  between finance 
and political economy in its narrower sense. 
The same  illusion which  has  recommel~ded 
- .  .  -  - -  - 
plicatior~  of it in the most,  eficient mode, to 
any of its three uses. viz. subsistence, security, 
and enjoyment; and which not being attended 
with  preponderant  vexation,  are not to be 
expected to be performed by the spontaneous 
exertions of  individuals:  of the three con- 
ditions requisite for the production  of this or 
any other effect,  viz.  inclhation,  power, and 
hnowledye,  some one or more being wanting 
on the part of individuals.* 
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the encouragement  of  particular brunches of 
wealth as a means of  increase to the whole, 
has led to  the exaggeration  of  the bad  effect 
of taxes in this point, of view. 
Hence  the care taken by governments to 
throw the weight of taxes upon imports and 
home productions,  rather than upon exports ; 
that is, upon their own subjects, rather than 
upon foreigners. 
Under  the above heads may be reduced, 
without violence, everythir~g  that can be said 




$ 1. Sponte Acta. 
THE  national wealth is the sum of the parti- 
cular masses of the matter of wealth belorlg- 
rcspectivcly  to the several individuals oL' 
whom the political  co~nmunity -  the natioll 
-is  c.omposed.  Every atom of  that matter, 
added by any one such individuul to  11is own 
stock, without being taken from that of  ally 
other  individual,  is so much  added to tl~e 
stock of nationill wealth. 
TO  add  to his  own  particular  stock,  anct 
to add  in  each  portion  of  time  more  tl~;u~ 
by use or otherwise is taken from  it in that 
sarnc portion of  ti~nc,  is,  wit11 a very few es- 
ceptions,  the co~lstant  nil11  ancl  occupation 
of  evcry i~ldividi~;tl  in cvcry civilizctl  ~~iction. 
E~~joyn~ent  is  the oK>pring of  wealtl~, - 
wealth of labour.  Mrhat men warrt from go- 
vernment  is,  not irlcitcrnent  to labour,  I~ub 
security against disturbance  -security  to  cacll 
for his portion of the matter of wealth, while 
labouring to acquire it, or occupied in enjoy- 
ing it. 
For the purpose of  incresing wealth,  in- 
dividuals  require neither to be  forced to  la- 
bour,  nor allured.  The want of that which 
is  not to be had witliot~t  lal~our  is sufficier~t 
force:  the assurance of  being  nble to elrjoy 
it,  is  sufficient allurement.  Leave  nlen  to 
themselves : each man  is orcupied either ill 
the acq~~isition  of  wealth (the instrun~ent  of 
enjoyment,)  or ill  some  actual  er~joyrnetrt, 
which,  in  the eyes  of  the  only con~pete~~t 
judge,  is of more value.  If idleness be to  be 
discouraged,  it is not because it is the rlorl- 
acquisition of wealth,  but because  it is  the 
source of crimes. 
Whoever  takes  upon  him  to add to nn- 
tiorla1 wealth  by coercive,  and thence vexa- 
tious measures,  stands er~~aged  to  make out 
two  propositions : -  I. That more wealth \\,ill 
be produced by the coercion than would have 
been produced without it; 2.  That the com- 
fort  flowing from the extra wealth thus pro- 
'duced,  is nrore than equivule~rt  to whatever 
-- 
Exa~npleu:  Establishn~ents  for the propaga- 
tion of  knowledge.  viz. on the subject of  those 
arts on which the iugmentation  or preservation 
of the matter of wealth, in any of its shapes  de. 
oends.  In  Eneland -  1.  The Board of ~sdcul- 
vezation may be found attached to the mea- 
sure by which it was produced. 
$ 2.  Agenda. 
The application of the  matter of wealth to 
its several purposes,  in the character of an 
instrument of general  security,  is  evidently 
of  anterior  and superior importance to the 
increase of it.  But this class of operations 
belongs  to other heads -  to legislation and 
administration in gelleral -  to  the establish- 
ment of  laws  distributive  and laws penal ; 
and the institution,  collation,  and exercise of 
powers military,  fiscal,  judicial;  and of po- 
lice. 
The operations coming under the head of 
Agenda-  viz. on the part. of government, - 
may be  described as  those  which  are  con- 
ducive either to the increase of  the national 
stock of the matter of wealth.  or to the an- 
iure. 2  The ko a1  ~nstitution  .  3  The aeteri- 
nary)school;  4.  $'he  Royal ~ddlm~:  viz.  to a 
certain degree if considered in this point of view. 
In each of  these several instances, the amount 
of protit reasonably to be expected is beyond cal- 
culation; while the indiv~duals,  among whom it 
may come to be shared  are e ually out of  the 
reach of  conjecture.  0;  the o%er hand  in the 
character of a source of profit  there is ndimited 
assemblage or class of  individuals  to whom the 
establishment  of  any one  of  theie  institutions 
would at the same brne  have been practicable 
and  have afforded  a reasonable  expectation  of? 
payment for the expense. 
6.  An illustrious and more useful  example- 
because more needfd  as well as more extensive, 
than all these  ~n~lish  ones put together  sup- 
posing the execution to correspond with tie  de- 
si  n -  is afforded by the universities and other 
efucation-establishments now setting on foot in 
the Russian empire (1801.) 
6  France  on  the same supposition,  may be 
refirred to tor another. 
The justification  of the communication  from 
sea to sea through  Scotland by the Caledonian 
canal, is to be sought for in the same principles 
though the preponderance of  profit over expens; 
can scarcely be expected  to prove equally consi- 
derable.  Of the profit, part  though.to an unas- 
signable amount, will distribute itself among a 
limited, and perhaps individually assignable de- 
scription of  individuals:  other part, In  portions 
altogether unassignable, among individuals more 
clearly unassignable;  viz. among the community 
A  particular  case for  tl~e  interference of 
government in this view, is where inclitlation 
and hnowledye, both adequate to  the purpose, 
and even power  (so  far as depends  on the 
possession  of  the matter  of wealth,)  being 
pre-existent on the part of  individuals,  no- 
thing but an allotment of political power of 
an appropriate kind,  requires to be supplied 
on the part of government.  Such is the case 
where corporate powers are requisite for the 
management of a conlmon stock;  and thereby 
for enabling  individuals spontaneously asso- 
ciated for the  purpose, to  give a more effectual 
cornhination  to their exertions in the pursuit 
of a common end. 
Whenever non-agenda  have been acta, the 
doing  away of  these male acta  may form  so 
many additions to  the catalogue of agenda. 
To  this bead belong those operations which 
consist in the removal of obstructions tosponte 
acta.t 
From the catalogue of  agenda,  having for 
their object the increase of the national stock 
of the matter of wealth in all its three shapes 
together,  must  be  distinguished  any  such 
measures, the aim of which is confined to the 
increasing of  it in any one of  those shapes, 
at the expense of  either of  the two others. 
Measures of this tendency will, so far as they 
are just,ifiable,  find their justification  in the 
same  considerations  whicll  prescribe the ap- 
plication of the matter of \~edth  to its seve- 
ral uses. 
In t,liis way,  if a  sacrifire be tnadc of  the 
matter of  wealth  in the most  agreeable of 
its  shapes,  to the same  matter  in  one  or 
other  of  the two  necessary  ones -  of the 
matter of enjoyment to the matter of  subsist- 
at large.  On this sup  sition  it seems  it is that 
the expense was  divlgd between the &regate 
of  these private  purses  and the'public  purse. 
Had the profit to the local proprietor and other 
neighbouring  inhabitants been ade  uate  and a 
fund adequate to the whole expenseleen )obtain- 
able from that source, the propriet  of a contri- 
bution at  the public expense would &e  fallen to 
the ground. 
1- Examples :  1. Facilitating the conversion of 
inter-community of occupation of  land into sepa- 
rate ownersh~p. 
2.  Abolition or modification of those laws by 
which land is vested inalienably in aline  of natu- 
ral successors how much  soever by impoveriuh- 
ment  disabled  from  causing  increase,  or even 
preventing decrease  in the value of  its produce 
3.  Abolition  or  Adification  of  laws,  whic'h 
give the like perpetuity to obli  ations attachcd to 
property in land  in the case w%ere those obliga- 
tions are attend&  with greater burthen  (viz.  in 
the way of obstruction of increase,)  to the party 
on whom  they are imposed,  than pro$& to the 
party in whose favour they were imposed.  Such 
1s  the case with many of the obligations termed 
(with reference to the party favoured by them) 
feudal riotits. 
4.  ~raaual  abolition and intermediate modifi- 
cation of those personal obligations which  COW 
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ence, or tLe  matter of defence ;-if  the as- 
rumed necessity be  real,  the transformation 
belongs, by the supposition, to the catalogue 
of ageada. 
If in any nation,  for the use of the whole 
or any part of such nation, government were 
to  establish, in the  character of security funds, 
magazines of the matter of subsistence,  not 
to  be drawn up011  but in times of extraordi- 
nary scarcity,-an  institution of  this  sort 
would hardly be thought of, much less be re- 
garded as beneficial and desirable,  under the 
notion of its producir~g  a  clear  addition  to 
the aggregate mass of the national  stock  of 
the matter of wealth,  in all its shapes taken 
together.  In the  catalogue of agenda it  could 
not be placed  in any other character than as 
a sacrifice of enjoyment to  subsistence. 
If the nature of the case be such, that the 
aggregate of the security-funds laid r~p  in the 
country  in  question  by dealers,  may at all 
times be safely depended upon  as sufficient 
the establishment of  such  funds by 
ment, on its own account,  will be plainly in- 
defensible : heing pregnant with loss instead 
of gain  (as,  in  the business  of buying  and 
selling,  trust-management  will  naturallv be, 
when compared withinterested managemknt.) 
it  would disturb the operations of individual 
dealers,  and be prejudicial rather than con- 
ducive to  the end aimed  at ; -  viz. national 
security in respect of subsistence. 
If, on the other hand,  in that same coun- 
try,  seasons are continually liable to  recur in 
which the  aggregate of these private security- 
funds cannot with safety be depended upon, 
the proposition isreversed: government need 
not scruple to insure its subjects in this way, 
against loss and distress by scarcity. 
In each country the establishment of such 
security-funds is an a&rir of calculation.  For 
the meridian of England, a very considera1)le 
stock of data have already been furnished hy 
experience.  But what is  shorter than cal- 
culation,  is the reflection that the world  is 
wide,  and should the country ever  receive 
another visit from famine (a visit too  unplea- 
sent to  be thought of,) what is not to be had 
here, may perliaps be to be got elsewhere. 
In a similar manner, sacrifices may be made 
of enjoyment to ~lational  defence.  An ex- 
ample of this kind was found in the English 
navigation  act.  It operated in dimin~~tiorl, 
rather  than  in  augmentation, of the aggre. 
gate mass of the matter of wealth.  It made 
England pay rnore for freight than she would 
viz.  for a sort of nacyof  resetcc, for an extri  -01'e'ating  in this way,  anti  llot by grails 
portion of  possillr manlie force-ro~~vertiWe I  money, it made no adtlition to the general wealth  ill the way of forced frugality. 
into actual at pleasure.  The measure could 
only be deemed eligible by assutni~~g  the ne- 
cessity for the rnai~~ter~ance  of the sort of se- 
curity-fund  thns kept II~  ;  i. e.  for that part 
of the national stock of maritime skill which 
owed its production  and maintenance to this 
measure.' 
Another example may be found in the al- 
lowances in money given  for the encourage- 
ment of certain fisheries.  The  object ww the 
same as in the former case;  the mode of en- 
couragement being, not as in that case indi- 
rect, but direct,-  the money being give11 at 
the expense of national wealth,  and thence 
of national  en4joyment.  If witho~it  this en- 
courngcment the trade would not have been 
beneficial  enough to be carried on, the  quan. 
tity of  the matter of wealth  thus bestowed 
upon it was so much  taken from enjoyment 
and given to  defence, -  and thence,  if not 
necessary to defence, thrown away.  If the 
trade would have been heneficial, the result 
of the measure is, besidcs the transfer of so 
mucll of the matter of wealth from the ac- 
count of enjoyment to  the  account of defence, 
a net addition  to the quantity of the whole. 
But it is only in the supposed necessity of it 
for the purpose of dejence, that such sacrifice 
of national enjoyment can receive its  justitica- 
tion.  Take  away the necessity, thcre remains 
wealth, purchased at  the expense of justice- 
enjoyment given to one man,  at the expense 
of enjoyment taken  from  another.  A case 
conceivable,  and perhaps realized,  is -  that 
as to  part, the allowance may fall under one 
of the above suppositions;  as to  another part, 
under the other. 
9 3.  Non-Agenda. 
Whatever is not sponte ucttcm on the part 
of individuals,  falls thereby into the class of 
non-agenda on the part of government.  Co- 
ercion,  the inseparable accompaniment,  pre- 
cedent, concomitant, or s~rbsequent  of every 
act of government, is in itself an evil:  to be 
anything  better than a pure evil,  it requires 
to be followed by some more than equivalent 
good.  Spontaneous action excludes it: action 
on the part of government,  and by impulse 
from government, supposes it. 
Among non-ayenda,  therefore, must he rec- 
koned the attempting to  give birth or increase 
to this or that particular  branch of industry 
productive  of  wealth,  under  tlle notion  of 
giving an increase thereby to the aggregate 
of the national mass of wealth. 
otherwise; nnd pro tanto drove  the foreipt 
nations in question from this line of industrv 
into  some less profitable one.  This  loss, what- 
ever was the amount of it, was tlie price paid 
by  England  for  whatever  adtlition  it thus 
to its stock of  the matter of  defellce: 
Crt III.] 
.  considered  as a  of rpccial enmu- 
havinRfor  itsobject the increase of 
a&repate  mass of  wealth, it would belong to the 
head of nnn-agenda  Operatin  by discourage- 
ment applied to a rival branch of industry -via 
the same occupation  in the hands of foreimers. 
OF WEALTH. 
No kind of productive  labour of  any im- 
portance  cnn  be  carried on without  capital. 
Hence  it follou?s, that the quantity of  la- 
bour  applicable  to any object  is limited  by 
the quantity of capital which can be employed 
on it. 
If I possess a capital of ;E10,000, and two 
rpecies  of  trade,  each  yielding  twenty  per 
cent.  profit,  but  each requiring a capital of 
f  10,000 for carrying them on, are proposed to 
me, it  is clear that. 1  may carry on the one or 
the other with this profit, so long as I confine 
myself  to one ;  but that,  in carrying on the 
one,  it is not in  Iny power to carry on  tlie 
other; and that if I seek to  divide iny capital 
between them hoth,  I shall not  make  more 
than twenty per cent. ;  hut I may make less, 
and even convert my profit into a loss.  Hut 
if tliis proposition be true in the case of one 
individual, it is true for all the individuals in 
a whole  nation.  Production is therefore li- 
mited by capital. 
There is one circ~~mstance  which  demon- 
strates tliat men are not sel~sit~le  of tliis truth, 
apparently so  obvious. When they recommend 
the encourarrement of aartici~lar  branches of 
trade, they lo  not petend that they are more 
profitable than  others ;  -but  that they are 
hmr~chcs  of trade.  and they cannot  possess 
too many.  In a word, they kould eniour;lge 
trade in general,-as  if all trade did not yield 
its own reward -  as if an unprofitable  trade  - .  -  - .  . .  -  - . 
deserved to  be encooraged -'snd  as if a pro- 
fitable trade stood in need of encouragement; 
as if,  indeed, by these capricious operations, 
it wire possible  to do any other thing than 
transfer  capital  from one branch of trade to 
another. 
The quantity of capital being given,  the 
increase of  wealth will,  in  n certain  period, 
be in proportion  to  the good  employment of 
this capital -  that is to say,  of  the more or 
less advantageous direction which shall have 
been given to it. 
The advant.ageous direction of mpital de- 
pends upon two t,hings: -  I.  The choice of 
the undertaking;  2. The  choice of the means 
for earrvin~  it on. 
taking,  or the means of carrying it on, we 
shall see that the official  person, so fond of 
intermeddling in the detail of production and 
trade, is in no respect superior to the indivi- 
dr~als  he desires to  govern,  and that in most 
points he is their inferior. 
A prime minister has not so many oteasions 
for acquiring information  respecting farming 
as a farmer -respecting  distillation  as a dis- 
tiller -  respecting tlk construction of vessels 
as a shipbuilder-  respecting the sale of com- 
modities, as those who have been engaged in 
it all their lives. 
It is not probable  that he should  either 
have directetl his otterition  to these  objects 
for so long a time,  or with the same  degree 
of energy,  as those who have been urged on 
by such  powerful motives.  It is therefore 
probable, that in point of information relative 
to these  professions,  he is inferior to those 
~vho  follow them. 
If by chance a minister should become in- 
formed of any circumstance which proves the 
superior  advantage  of  a  certain  branch  of 
trade, or of a certain proccss.  it  wotild not bc 
a  reason  for employing autllority in causing 
its adopt\on.  ~iblicitj  alone would produce 
this effect:  the more real the advantage, the 
more supertluo~rs  the exercise of authority. 
To  justify  the regulatory interference  of 
government  in  the a&lirs  of  trade.  one or 
other of  these  tmo opinions  must be main- 
tained : -  that the public functio~iary  under- 
stands the  interests of individuals better than 
they do themselves;  or that  the ql~a~~tity  of 
capital in every nation being infinite,  or that 
tlie new branches of trade not requiring nny 
capital, all the wealth produced bia  new ad 
favourite  cotnmcrre is so niuch  clear gain, 
over ant1 above what would have been  pro- 
duced, if these advantages had not been con- 
ferred on this trade. 
These two opinions being contrary to the 
truth,  it follows  that the interference  of 
government is altogether erroneous-  that it 
operates  rather as an obstacle than a means 
of advancement. 
It is hurtful in another manner.  By im- 
idPti  heing well made, in connexion with the 
means  he has  of  acqt~iring  the information 
relative to  his undertaking. 
But knowledge  itself  depends in a great 
measure  upon  the degree of  interest which 
the  individual has in obtaining it :  he who pos- 
sesses the greatest interest will apply himself 
with the greatest attention and constancy to 
obtain it. 
The  interest which a man takes in the con- 
cerns of another, is never so great as he feels 
in his own. 
If we  consider everything  necessary  for 
the most  advantageous  choice of  an  under- 
--  ..-- 
The br&ability  of the best choice in both 
these respects will be  in proportion to the 
de~ree  of  interest which  the undertaker has  . . 
stroyed. 
Divide the aggrepte  mass of profit-seeking 
industry into arlv number of branches : each 
calls,  or at leasi has  an equal right  to  call 
upon  government for  encouragement -  for 
encouragement at t,he expense of  the pl~blic 
purse; that is, of a11 the other branches.  Gra- 
tify all alike, -  there is, as between them nt 
least, no injustice on the one hand, no profit 
on the other.  Gratify any number short of 
the whole -  injustice is certain-profit  quea- 
tionable.  I  The measum which  present  themselves  1  in the cl~aracter  of  non-agenda,  nlay be  dis- 
posil~g  restraints upon the actions of indivi- 
duals, it produces a feeling of uneasiness :  so 
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tinguished  into broad measures and narrow 
measures:  -broad  measures having for their 
effect,  or their object,  the augmentation of 
wealth in all its shapes without distinction : 
narrow measures having for their object the 
ar~gmentation  of wealth  by  the increase of 
profit-seeking  industry in this or that parti- 
cular branch  in preference  to others,  under 
the notion.of  its producing  more wealth in 
that than in others.  We shall proceed more 
particularly to  consider some of the measures 
which have been so employed. 
5  4.  Non-agenda -Broad  measures. 
Example 1.  Forced frugality. 
By raising money as other money is raised, 
by taxes (the amount of  which is taken by 
ir~dividuals  out of  their expenditure  on  the 
score of  maintenance,) government has it in 
its power  to accelerate to an unexampled 
degree the augmentation of the mass of  real 
wealth. 
By  a  pronortionable  sacrifice  of  present 
comiort, 'it ;lay  make any addition 'that it 
pleases to the mass of future wealth ;  that is, 
to  the increase of comfort and securitv.  But 
though it  has it in its power to do thii, it  fol- 
lows not that it. ought to  exercise this power 
-to  compel  the community to make this 
sacrifice. 
To  a  certain degree -to  a degree which 
in the ordinary course of things is quite snf- 
ficient for the  purpose, the community makes 
this sacrifice of itself.  This voluntary sacri- 
fice is, at  least in the  ordinary state  of things, 
amply sr~fficient  for the purpose -for  every 
purpose ;  and as the  impulse is spontaneous, 
so  far all is right. 
On the  othcrhand, the application of money 
raised by taxes in the shape of capital to  the 
endeavour to promote national opulence,  can 
o111v be carried into effect at the exoense of 
justice.  In  the first  place,  it operites un- 
justly by forcing a marl to labour,  though it 
were for his own benefit.  when he wishes to 
enjoy.  It  operates unjustly in the  second place, 
by forcing one man to labour for the sake of 
increasing the enjoyments of another man - 
increasing his enjoyments, or rather the stock 
of the  instruments of enjoyment in his hands; 
for all that government can do in behalf  of 
enjoyment, otherwise  than by security,  is to 
ir~crease  the quantity of the mass of instru- 
ments of  enjoyment: -  application  of theee 
ir~struments  in  such  marlrler  as to produce 
actual enjoyment, depending altogether upon 
the individual, and being an effect altogether 
out of the reach of government.. 
To  the opulence of the Prunsian empire Fre. 
cleric !he  (ireat made some real  additions,  and 
some llnaglnary ones.  The imaginary ones con- 
sisted in encouragements  given to this and that 
branch of profit-seeking  industry:  the real ones 
consisted in money given on  condition of being 
The effert of forced frugality is  procluretl 
by paying off national del~ts.  1r1 this case, the 
production  of the effect is riot only oriexc.ep- 
tionable, but necessary:  it  is a collateral re- 
sult, and that a very atlvantageous one, from 
a necessorv act of iustice. 
On the  -buying-ii  or paying-off  of the go- 
vernment annuities in which the heb~  ill Great 
Britain consists, the motley raised by taxes- 
of which the whole mass,  with a trifling ex- 
cention  or two.  bears not unon  cnaital but 
up'on  ir~come,  passes  into the hnntis of the 
expelled anntcifants;  who to make  it afford 
them an income,  as before,  must  employ it 
themselves in the shape of  capital,  or lerid it 
to  others, who will employ it in that s11ape. 
If the sum of  money paid by goverr~~neut 
to such  annuitants  or1  the  redemption  of 
their annuities  be greater than the sum  re- 
ceived by government on the  creation of those 
same annuities, the quantity of the sum'thus 
raised by forced frugality, and poured into the 
money market, receives  a  proportionable in- 
crease. 
The effect of forced  froga~ity  is also pro- 
duced by the creating of paper money by go- 
vernment,  or the suffering  the creation  of 
paper money on the part of individuals. 
employed  in  the shape  of  capital.  But to be 
given to Peter it must have been taken tiom Paul 
and his breth;en.  This he scrupled  not  to do: 
his object being -  the increase of his own power 
and hvandeur  not the preservation of  the means 
of enjoyment9in the hands of  his  subjects:  he 
was content to purchase  opulence at the expense 
of justice.  At  a similar expense  Egypt not only 
was  but  continues  to  be  enriched -enriched 
wit;  pyramids and templis. 
Yerlia  s, having placed himself  in a state of 
perpetua!  insecur~ty  by  injustice  towarda  his 
neighboun, he found himself under a sort of ne- 
cessity of increasin~  his means of security by this 
injustice towards his subjects.  On thin supposi- 
tion, the injustice consisted -  not in the taxes for 
defence, and the taxes for the production of na- 
tional  wealth  as a fund for defence.  which  the 
perpetually impending danger hid ienderetl ne- 
cessary, -  but in the wars of rapacit  by which 
the perpetually impending danger hag  been pro- 
duced. 
Among the largesses  bestowed by  the same 
monarch,  we  may tind another class which does 
not wme  under either head of reprobation.  These 
consist in money given in reparation  of damaa~e 
done by war.  Lar  esses  of this class are not only 
unexceptionable, fut  useful:  being consistent rra 
well with the interests of justice as with tho% of 
national opulence. Their utility rests on the same 
basis as thst of insuranceagainst loss by urlami. 
ties purely phynicaL 
As to he  largesses given under the notion of 
special enwuragement (encouragement to a Par- 
t~cular  branch  of trade in  preference to others ) 
though the addition  set down  as made on  this 
score by  each sum of  money so bestowed  was 
ima~nary,  yet  from that same  sum of  money 
flowed  a  real addition,  though  on  a  different 
score;  viz.  on  the score of forced frtcgality,  sa 
above explained. 
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shortness,  ~uealfh. None  may  well  be  put in 
eontrndistinction to everytKng else which 1s ever 
called wenltlb: -which  is ever considered as a 
modification of the matter of wealth :  for money 
so long as it is kept in the shape of mone  and 
in the same hands, is of no kind of use.  {A  that 
In this case, thc effect is produced by a spe- 
vies of indirect taxution, which has hitherto 
passed almost urrnoticed. 
§ 5. Non-a9enda-Br0ad  measures. 
Example 2.  Increasing money. 
Labour, and not money,  is the real source 
of wealth.  All hands  being employed,  and 
employed in the most advantageous manner, 
wealth, real wealth, could admit of  no further 
increase: -  but money would be  increasable 
ad infinitun~.' 
The effect  of  every increase  of  money 
(understand,  of the ratio of  the quantity of 
money employed  in  the purchase of  things 
vendible,  to the quantity of  things vendible 
for  money,)  is  to impose  an  unprofitable 
income  tor  upon  the incomes  of  fixed  in- 
c01nists.t 
TO  thirr head belongs theinvestigation of  the 
influence of Wney On  real wedfh -  OK  Say,  for 
shape no man can.ever make any kind of use of 
it but.by  parting with  it,  or  ot least  standing 
engagcd to part with it.  What  value it has, is in 
the way of e.rchn~cgc: value in the way of use it 
has none.  When out of that shape the materials 
are thrown into other shapes  then  indeed  they 
have their value,  but for whi)ch thc  would have 
had none in the way of exchange.  l!aper  money, 
not having in respect of its matcri;tls any value 
in the way of use, has no value but in the way of 
exchange: norin that way, but on thesu  position 
of its being capable of being exchangdfor that 
money, or an equivalent for that money, of which 
it wntaina nnd conveys the promise. 
If  on  the introduction of  the additional 
money into the  circulation,  it  passin the  first 
instance into hands which  employ it in the 
way of unproductive expenditure,$  the suf- 
fering from  this tax remains  altogether un- 
compensated:-if  before  it come  into any 
hands of  that description,  it have come into 
hands by which it has been  employed in the 
shape of capita1,l) the sufferingby the income 
tax is partly reduced and partly compensated. 
It is reduced, by the mass of things vendible 
produced by means of it  :-a  mass,  by the 
amor~nt  of  which, were it not for the corre- 
spondent increase in the mass of  money, the 
value of  the mass of  money woulcl pro  tanto 
have been increased,  and the prices of things 
vendible decreased.  It  is in a certain degree, 
though in a very inadequate degree, compen- 
sated for$ by the same means;-  viz. by the 
amount of the addition made to the quantity 
of  sensible wealth -  of  wealth  possessing a 
value in  the wav of  use.qT  Here,  as in the 
above case of forGed frugal&y, natidnal wealth 
is increased at the expense of  national com- 
fort and national justice. 
011 those who receive no share of the  fresh 
addition to money -  on those whose sole in- 
come co~~sists  in an unincreasing sum of  mo- 
ney,  the income tax hears with dl  its pres- 
sure; whilst  those who receive  a  share of 
the fresh money equal to the amount of the 
depreciation,  receive beforehand a  compen- 
sation adequate  (in  money at least,  howso- 
ever it  may be in regard to  feelings) to their 
loss by the indirect tax. 
In  this case, the measure coincides with the 
one already reprobated,-  the increasing the 
mass of real capital by money raised by taxes. 
,  The  difference is, that the laode in which the  + The  following isan indication of  theindirect 
incometaxresaltingfrom increaseof money :- In 
Britain (anno 1l!01) moneyis about g72,000 000. 
income about f?lti,000,000-(72  :  216 :  :  i:  3.j 
-Each  n~illion  added to money,  adds there- 
fore  three  millions  for  ever  to pecuniary  in- 
come.  and  this  (setting  aside the 15 per  cent 
for e;fr  2150 000) for protit on  the million  if 
employeh in tie  sha  e of capital) without acldi- 
tion to real income.  !fin  every year, £2,000,000 
be added to money (plus f  300,000 for an equiva- 
lent to the addition made as above to real wealth) 
in 36 years  (anno  1837) the nominal  or pecu. 
niary amount of a mass of real income equal  to 
the amount of  1801,  will be doubled,  i. e.  be- 
come  f  479 000,000:  to which  will  be  added 
~IO,UOU,~$  for an e uivalent to the intermediate 
addition to real wedth (f  300,000 x 36.)  Rut 
the f  432,000,000  of  1837 being worth  no more 
than the ~2l6,000,000  of 1801, each £100  of the 
f432,000.000  will  be  worth  but  &SO  of  the 
L216,000,000;  that is, the income of  each $xed 
incomist will by that time have been subjected to 
anindirect income tax off 50 percent.  He whose 
yeeuniafr income in 1837 is double what it ib in 
801  WI 1  in point of wealth be neither a gainer 
nor ;  loser  by the chan  e.  Not so in  point of 
con  mt  For by m mu%  as he is a  piner in 
weaih in the one way.  by BO much he u  a loser 
in the other :  and by the nature and constitution 
of  the  human  frame,  sum for sum,  enjoyment 
from pin  is never equal to suffering from loss. 
$ As if  a proprietor of n  mine of  old or sil. 
ver  living solely on the inwme gielfed  to him 
fro;  his mine,  and spendin  his whole income 
as income is spent by "on-la%ouring hands, weri 
to receive an increase  of  such  his rent in the 
shape of gold  or silver ready coined  and spend 
the whole of  it as before. -  or as If a govem- 
ment should  issue  paper &oney in discharge of 
its debts,  or for defraying  the consumptive part 
of its expenditure. 
(1 As rn the case of paper  money issued by a 
banker to a borrowing  customer,  agricultumt, 
miner,  fisher,  manufacturer, or merchant,  to be 
employed in trade, &c. 
§ The compensation, beaides being inadequate 
in quantity, is in its a  plication unconformable 
to justice,  being shard  in  larqer proportion  by 
the mercantile man,  or whose bm$tthe  tax has 
been imposed, than dy the public on whom it has 
been imposed. 
T/ Money, inasmuch as while it remains in the 
same hands it possesses not any value in the WRY 
of physical use,  has noother value than what at 
the instant of ib  pusing from hand to hand it 
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money is raised  is disadvantageous  to a de- 
pee  of  usuriousness  much  beyond anything 
ever  exemplified  under  that  name; -  the 
money being raised at an interest of  300 per 
cent.,  payable  for ever by the possessors of 
fixed incomes -  subject  to  a  small  deduc- 
tion as an eqclivalent for the goods produced 
in  each  year  by  the  addition  made  to the 
mass of real capital. 
No sooner,  however, does such additional 
sum of money  pass  on  from  the hands  by 
which it is employed in the shape of capital 
into those hands by  which it is employed ii 
adding to unproductive expenditure, than its 
operation in the way of  making an addition 
to real wealth is at an end.  No sooner does 
it  go in addition  to money employed  in  the 
purchase of articles for consumption, thanits 
power of producing an addition  to  the mass 
of the matter of real wealth is at  an end : - 
thenceforward and  for ever it keeps on con- 
tributing by its whole amount to  the increase 
of prices,  in the same manner as if from the 
mines  it had come in the first instance into 
an unproductive hand,withoutpassingthrough 
any productive one. 
In all cases where the addition thus made 
to wealth is not illusory in toto, it is so as to 
part,  and  that  by far  the greater  part.  Of 
the proportion  between  the illusory and the 
real  part  of  the supposed  addition  to real 
wealth,  the rise of prices in a country where 
no fresh money has been poured  into unpro- 
ductive hands,  without first passing through 
a productive hand, is at once ademonstration 
and a measure.  SO  much of the added wealth 
as bath not been  accompanied by a  counter- 
vailing addition to wealth, whether  it have 
contributed anything to that addition or no, 
is over and above that portion which has been 
so!ely  employed  in  producing  the  rise  of 
prrces. 
Supposing that within the last half century, 
in  the  whole  commercial  world  together, 
wealth hasreceivedan increase to  the amount 
of  one-fourth,  and  at the  same time prices 
havedoubled, -it  follows, that of the money 
now existing in that world,  nearly  half  has 
to  a certainty been worse than thrown away, 
having been  employed  in  the imposition of 
the unproductive income tax above described':  -  and as to the addition to wealth,  it is a 
matter  of  uncertainty what part,  and  even 
whether any part, has been  produced by the 
addition  to money,  since without any such 
addition it might have been produced as well 
as by it. 
In respect of the ratio of money to things 
vendible -  of  the aggregate  of  the one,  to 
the aggregate of  the other, -  the  state of' 
thine most desirable is -  that it  sllould toll- 
tinue the same at all times -  no increase  at 
any one time,  no decrease at any 
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The telldency of a decrease, if:  sudden, and 
to  a certair~  degree considerable, is to produce 
general  bankruptcy : the mass of  pecur~iarv 
engagements  entered into within any give6 
periodof time, beinggroundedofcaurse on the 
existing 'ratio of  money to  things yendible at 
that time,  and not on the supposed suddenly 
supervening,  or any inferior ratio.  If at  any 
time,  the mass of things vendible  not being 
irl the same proportion  decreased,  out of the 
quantity of  money of all  kinds habitually in 
circulation  a portion of nny sort, in the sup. 
posed degiee considerable, be suddenly defal- 
cated,  the deficiency  must  be  supplied  by 
some portion of another  sort,  or something 
that will be accepted asequivalent, orthesup- 
posed general bankruptcy follows of course.' 
The tendency of  the like decrease,  ill  so 
far as it  is permanent,  but too gradual to be 
productive  of  general  bankruptcy,  is -  to 
impose an unproductive income tax,  parallel 
to  that above mentioned, but upon a hfferent 
set of parties -  upon all parties charged with 
annuities,  or other fixed  payments,  on  the 
ground of contracts to  which it is not in their 
power to put an end. 
As to an increase in the ratio of money to 
things vendible, the tendency of it  in respect 
of the unprofitable  ir~come  tax,  by increase 
of  prices  of  things  vendible-by  deprecia- 
tion of  money -  has been shown above. 
So far as addition to money is made in the 
shape of metallic  money,  the mischief pro- 
ducible by it is coniined  to that of  the de- 
preciation,  as above.  So far as  it is  made 
in the shape of  paper money -  consisting in 
promises of metallic money -  the amount of 
which promises is accordingly exigible in the 
shape of metallic money, -  to  the actual mis- 
chief of depreciation,  is superadded the con- 
tingent mischief of  general bankruptcy.  ' 
When governments add to money by paper 
money,  it is commonly in a non-commercial 
way:  when  individuals,  singly,  or in asso- 
aatlon, make the like  addition,  it is most 
commonly in  a  commercial way ;- though, 
in a non-commercial way,  it is natural  that 
these coiners of money at the public expense 
-these  uncommissioned sovereigns, or un- 
punishable  and  irreproachable  robbers  (for 
they may be  called  both  or either,)  should 
put off as much of it as they can get anybody 
to take. 
Whether by governments or individuals, it 
may now be seen at what expense the profit 
is acquired,  and at  how much cheaper a rate 
the  end, whatever  it  be,  would  be  accom- 
plished without any such  addition by money 
drawn out of the old stock. 
This is what  governments  mnsider* 
when  enkge  make payments  money 
in lar  e marsea  at once to governments or indi- 
vidu%  in foreign muntriea. 
$ 6.  Nos-agenda -Broad  measures. 
Example 3.  Forced reduction of the rate of 
LsYdeclining>s well as  the most 
accelerating and agpavating the decline.' 
The  mischief that would be produced by a  interest.  -  -- - .  .  -  - -  - 
Of reducing the rate of interest allowed to 
bs  .given by individuals for money borrowed 
of ~ndividuals.  the principal mischief consists 
in another s&t of  unproductive income tax 
imposed upon all  such individuals whose in: 
come arises out of  a mass of money lent out 
at interest to individuals ; -  the produce of 
wbich tax, instead of being paid in to  the pub- 
lic treasury  for the service of the public, and 
in lieu of the burthen which would otherwise 
be to  he imposed to the same amount in some 
other shape, is made over gratisto  those whose 
circumstances oblige them to  borrow money, 
or enable them to borrow it with a profit. 
It  imposes not, as in the former case, an in- 
direct unproductive  income tax,  but a direct 
one.  It  is not, as in the case of the increase of 
money, gradual, andinits amountinsomemea- 
sure uncertain and questionable,  but sudden 
and determinate.  Rediiction  from 5 to 4 per 
cent. woiildbe atax of exactly 4s. in the pound. 
As to the effect  in  the way intended,  it 
would be purely illusory.  To  the proportion 
of  money employed in the shape of capital it 
would make  no addition :  if  by impoverish- 
ment it. forced some  who,  by  anterior  opu- 
lence, had been either withholden from trade 
or withdrawn from it,  to embark in trade so 
much capital as they thus embarked in a trade 
of their own,  so much would they withdraw 
from  the  trade  of  those  other  traders,  to 
whom otherwise it  would have been lent. 
Instead  of  adding  to,  it would  defalcate 
from the aggregate mass of wealth.  Being a 
tax on  money,  lent in  the shape  of  capital 
within  the country,  it would  in effect  be a 
prohibition-  prohibiting the  keepingit there, 
andunderapenalty equal to  the amount of the 
tax.  ~t would have the effect of a bounty  on 
the exportation of it-onthe  exportationof it 
toany country where any rateofinteresthigher 
than the reduced rate would be to  be had. 
The expectation that the reduction of  in- 
tenst lvould produce  an  addition  to  the ag- 
gregate mass of  wealth,  is an illusion which 
has its source in another illasion.  Increase of 
wealth,  though  not the effect,  is apt to be 
an accompaniment of a reduction in the rate 
of  interest.  As capital increases, wealth in- 
creases ;  -and  as capital increases, if the ef- 
fectual  demand for capital (for money in the 
shape of capital) do not  increase in so 
a pmportion, men rill  not give so high a price 
for the use  it as they did before.  The re- 
duction in this case is the result of fieedoni; 
and though it  do not itself increase wealth, it 
cannot take place any further than as w5alt.h 
is inueaKd  by other  ~h~ reduc.ion 
here contended against is the product of coer- 
cion :  and whenever  the illusion prevails, -it 
reduction in the rate of lawful in'terest, is o;er 
and above the constant mischief produced by 
the fixation of that rate. 
$ 7.  Rates $interest-  evi'r  ?ffxation' 
If  it be reasonable  for legslators to en- 
courage  inventive  industry  by  fictitious re- 
wards,  it  is much more reasonable that they 
should not oppose  obstacles  to  the ~roduc- 
tiveness of natural rewards. 
The natural reward  of  inventions,  when 
carried into effect, is the ~rofit  to  be derived 
from them in the way of trade.  But all trade 
requires capital.  If  the inventor have it of 
his own,  it is well ;  if not,  he must seek it 
from others.  Many circumstances,  however, 
conspire to hinder his obtaining it. 
Does he endeavour to  borrow it, upon what 
conditions  can  he hope  to find  a  lender ? 
Upon the ordinary conditions,  it  is natorally 
impossible  that he should find  one.  A new 
undertaking cannot failof being hazardous, if 
it were only because it is new.  It  is  therefore 
necessary to grant to  the lender an adva~~tage 
proportionate to the apparent degree of risk. 
Thereare two methods ofgranting this advan- 
tage :  the English laws proscribe them both. 
One method consists in granting bterest at  8 
rate superior to the ordir~ary  rate:  but this is 
prohibited by the laws fixing the rate of  inte- 
rest.  This prohibition  is partly inefficecious, 
and partly pernicious ;  that it was altogether 
useless, would be its greatest e1ogium.t 
The second method consists in granting a 
variable interest,  proportioned  to  the protits 
of the undertaking.1 
In Ireland,  in 1788 or thereabouts, the re- 
duction of  the rate of  interest from 6 to 5 per 
was propsed in  a  of 
$$$~fa~~'$~~~\~~$~$~p,"f:~  :yh% 
6'  The Defence of  Usury,"  which I 
sent over ~t the time  contributed to throw out 
the measure, as ~arn;ll, then Chancellor of  the 
Exchequer,ver~  good-humouredly acknowledged 
'OT;or  the  of  these positions, the reader 
is refendtoRI.Bentham'sT  a*  66 ~cf~~~~f  ,ysusy, 
8houringtkimpo~icyoft~  legal  upon 
pecuniarybasgaim."  In~onsistenc~isthenatural 
companion of  laws dictated by narrow views:  it 
it is lawful t~lendorb~rr~w  at any rate of interest 
in maritime enterprises. as if thepretended dan- 
and pretendcd ab'sq  which render he.in* 
efinable evil named usury so  much the ob:ect 
of dread, could only exist upon dry land, and de- 
pended upon the solidity or fluidityof the element 
upon wh~d  the enterprises were carried on. 
+ In England  a eapitaliat cannot emplo  any 
posion, of  hi8 APital in  trade,  without  zeiring 
~~$~~~e~~~~~;~~($~~~~~~~;  rTEi 
ill  not  sLatute law  to  rhls erect,  but it is raid to 
may be carried illto effect at any time, in the I  be a rule of  common law. 48  MANUAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY.  [CH. 111. 
of lottery,  which promised-to yield them an 
interest above the ordinary rate.  The most 
elevated classes might find an amusernent in 
clesccntlina  illto tlte  territories  of  ittdustrv. 
111 France, there is one branch of commerce 
at  least,  in which it is possible  to  limit the 
portion of property that one is willing to  risk. 
It is in the business  of  banking.  The sum 
employed in this manner is said to  be en com- 
tnandite. If this liberty be useful in this branch 
of commerce, why should it not be equally so 
in every other, and especially in newly-dis- 
covered branches, which have so  many natural 
obstacles to  overcome,  which it  is needless to 
increase by legal interference ?  This liberty, 
under  certain restrictions for the prevention 
of monopolies from the unrestrained accumu- 
lation of capital,  has been established in Ire- 
land.  When will England  bave the wisdom 
to  imitate this example ? + 
An  inventor,  therefore,  in want of  funds 
can only apply to  a tradesman or merchant to 
enter into partnership with him ;  but persons 
engaged in business are those who have the 
least portion of disposable capital; and as they 
are enabled to  make their own terms, inven- 
tive industry is often stifled or oppressed. 
Were it  lawful for every one to engage in 
commercial undertakingsfor a limited amount, 
how many facilities would be afforded to  men 
of genius ! All  classes of society would fur- 
nish assistance to  inventive  industry:  those 
who wished to risk only a small sum -those 
who could annually dispose of a certain sum, 
woultl be  cnahled to cngnge in  this species 
and therevstaking a small part of that wealth 
which they risk upon games of chance.  The 
spirit of gaming, diverted from its pernicious 
direction,  might serve to  increase the produc- 
tive energy of commerce and art. 
There are some who are natural enemies 
to merit  of  every kind : every conquest  a- 
chieved  by industry in the career of  inve~r- 
;tion, is a loss  to them-  every discovery an 
Injury.  Co~nmon-place  men have a common 
interest, which they  understand but too  well: 
it  is,  that all should  be  common-place  like 
It is not only that he may prevent prodi- 
gals from obtaining money,  but that he may 
prevent its reaching the hands of  projectors, 
whom he places with them upon the  same  level, 
that he approves of the  fixing of  the rate of 
interest upon the  footing upon which he found 
it.  If  the legal  rate of interest in Great 
Britain, for example,  were fixed  so high as 
8 or  10 per  cent.,  the greater  part of  the 
money which was to  be lent, would be lent 
to  prodigals and projectors,  who alone would 
be willing to  give this high interest.  Sober 
people, who will give for the use  of money 
no more than a  part of what they are likely 
to make by the use of  it, would not venture 
into  the contpetition.  A  great  part of the 
capital of the country would thus be kept out 
of the hands which were most likely to  make 
a profitable and advantageous use of  it,  ar~d 
throw11 into those which were most likely to 
waste and destroy it.  Where the legal rate 
of  interest,  on  the contrary,  is fixed but a 
very  little above the  lowest  market rate, 
sober people are universally  preferred as bor- 
rowers, to prodigals and projectors.  The per- 
son who  lends  money  gets  nearly as much 
interest from the former as he dares to  take 
from the latter, and his money is much safec 
in the hands of the one set of people, than i~t 
those ofthe otl~cr."t 
l'l~is  is rtot the onlv oassare in which this 
themselves.  It  is to  be regretted chat Adam 
Smith. in his 66 Wealth of Nations."-a  work I 
which-will rise  in public estimation  in  pro- 
portion as genius shall be  held in honour - 
should bave furnished arms which the adver- 
saries of genius may direct against that work 
itself.  It is to be regretted that,  under the 
odious name of  projects,  a  name applied to 
the most useful enterprises, even to  the mo- 
ment when they receive the sanction of suc- 
author attacks proje&rs  (sie b.  i. ch. iv. ;) 
but it is here that he attack  them more di- 
rectly ; whilst  11s to  prorlignfs,  it hns  bcrn 
rlscwl~cre  sltow~t  tltat it iS'110t to them that 
money is lent, or that any are willing to lend 
at extraordinarv interest.  Friends will either 
not lend  at all;  or will  lend at the ordinary 
rate.  Strangers will only lend, to those who 
are witlrout  intlt~stry,  upon  security.  But 
he who has security to offer,  has no need to 
give a  halfpenrly more,  because  he is a pro- 
digal : it  is upon his security that the ntoney 
will  be  lent,  and  not  upon  his  character. 
Whether the security offered  be  present  or 
future,  certain  or contingent,  produces  no 
difference : a  future or contingent security, 
by means of a valuation,  becomes  as good a 
pledge as if it were present or certain.  In a 
word, if money be lent upon the industry of 
the borrower,  it is  lent not to a  prodigal, 
but to  a projector.  It is therefore upon the 
latter class alone,  that the burthen of these 
prohibitory laws presses. 
An  opinion which derives all its force from 
the authority of the individual who pnblishes 
it.  cannot be better  combated than bv that 
- -.-  -- 
a This has been  panidy  accomplishd  by  6s  bee;  not only ia an uninterruitG,  but 
117.  Iv. bi  iicL  13.  elnmri  the I  in an accelerated state of increase ; -  2.  The 
cess, they may there be seen indiscriminately 
stamped with the seal of opprobrium, and in- 
tliscrimirtntely  enveloped with contempt. 
crown to limit bi  ihe responsidilitjbf the 
p"i~ners  of trading companies. -  Ed.  1  + Wealth of  Nations, b.  ii. ch. 4. 
---- -. -, 
a"thority  itself. 
1.  The  prosperity of England has been pro- 
gressive. ever since the number of oroiectors 
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aggregate  of the good  economy has  always  useful  projectors.  I  do not  say that they 
been greater than the agaregate of  the bad; 1 drive away all : had  that been the case. re 
-3.  with respect to  commerce,  each indivi- 
dual is a  better judge of  his own interests 
than  government  can  be for hirn ; -  and 4. 
General laws must be much more defective 
with respect to  commercial regulations.  The 
members of a government may take notice of 
particular cases,  but general laws can never 
regard them. 
These are the general  propositions of  the 
work of Adam Smith ; -  truths precious and 
irrefragable,  which no one has more success- 
fully laboured to unfold than this illustrious 
politician.  But if these principles are  followed 
out,  no laws ought to  exist for the restraint 
of  projectors,  and for preventing them from 
obtaining  loans of  the capital of  which they 
stand in need. 
The censure  which condemns projectors, 
falls upon every species of new industry.  It 
is a general attack upon the improvement of 
the arts and sciences.  Everything which is 
routine to-(lay was originally aproject;*  every 
manufacture.  how old soever it mav be,  was 
once new; and when new, it was tge  produc- 
tion of  that  mischievous  and bold race who 
ought to  be destroyed-therace  of projectors! 
1 know not whnt cnn  bc  replied  to this, 
unless it be said that the past  projects have 
been useful,  but that all future projects will 
not be so.  Such an assertiolr would, however, 
rcnuirc nroof.  strong ill proportion  to  its on- 
should not have attained our present degree 
of  prosperity.  But they drive away a part: 
unhappily,  we cannot know what part,  nor 
how great a part of their numher.  The  talent 
requi;ed  for operating upon matter, or direct- 
ing the powers of  nature, is extremely diffe. 
rent from that required for aperatingupon the 
mind -  the talent of  meditating in a study, 
and thereby making  discoveries,  from that 
requisite for making known those discoveries 
to  the world.  The chance of success in the 
career  of invention  is in proportion  to the 
talent of the individual; the  chance of obtain. 
ing a loan of capital from another  to  make an 
invention productive,  is in proportion  to his 
reputation.  But this latter,  far from  being 
in direct,  is naturally in inverse  proportion 
with the former.  The  more unaccustomed an 
individual is to society, the greater his dread 
of  mingling in it, the less is be at  his ease - 
the less  is  he master of his  faculties,  when 
he is obliged to mingle with it.  The effect 
I produced  upon  the mind  of  the individual 
who has, or'who  supposes that he has, made 
a great discovery,  is s mixture of  pride  and 
timidity, both which feelings concur in aliena- 
ting the minds of men,  and  clirninishing  the 
probability of success in every enterprise, in- 
asmuch as it may depend upon the degree in 
which such individual  succeeds  in rendering 
hirnself and his nroiccts estirn:tblc  in tlte eves 
T  us. 
iiitiorl'to general opinion.  111 every career,  of  others.   his' phde has for its cause the 
experience is considered as worth something.  superiority which he believes himself to pos- 
The warning to be derived from past failures 1 sess above them ;  this tirniditv is  caused  by 
may contribite to future security,  if not to 
~uccess. 
Were it even proved that  no projector ever 
engaged in a new branch of industry without 
being ruined,  it would not be proper to  con- 
clude that the spirit of invention and of  pro- 
jects ought to  be discouraged.  Each projec- 
tor,  in ruining  himself,  may have opened a 
new path, by which others may have attained 
to wealth.  So  soon as a new die, more bril- 
liant or more economical than the old ones, tr 
new machine,  or a  new practice in agricul- 
ture,-has  been discovered, a thousand dyers, 
ten thousand mechanicians,  a hundred thou- 
sand agriculturists, mav reap the  benefit :  and 
then -  though the ori'ginal autl~or  of the in- 
vention have been ruined in the bringing the 
discovery to perfection -  as it  respects the 
nationnl wealth, of what consequence is this, 
when considered as tbe price of so  much gain? 
That restrictions of this nature are ineffi- 
cacious, bas been successfully shown by Adam 
Smith himself."  But if inefficaciolls,  this is 
snfficient reason for their condemnation :  un- 
less they effect the purpose  designed,  they 
are positively mischievous. 
They tend, in the first place, todrive Rway 
See br i, ch.  ix. 
the faint hope he possesses 02  making them 
sensible  of  this  superiority.  Uot  though 
pride united with courage is one of the most 
powerful  means  of  subjugating  men,  pride 
united with timidity is one of  the  most cer- 
tain causes of exposure to  their aversion and 
contempt.  That disposition,  which  under 
the name of modesty is so much  praised  as 
a comparrion well adapted to the  introduction 
of true merit, and which is so necessary when 
inferiority of situation will not allow the em- 
ployment of  boldness  in the service,  is not 
true timidity,  but skill which  has  learnt  to 
assume this appearance ;  it is skill, which to 
strength, and consciousness of that strength, 
unites the  knowledge of when, and how, and 
in what sense, and in what  proportion,  this 
strength ought to be displayed,  for the most 
favourable exhibition of  its pretensions; and 
when, and how, and in what sense,  it  ought 
to be hidden, that the protector whose assist- 
ance is desired,  may enjoy the feeling of  his 
own superiority.  If ever timidity has effected 
anything  at the expense  of  that assurance 
which  assumes  its appearance,  it has  been 
when allied with beauty, whirh causes every- 
thing to  be forgiven,  and which nothing can 
resist.  Separated f~om  this powerful probee- 52  MANUAL  OF POLITICAL  ECONOMY.  [Cu.  111. 
obtaining their assistance.  In effect, it is true 
that the whole  work would be a  collection 
of  more  or less approved  counsels;  but  in 
making the recapitulation, some general re- 
marks might be added, which would not have 
been snitrl~le  elsewhere, hut which might be 
particularly  useful here.  They might,  for 
example, be advised to  apply to  those learned 
i~~divitloals  who would be able to  supply their 
ignorance; the  class of learnedmen who ought 
to  be  found competent judges in eacb depart- 
ment might be pointed out ;  instructionsmight 
be firrnishrd,  tn  enablc them to  jndge of the 
co~~nscls  of the  judges tl~emselves,  by warning 
them of  the interests and prejudices,  to the 
srtluction of  which  these judges  may thcm- 
selves be exposed. 
Whcn nn excess of population in relation 
to  territory exists or is foreseen, colonization 
is a very proper measure.  As a means of in- 
creasinq the general wealth of  a country, or 
ofincrkasing the revenue of the mother-coun- 
try,  it is a very improper  measure.  All the 
common ideas up011  this subject are founded 
in illusions. 
That colonies atld to the general wealth of 
the worltl, is what cannot be do~tbted  ;  for if 
labo~ir  be necessnry to production,  Imd is no 
less so.  The soil also of  many colonies,  in- 
dependently of what it annually produces,  is 
rich in raw materials,  which only require that 
they should be extractcd and carried away, 
to  give tlicrn val~~e.  But this wealth belongs 
to the colonists -  to tl~ose  who occupy the 
land, and not to the mother country. 
§ 8. N~~-~Y~~~~  -~~Oad  1  When first established.  colonies are it  in 
Exaunple 4.  Increasinglnnd -  viz. by cola.  a condition to  pay taxes :  in the  end, they will 
nizi~tion.  I  not pay them.  In order to  estal~lish  them- 
Lnnd  is worth  nothing, but in  proportion 
as labor~r  is applietl to  it.  Land at a distance 
is worth less than land at  home, by the  amount 
of all the distance.  Of the mass of labour 
which is en~nloved  in  addine to real wealth. 
no inconsid&ab\c  portion is  employed in less: 
ening the expense of carriage -in  recli~cing 
the  expense of carriage from a great distance, 
to  a  level with the expense of carriage from 
n less distance.  If it could be done without 
destruction to existing capital,  and above all 
without vexation, and destr~~ction  of security 
of  propcrty,  wealt,h might  he  increased  by 
takina  the  existinn  ~opulation,  and  trans- 
to proiect them -  to keep them in depend- 
ence,  expense i-3  required ; -  and  all  these 
expenses must be discharged by taxes levied 
upon the mother-country. 
Colonization  requires  an  immedinte  ex- 
pense -  an actual lbss of wealth,  for afuttrre 
profit -for  a contit~grnt  gain.  The capital 
which  is carried nwny for the improvement 
of  the land in the colonies,  h:~d  it been  em- 
ployed  in the  mother-country,  would  have 
added  to its increasing wealth,  as  well as 
to its population,  and to the means of  its 
defence;  whilst,  as  to the produce  of  the 
colonies,  only a  smull part ever reaches the 
plantrng it from gr&t'ermdistances with refer-  mother-country. 
once to  the metrooolis.  to  lesser distances.  I  If  colonization  be a folly when  employed  .  . 
Land newly acquired,  especially in the  way 
of colonization,  is acquired at a greater dis- 
tance.  Tire foundation of a colony is  an in- 
trocluctory  expense, -  the government  of  it 
n  rontinual standing expense, -  war for the 
defence of it an occasional one.  All this re- 
quires nroney :  and money is not to be had 
for  these  expenses but from taxes.  To  the 
mother-country,  the positive  profit  from  a 
colony is equal to 0 ;  the negative profit, the 
loss-the  defalcation from national wealth- 
is equal to  the amount of such taxes." 
When  at the expense of a  war which  has 
cost a hunJred millions  of money, ar~d  in which 
a hundred thousand lives  have  been sacrificed, 
England has got a new colony -whatever  For- 
tion  of wealth in  the shape o/ capital in  trans- 
ferred to  the new spot, the Englishman considen 
atl crecctcd  For a  fcw negrctive hunclred thou- 
sands a-year  he looks u  n the positive hundre 
millions mwkll bestowe800n  the strength of th~s 
negative increase in  opulence  the Englishman 
increases in insolence.  the ~e;man  envies him ; 
the Frenchman would devour him ;-and  thus 
it is that wars are never to have an end. 
It ia  true,  that  b. the export of  capital,  a 
check is applied  to tie virtual income tax in]- 
posed  upon  fixed  incomists  by  the  recluctiou 
etftcted m the rate of interest by the continually 
as  a means of  erlrichment,- it is at least- an 
ngreeable folly.  New enjoyments, insomuch 
as enjoyments depend upon the novelt,y and 
variety of  objects, result from it.  The ~111- 
stitution of  sugar for honey -  of tea, coffee, 
and chocolate, for the beer and  meat which 
composed  the breakfast  of  maids  of  honour 
in the reign of Elizabeth -  the indigo \vhich 
varies our  dyes-the  cochineal which  fur- 
nishes the  most brilliant scarlet -  the maho- 
gany which ornaments our apartments -  the 
vessels of gold and silver which decorate our 
tables, -are  allsourcesof enjoyment, and the 
pleasure  which  results from these objects of 
luxury is in part the profit  of  colonization ; 
whilst  the  medicinal  and  nutritive  plants 
which have been received from the  colonies, 
in particular bark and potatoes, are possessed 
of IIIUC~I  supcrior utility. 
Novelty and variety,  in respect  of means 
of enjoyment, add nothing to  the quantity of 
wealth,  \\.hich  remains as it was,  ~f the old 
- 
increasing ratio of that part of the mass of money 
which is employed in the shape of  cn  itnl, to the 
ren>aintler which is employed in the 8!ape  of ex- 
penctitttre of  income, but this is a good which is 
effected without being intended  to be done. 
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productions are supplanted  by the new ones. 
It  is thus also with new fruits,  new flowers, 
new colours,  new clothes,  new furniture,  if 
the new supplant the old.  But as novelty and 
variety ere sources of pleasure, in proportion 
as they are increased,  wealth increases also, 
if  not in quantity, at least in value.  And if 
these new wants are incentives to  new labour, 
a positive increase of real wealth results from 
them. 
These advantages,  such us tbey are,  can 
only be  derived from  a  colony situated  in a 
climate whose  productions  cannot  be  natu- 
ralized in the mother-country ;  cvhilst,  as to 
the mi~~es  of  Mexico and Potosi, their effect 
has  been  to add  to the quantity of  vessels 
composed of  the precious metals, and to the 
quantity of coin.  The addition to the vessels 
increases the amount of real wealth -the  ad- 
dition to the coin has all been lost: the new 
mass of gold and silver has had no other effect 
t11a11  to  depreciate the old,  and to diminish, 
in the same proportion,  the value of all pecu- 
niary revenues,  without adding to  the amount 
of real capital or future wealth. 
However.  in takinr all  interests into the  ---  -  - 
calculation,' it is cert;iiri  that the welfare of 
mankind has been increased by the estal~lish- 
anent of color~ies.  There can be no doubt on 
this .subject,  in rcspcc,t  to the nations who 
by  degrees  have become  established  there, 
and who owe their existence to  colonization. 
The mother-countries also  have  themselves 
pined in happiness in mother point of view. 
Let us take England, for example.  According 
to the progress which  population has  made 
during the last century, it may be supposed 
that it  would soon have attained its extreme 
limits -  thnt is to  say,  that it would  have 
exceeded the ordinary means of subsistenre, 
if  the superabundance had not found  means 
of discharging itself in these new countries. 
But a long time before population has reached 
these limits. there will be a creat diminution 
of  relative bpulence,  a painLl feeling of  ge- 
11cra1  poverty  and distress, a superabundance 
of men in all the laborious classes, and a mis- 
chievous rivalry in offering their labour at  the 
lowest price. 
For the benefit of  mankind. at large,  it is 
desirable that the offsets which are to  be em- 
ployed as new plants  should  be taken from 
the most healthy stocks and the most Aou- 
rishing  roots ;  that the people who go forth 
to  colonize nnoccupied  lnntls,  shoc~ld  go  forth 
from the r~ation  whose  politicul  constitution 
is most favourable to  the aecurity of  indivi- 
duals; that  the new colo~~ics  should 11e  swarms 
from the most i~~dustrious  hive ;  and that thcir 
edocrrtion should have formed them to those 
hubit3 of frugality and labour which are neces- 
wry to make transplar~ted  families st~cceed. 
It may often be advantageous for colonies 
to remain a long time under the governluent 
I might  reply,  that a long train of  alchy- 
mists,  after all the misfortunes of  their pre- 
decessors, long continued obstinately to  seek 
after  the philosopher's  stone,  and that this 
great work yet has its partisans ; -  I might 
reply,  that many nations in  the  East have, 
during  many ages,  been  governed  by astro- 
logy ;-I  might enumerate along list of errors 
which  have  misled  both  governments and 
people.  But a question of this nature ought 
not to be obscured by declamation.  Be  who 
alleges  the number of partisat~s  by which a 
, 
1 
system is supported. instead of s~~~ortir~g  it 
by proofs,  desires to intimidate,  and not to 
convince his adversery.  Let us examine a11 
the arguments  by which  the advuntages of 
colo~iies,  in respect of wealth, have I~een  en- 
deavoured to  be proved:  we shall not find a 
of the mother-country,  provided alwuys that 
such government be what it ought to be. 
It  would, withotlt doubt, have been advan- 
tageous to  Egypt to  have remained under the 
government of Great Britain -a  government 
which would  have bestowed  upon it peace. 
security, the fine arts, and the enjoyment of 
the magnificent  gifts which  nature  has  1a- 
vished upon it.  But in respect to wealth, the 
possession  of Egypt, far from being advnnta- 
geous to England, would have proved only 8 
burthen. 
I  hear  a universal  cry raised  aginst this 
paradox.  So many profo~~nd  politicians,  di- 
vided upon every other point, are ur~a~~imo~~s 
upon the importance of  colonies, -  are they 
or~ly  agreed that they may fall into an error? 
So many  merchants, -have  they  deceived 
themselves in so simple a calcr~lation  as that 
of  the  profit  or loss of  colonial  commerce? 
The experience of two or three centuries,- 
Iias it not opened the eyes of  govern~nents? 
wouid it not be extraordinary that  they should 
still obstinately sustain the enormous weight 
of  these distant establishments,  if their ad- 
vantaaes were not clear and manifest? 
single one which' is not in opposition to  the 
most firmly established principles of political 
economy. 
I.  The weaM of  the coioniea tr poured tnto 
the mother-country :  it  is brouyht  thither by 
commerce ;  it eonsequent~y  aninrates mantifuc- 
Wen, and they SKppOTf  the  larye towns:  the 
prosperity of  Sordeaut, for  example,  is one 
proof;  its weahh depends upon its trade with 
the West Indies. 
This reasoning proves nothit~g  in favour of 
a system of colotlies: there is no necessity for 
governing or possessing  any island,  in order 
that we  may  sell merchandise  there.  Tl~e 
inhabitants of  the Antilles  stand in need of 
the productions of England and Frnnee :  were 
they independent states, it would still be ne- 
cessary that thcv  should  buy them:  during 
their stwte of  de'pe~~dence,  what can they do 
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mother.aountry ;  they exchange them for corn 
and cloth.  Those who supply these commo- 
dities, if they had not sold them to  these par- 
ties, would have sold them to others.  Sup- 
pose that the inhabitants of St. Dolningo, in 
place of buying their corn in Frnnce, were to 
huy it  in England; France would losenothing, 
because,  on the whole,  the consumption of 
corn would not be less: England having sup- 
plied St. Domingo, would not be able to  sup- 
ply other  countries, which would be obliged 
to  supply thcmeelves from France. 
Trade is in proportion to cupitul.  This is 
the principle : the total amount of  trade in 
each  country is alwavs in proportcon to  the 
capital which  each Guntry possesses.  I am 
a merchant;-l  have a capital of X10,000 em- 
ployed in commerce.  Suppose Spanish Amc- 
rica were opened  to me,  could  I, wit11 my 
S10,000,  carry on a greater trade than I do 
at  present 2  Suppose the West  Intlies were 
ehut against me,  would my f  10,000 become 
tlseless in my hands? should I not be able to 
apply them to  some other foreign trnde, or to 
make them usefit1 in the interior of the coun- 
try, or to  employ them in some enterprise of 
domestic agriculture ?  It is thus that capital 
always preserves its value:  the  trade to  which 
it  givcs birth may change its form or its clirec- 
tion,  may flow in different channels,  may be 
directrd  upon  one mulufncture  or another, 
upon foreign or domestic undertakings ;  but 
the final result is,  that these ~roductive  ca- 
pituls always produce; and they produce tlic 
samc  quantity,  the same value,  or  at leust 
the difference does not deserve attention. 
It is therefore the quantity of  capital which 
determines the  quantity of 'tmde, snd not the 
extent of  tile  nmrket,  as has  bcen  generally 
lwlievcd.  Open a new market,-  the  q~latitity 
of trade will not,  unless Ily some nccidentnl 
circumstance,  be i~~~reasctl  : shut up an old 
market, -  the quantity of trade will ~iot  he 
di~nit~ished,  unless by acciderlt,  und only for 
a moment. 
Sllol~ld  the new market be more ntlvnntn- 
gcous than the old ones, in this case the  protit 
will be greater-  the trade may hecotne more 
extended;  but the existence  of  this extra 
profit  is always supposed but never proved.* 
The mistake  consists in  represeuting  all 
Bryan Edwards, in hieElistory of the \Irest 
~~~,e>~~~$  ~~$~~~~{~~~~  ::!::if 
cqjitnls employed In  pl;lnhtions greater th)an 
seven per cent, whilst it iu fifteen pcrcent.upon 
capital employed in the mother-country,.  - 
a This fifteen per cent. wna  taken  from one of 
the  finance  pamphlets  of  'l'rensllry  Secretary 
ltose.  Some years before, to a question pot by me 
to the late S!r  Francis Baring,  the nnhwer was, 
six  per cent  h hi^ meant,  of course,  over 
almyc interest, then at five per cent-communi- 
caled by  the Autlror. 
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big11 prire which you wish to rcmady hy the 
nlonopoly  is an evil which will cure  itself. 
Large profits in any one branch of trade will 
dtitw thither a large number of  competitors : 
all merchants are rivals,  and their rivalry na- 
turrlly produces a reduction of price, till the 
rnte  of  profit  in  each  particular  branch  of 
trade be upon a level with ail others. 
2.  You  may  oblige your  colonist  to buy 
everything of  you;  but  the advantage you 
expect to  derive from this exclusive  commerce 
is deceptive. 
if it respect commodities and manufactures, 
which  owing to  a natural superiority, you are 
enabl&  to  furnish of  better quality and at a 
lower price  than  foreigners,  it is clear tbat, 
without  monopoly,  your colonists would ra- 
$her buy them of you  than  of  others.  The 
monopoly  will not enable you to  sell them at 
a higher price ;  your merchants,  bcing all in 
a state of competition with each otl~er,  natu- 
tally seek to  supplant  each other by offering 
their goods at the lowest price possible. 
While as to  the protluctions and other ar- 
ticles which yo11 are not able to furnish them 
upon terms equally favourable with foreigriers, 
it is certain that, without the monopoly, your 
colonists will  not buy them of you.  Ought 
re  to conclude,  that the monopoly will  be 
advuntageous to  you? Not in the least:  the 
nation in general will  gain nothing.  It  will 
only follow, that  a species of i~idustry  will be 
cultivated among you, which does not natu- 
rally suit you ;  that bad commoclities will be 
produced,  and bad man~~factures  carried on. 
The monopoly is similar to a  reward be- 
stowed  by government  for the maintenance 
of  manufactures  inferior  to those of  other 
nations.  If this monopoly did not exist,  the 
same capital tvould  be applicd  to  other spe- 
cies of industry ill which you have a decided 
advantage.  l~lstead  of losing by this arrange- 
ment, you will  gain  a  more  stable prospe- 
rity ;  since the  manufactures which cannot be 
maintained but  by forced mc;lns are exposed 
to a thousand vicissitr~cles. Observe further, 
tbat this monopoly is b~~rthencd  with a rvun- 
ter-monopoly.  It is not permitted to you to 
purchase productions eimilar to those of your 
colonies,  when you find them elsewhere at a 
lower price:  incompensation for the reetraint 
you impose  upon your colo~~ies,  you  Impose 
one upon yo1lrselv~3.  If they can buy only of 
you, you can buy only of thern.  How many 
incollveniences  result  from  this1 When the 
barvest  has been deficient  in your color~ies, 
you  are not able to  supply yourselves from 
those places where the  season has been more 
fnvourable;  in the midst  of abundance, you 
are suffering from dearth.  The  monopoly has 
no effect in lowering the price  of commodi- 
ties;  but  the couriter-monopoly is certain 
oc!.rrsionally  to produce extraordinarily high 
pn  ces. 
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the profit of a  new trade ns so much added 
to the  amount of national profit, without con- 
sidering that the same  cnpital  employed  in 
any othcr brnnch  of  trade  would  not have 
been  unprodt~ctive. People  suppose  them- 
selves to have created,  when they hnve only 
transferred.  A minister pompously boasts of 
certiin new acquisitions,  certain  estahlish- 
nients upon far distant shores; and if the ad- 
ventures which have been made have yielded 
a ~riillion  of  profit, for example,  he does not 
fi~il  to believe  tllitt  he  has  opened  a  new 
sourcc of national  wealth ; he supposes that 
this million of profit would not Iiave existed 
without him,  whilst he may have occasioned 
n loss:  he will have  done so,  if  the cirpitul 
employed in this new trade have only yielded 
ten per cent.,  and that employed in the ordi- 
nary trade have yielded twelve. 
The answer to this first objection may be 
reduced to  two  points:-1.  That the posses- 
sion of colorlies is not necessary to  the cnrry- 
ing on  of  trade with  them ;  2.  That even 
when trncle is not cnrrietl on with the colo. 
nics, the capital which s11c.h trade wonld have 
reiluired,  will  be applied as productively to 
other ~~ndertakings. 
11.  The advocates of  the color~iitl  systcm 
would consider the above answer extremely 
weak : they see  in  this  commerce  two cir- 
cumstances  which  render  it more  advanta. 
geous than that which is cnrried on with free 
~~irtions. 
"  We estal)lished,"  say they,  "a  double 
monopoly nprinst the colonist:  first, the  mo- 
nopoly of their prodt~ctions,  which wc perniit 
thetn to sell to  us alone, and which we thus ob- 
titi11 from themat the lowest price;-serorldly, 
the mor~opoly  of  their purchases,  whicll  we 
oblige thcm to  make among ourselves,  so tliilt 
we are able to sell our protlr~cc  a1111 mnnufitr- 
tures to them at a drarer rntc than we corild 
to a free people, among whom,  otl~c~.  nntio~ls 
would enter iuto competition with us." 
Let us  examine  the effect  of  these t~vo 
moilopolies scpartitely. 
1.  Yo11 prcvent  your colonies from selling 
their productions to any but yourselves ;  but 
poll  cannot  oblige  them  to cultivate  their 
lands, or to  manuhcture at  a loss.  There is 
a  nett~ral  price  for every commodity, deter- 
n~irlcd  by the average  rate of  profit in com- 
merce in  ge.cllernl.  If the  cllltivntor cannot 
obtain this natural price, he will not contint~e 
c"ltivate ;  he  his 
und~rtakin~s.  The monopoly lnay prod~~ce  a 
forced  reduction of  price .for  a time;  but the 
colonist will not coritinue to  cultivate sugar 
if he lose by its crlltivation instead of gainin; 
It is therefore  impossible for this monopoly 
to produce a constunt reduction of the price of 
commodities below their natural price ;  whilst 
free competition is sufficient to reduce then: 
and  keep them at this natural price.  The 
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consider colonies under another point of view 
,the  advantage they produce to  the  revenue. 
The tares lecied  upon  the  commerce  of  the 
colonies,  whether  upon  importation  or upon 
elportation,  produce a  revenue  which wodd 
cease, or be much diminished,  iftheg, ware in- 
&pendent. 
The taxes levied upon the oommerce with 
the colonies  lnay pmduce  a  considerable  a- 
mount.  But if they were free,  would they 
carry on no commerce?  Could not this com- 
merce be taxed ?-could  it not he taxed as 
heavily as smuggling would permit?  England 
levies taxes upon its commerce with France; 
France levies taxes upon its comnlerce with 
England.  The possession  of colonies is not 
necessary to  the levying of taxes upon  the 
commerce carried on with them. 
I do not repeat here, that your tnxes upon 
the articles  of  their  production,  and  upon 
those of your importation from the colol~ies, 
are taxes of which  you  pay  every  farthing 
yourself:  this has dready been demonstrated. 
What you make the colonies to  pay,  are only 
the tnxes upon your exportations to  thcm. 
I allow that you may thus gain  more from 
your colonies than you would beable to gain 
from forei6.n nations ;  since the  foreigners can 
quit your market when  they please,  if they 
cannot obtain  among you certain  articles so 
cheap  as  from  others : you  are  therefore 
obliged to humor~r  them.  But your own sub- 
jects, obliged to  s~~pply  thcmselves from you, 
are obliged  to  submit : you  keep them in r 
prison,  and yo11  can put what price you please 
upon their existence. 
An advantage, however, of this nature can 
or~ly  be deceptive.  When you  hnve matte a 
prison of your colonies, it  is necessary to  kcep 
all the doorscnrefully shut: you have to  strive 
against the I'roteus  of smuggling ;  fleets are 
necessary to  blockade their  pmts,  armies to 
restrain a discor~tented  people,  courts of jus- 
tice to punish the  refractory.  How  enormolrs 
arc the expenses to  IIC  deducted,  before  this 
forced commerce will yield a net revenue ! 
To  the amount of the expenses of peace, 
add that of  a single armament -  of a single 
war,  and yon will perceive,  that depende~~t 
colonies cost  much  to the mother-country, 
and never yield  an equal  return ;  that,  far 
from contributing to tlie strength of  a state 
they  are  always  its  weak  and  v~~lnerabl~ 
points ;  that they keep up  among maritime 
~lntions  continual jealousy;  and that thus the 
peoplc in France,  and in England,  are sub- 
jected to heavy taxes, which  hnve no othcr 
elfect thtm to rcnder the  productions  of the 
colo11ic.s  dcarcr than if they were free. 
To these  considcrations opposed  to the 
colonial  system,  dmwn  from  political  eco- 
nomy,  many  others rrray be added,  derivrd 
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often mischievous to the people submitted to 
it; governmentis almost always, as  it  respects 
them, in a state either of jealousy  or indiffe- 
rence :  they are either neglected  or pillaged  -  thevate made places of banishment for the 
recepdon  of the vilest  part  of  society,  or 
places to  be pillaged  by millions and  favour- 
~tes,  whom it is considered desirable suddenly 
to  enrich.  The sovereign,  at two thousancl 
leagues  distance  from  his subjects,  can  be 
acqrtaintedneither wit11 their wants, their in- 
terests,  their  mantlers,  nor their  character. 
Their most legitimateand weighty complaints, 
weakened by reason of  distance,  stripped of 
everything which might excite sensibility-of 
everything which might soften or subdue the 
pride of power,  are delivered without defence 
into the cabinet of the prince,  to the most 
insidious interpretations, to  the most unfaith- 
ful representations :  the colonists are still too 
happy, if their demand of justice be not con- 
strued into a crime, and if  their most mode- 
rate remonstrances  are not punished as acts 
of rebellion.  In a word,  little is cared  for 
theiraffection-nothing isfeared for their re- 
sentment -  and their despair is conte~nned. 
The most violent  procedures  are easily dis- 
yised  ur~der  an appearance of necessity,  and 
the best intentions will not always suffice to 
prevent the sacrifice of the public to  private 
~nterests. 
If we proceed  to consider the situation of 
coloniesindetail, we shall not fdl  to  be struck 
with its disadvantages.  Have  the colonists 
any lawsuits in their mother-courttry  ?  Tl~eir 
witnesses  must cross  the seas; they arc at 
the mercy of their agents ;  years glide away, 
and the expenses of justice  continually uc- 
cumulate.  Is there danger of 3 revolt 1  are 
they threntened  by  an enemy ?  Succours 
arrive when the mischief is done:  the retnetly 
oftentimes proves an additiottal calantity.  Do 
they want food ?  Famine has lard waste the 
country before the mother-country has been 
apprised  of  their necessities. 
These are not mere assertions :  they are 
borne out  by a faithful summary of the lristory 
of every colony.  It  is tragical, even to  horror I 
The  evils suffered  in these  establishments, 
from the ignorance, the weakness,  or the in- 
sensibility of European governments, exceed 
everything which can be imagined.  When we 
consider the multitude of men destroyed, the 
fleets lost,  the treasures  swallowed up,  the 
establishments  pillaged-  we are ustotrished 
to  hear colollies spoken of  as a means of en- 
richment.  The natural development of their 
fruitfulness,  and of  their industry,  has been 
retarded for ages ;  they have been covered a 
thousand times with ruins ;  nations have irn- 
poverished themselves,  that they might hold 
them in servitude, \~he~rtheyn~igIithi~ve  beeti 
sharers in their wealth by leaving to tlrem the 
ertjoyment of the benefits of liberty. 
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There  are  marry arguments which  prove 
the  inutility  of  their  dependence.  North 
America presents a striking fact which ought 
to enlighten Europe.  Has the trade of Eng- 
land  diminished,  since  her  former  subjects 
became free?  Since she lost these immense 
possessions,  has slie exhibited any symptoms 
of decay ?-has  she had fewer sailors?-  has 
her maritime power been weakened ?  She has 
found a new source of wealth in the indepen. 
dence of the United  States.  The emancipa- 
tion of  this great cotrntry has curried thither 
o greater number of men,  more capital,  and 
more industry.  Great Britain, relieved  from 
the expense of defence and governmellt, has 
carried  on  a  more  advarrtageous  colnlnerce 
wit11 a more  numerous and wealthy people; 
and  it is  thus that  everything concurs  in 
proving,  that the prosperity of  a natiotr  is a 
benefit in which all others participate,  every 
one in proportion  to his means ;  and that the 
colonial system is hurtful to Europeans, ol~ly 
beca~lse  it is hurtfill to  the colonieu. 
Let us,  however,  see  the  consequences 
which we ought to draw from these data 
1.  Ought we not to  form  any colorlid es- 
tablishtnent?  Certairlly not with the intenti011 
of enriching the mother-country :  it isalways 
a certain  expense,  for n  contingent  and far 
distant profit.  But we have see11 that,  as a 
means of  relieving the population -of  pre- 
venting  its excess,  by  providing a vent for 
those  who  fi~rd  themselves  overburtllened 
upon their native soil,  colo~lizntioll  offers  an 
ntlv;~ntageous resource ;  and when it is well 
conducted,  and  frce  from  any  regulations 
which  lnay hinder its prosperity,  there may 
result from  it a uew people, with whom we 
shall possess dl  the co~~nexions  of  language, 
of social habits,  of natural and political ties. 
2.  Ought colonies already possessed  to  be 
emancipated? Yes, certainly ;  if we o~lly  con- 
sider the saving of  the expenses of their go- 
vernment,  and the superior advantages  of a 
free commerce.  But it is necessary to  exatnine 
what is tlue to color~inl  enti~blislr~nerrts  -  to a 
family which  has  been  created,  and  which 
ought not to be abandoned.  Can they main- 
tain  themselves?  Will  not  their  i~iternal 
tranquillity  be  interrupted?  Will  not otle 
class of the  itthobitants be  sacrificed to  all- 
other ?  for  example,  the  free  men  to the 
slaves,  or  the slaves to the free men ?  Is it 
not necessary  that they sliould be  protected 
nnd directed,  in their conditiorl of  colrlpara- 
tive weakness ant1 ignorance?  Is not  their 
present state of  dependence their safeguard 
against anarchy, murder, alrd pillage?  Such 
are the points of view under which thia ques- 
tion ought to be considered. 
When we  shall  have  ceased  to consi[lcr 
colonies with the greedy eyes of fiecality, tho 
greater number of tlicse  ir1convenienzc8 will 
cease of  themselves.  Let goverriments  lay 
where else. 
Giving birth or increase to  this or that par- 
ticular branch of  procluctive inclustry,  under 
the rrotion  of giving art  increase thereby to 
the aggregnte of the ~~ational  mass of wealth, 
aside  all false  mercantile  notions,  and  all 
jealousy  of  their  subjects,  and  everything 
which  renders their yoke burthensome  will 
fall at  once :  there will no longer be any rea- 
son to fear hostile  dispositions and wars for 
independence.  If wisdom alone were listened 
to,  the ordinary object of contention worlld 
be reversed -  the  mother-country would de- 
sire to see her  childre11 powerful,  that they 
might become free,  and  the colonies  would 
fear the loss of that tutelary authority which 
gave them  internal tranqnillity and security 
against external foes. 
5  9.  Nun-agenda -  Nurrow measures. 
Getteral Observations. -  Given in  the  shape 
of money, encouragements (so called,) special 
encouragemer~ts,  though they miss the good 
they  aim at in the shape  of  special  encou- 
ragement,  produce,  in the shape  of  general 
encouragement,  another good which they do 
not aim at.-  the addition made,  as above, by 
forced frugality at the expense of justice. 
Given otherwise than in the  shape of money 
,given  by discourugerne~rts  applied to  rival 
branches -  they make no addition to  wealth 
by forced  frugality,  arrd  therefore  make  IIO 
addition  at all to wealth.  Discouragements 
to  the import,  and thence to the production 
of foreiglt goods,  are discouragements to the 
export, arid thence to the production,  of  the 
home  goods that would  have been  taker) by 
the foreigners in exchange for their goods. 
Of  the  favour  shown  to home  goods  irr 
co~nptrrison  wit11 foreign  goods,  wbot is  the 
result? Thtlt, in each country, men get their 
commodities  either not so good,  or not so 
cheap,  and thence not in such plenty as they 
would  otherwise.  Such not only is the re- 
sult of all these conflicting operations,  on the 
part of all nations taken together, but, to the 
extent of tlre operation, would be so in each, 
even if  there were  no such  retaliation  any- 
times it has been  employed within  the year  in 
rnaliing  are compowe8.  the  urchases ot which  ultimate  prices 
t  It may  however, hap  en in some instances 
that a branch of industry, wtich if pursued would 
If in one of these branches the rate of pro- 
fit be greater than in others -in  the one 16 
per cent.  for example, in the  others but 15- 
the greater the portion of capital employed in 
this most productive branch,  in preference to 
the other less productive ones, the  greater the 
annual addition to  the aggregate mass of  na- 
tional wealth.  But so long as they do but 
know which of all tlre branches open to  them 
is most productive, individuals that have un- 
engaged pecuniary  capital to employ,  are al- 
ready as completely disposed to employ it in 
this most profitable brancb,  as all the exer- 
tions  that car:  be  employed by goverrtment 
can make  them be.t 
When, by the exertions of  government,  a 
mass of capital,  which otherwise would have 
gone  into a  branch  of  productive  industry 
producing but 15 per cent.,  is directed inton 
branch producing 16 per  cent.,  the profit by 
these exertions  is not the 16 per cent.,  but 
the difference  between that and the 15  per 
cent.,  viz.  the one per cent.  It  is for the 16 
per cent.,  however, and not the 1 per cent.. 
that credit is commonly taken by those states- 
Inen  who  go to market for glory  with  the 
merit  of affording encouragement  to trade : 
and if  10 per  cent. he the profit  up011 stock 
in the new branch, the whole 10 per cent.  is 
taken credit  for  as profit  by  the measure, 
though 5 per cent.  less have been  the real 
fruit of it. 
It is for the encouragement or creation of 
particular branches of  trade or industry  thut 
statesmen  have founded and defended,  at~d 
conquered or attempted to  conquer colotties. 
It is for the sake of colonies, more than for 
anything else, that governments have been at 
the expense of a marine: and reciprocally for 
the sake of  a  marine that they have estab- 
lished or defended colonies.  In  Europe, thoye 
who are governed  pay for the expellse:  irl 
America,  it is become a principle that those 
The aggregate trlass of money employed in 
the shape  of  productive capital,  will,  in all 
branches of  industry taken together, be pro- 
ductive of so much per cent. upon the amount 
of it-say  15  per cent.,  or niore or less,  ac- 
cording  to the average  rate of  profit  rrpot~ 
stock in the courttry in question,  which is in 
the inverse ratio of tllrrt portion of  the mass 
of  money in circulatio~r, which is ernployed 
within the year in the shape of productive ca- 
pital,  to  that portion of it  which is employed, 
gs money is employetl,  by u nran who is said 
to  spend his incotr~e.' 
Each being  multiplied  by  the  number  of 
is either useless or ~nischievous.  I 
mars of  capital of  such  magnitude  auindivi- 
tlualv separately taken, or in small numbers,  are 
not  able to  ralsa  But where this happens,  it 
can only be in consequence of positive regulation 
of government,  which in  contemplation  of  the 
m~schief  apprehended  from overgrown masses of 
cnpiul, in certain cases forbids, Ilmits, or seeks to 
limit, the quantity of capital that shall be applied 
under one management to any branch of  ~ndus- 
tr;  _ br  limiting  the  number  of  individuals 
w Ib bha 1 be allowed to contribute to it, -or  by 
not suffering a man to  embark in  trade an  part 
of his property without embarking the whore.  In 
giving  an encouragement  in this slinpe, govern- 
r~icnt  does little  or nothing  more than reinove 
obstacles of ir~  own creating, and the pod  it does, 
if any, is done at no expense. 
be  more  ~rofitable  th&  any othkr,  requires  a BOUNTIES UPON  PRODUCTION.  GO  hIANUAI,  OF 
he has possessed  other means of producing it. 
The  bounty may have operated  upon his in- 
 itta tat ion,  but it cannot have contributed to 
hi3 ability. 
Bounties have been  bestowed  upon parti- 
c111ar  branches of tradefor all sorts of reasor~s: 
-on  account of their antiquity,  on account 
of their novelty-because  they were flortrish- 
iltg.  because  they were  decaying-because 
they were advantageous, hecause they were 
burthensome -  because there were hopes  of 
improving them,  and  because  it was feared 
they would grow  worse ;-so  that there is no 
species  of commerce in the world which could 
not, by one or otherof these co~ttrarv  reasons, 
claim  this kind  of favour during every mo- 
ment of its existence. 
It  is in the case of an old branch  of trade 
that the evil of such  measures is most enor- 
mous,  and in that of  a  II~W  one that its in- 
efficacy is most striking.  A long-established 
branch of trade is in general widely extended: 
this extent furnishes the best reason for those 
who solicit these favours for its support ;  and, 
to  give it effect, it ought at the same time to 
be represented as  gaining and losing, -gain- 
ing, that there may he adisposition to  preserve 
it -  losit~g,  that  there may be a disposition to 
assist it.' 
In the case of a new brartch of trade or in- 
dustry, the futility of the measure is its prin- 
cipal feature.  Here, there is  no retaon which 
carries the mask of an tlpparent necessity - 
no pompous descriptions of  its extent.  All 
whichcan  be alleged is, that, once established, 
it will become great and lucrative,  but what 
it wants is to  be established.  What, then, is 
done  for  its  establishment?  Measures  are 
taken, which can only operate  after it is es- 
tablished.  When the trade is established,  it 
wiil have such great success that  it will yield, 
for  example,  fifty  per  cent.  profit;  but,  to 
establish it,  it requires  such large advances, 
thut it  is doubtful if those who possess capital 
will make them, on aceount ofthe risks which 
nre almost  always  inseparable from every new 
undertaking.  What course does the govern- 
ment ptlrsue ?  Does it give capital 7 No,  this 
woul~l  be foolish.  Does it  lend capitd?  No, 
this would be  to  run  too great risk ;  it will 
give a bounty upon  the article when it  shall 
have been  made:  till then,  it says, we shall 
give IIO money.  Thus, to  the fifty per cent. 
you will girl  by your  merchandize,  we  will 
11 is true  though it lnay not  be  the  expense of sipporting it  by bounties with a view 
to  .the  increase of wealth,  it may  be  proper  to 
+s~~~t  it a8  a means of subsistence or defet~cc  It 
1s st111 more true  that what ought not to be done 
with the intenti& of  supporting an unprofitable 
branch of tmcle, may yet he proper for preventing 
he  ruin of the workman actually enlployed  in 
such business:  but these are objecta entirely &- 
tinct. 
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ad11 a bounty of  ten  per  cent.  Very well : 
and, according to this reasoning, at  what time 
will you refuse assistance?  You refuge so  lot~g 
as  the bestowment of it will be useful -  you 
grant it in order thnt something may be do~te, 
and you do not give it till it is already done 
by means independent of you. 
Mistrust,  short - siglitedness,  a  sr~spiciotts 
disposition,  and a  co~tfi~sed  head,  are vary 
susceptible of union.  Why are I)or~ntirs  pre- 
ferred to  advance of capitirl ?  They are afraid 
of  bei~tg  deceived  in  the  latter  ease.  If 
S10,000 are given at  once, nothing may per- 
haps be done :  to avoid this risk, they give, 
when the thing is done, 810,000 per annum, 
which they will never receive again. 
Instead of being beneficial, the expense to 
the state becomes more burthensome in pro- 
portion as the trade becomes extended.  The 
bounty instituted  for one reason, is cor~tinued 
on an opposite accout~t:  at first it was give11 
in order to  obtain-in  the end it is continue11 
for  fcur of  losing,  the  particular branch  of 
trade.  What would have heen  necessary for 
its etltablishtnent was a trifle -  what m~~st  be 
paid for its cor~tinuance  knows no bounds. 
The ctrpital  bestowed upon  n new brilnch 
of itidustry for an experiment, is always corn- 
partitively a small sum ;  bnt what is giver1 as 
a  bounty is always,  or at least  it is always 
hoped that it  will he, :i large one ;  for unless 
a large quantity of the merchandize be manu- 
factured and sold, and consequently, urtless 
large  I)ou~~ty  be  paid  for its production and 
sale,  the  object  is considered  as urlacconl- 
plished -itis  cortaidered that the bounty has 
11ot answered its end. 
When the article is one which would not 
have been manufactured u~ithoclt  the bounty, 
all  that is paid  is lost;  but if  it he one of 
those which,  even without the bounty,  the 
manufacturers would  have found  it tlteir in- 
terest to  produce, only a portion of the  bounty 
is lost.  As it makes an additioo, attd that a 
very sensible addition  to  tlte ordinary profit 
of the trade, it  attracts a great number of it)- 
clividuals towards this  particular enterprise : 
by their competition, the article is sold at  the 
lowest rate, and the diminution of  price  is 
in proportion to the bounty itself (allowance 
being made for the necessary expenses of so- 
liciting and  receiving it.)  In  this state of 
things,  it would  appear,  at first sight,  thict 
the bounty does neither good nor harm :  tlte 
public pins  hy the reductio~t  of price as muell 
as it loses by the tax, which is the effective 
cause of this reduction. 
This would be true, if the individrtals who 
paid the tax in the one case were the  stlnlc 
who profited  the  in the other-if 
the measure of  this profit were  the 
measure  of  their contribution -if  they re- 
ceived the one at the same time that they paid 
the other,  and if (111  the labour lost in these  a bounty on exportation.  I  ‘ 
operations had not cost  anvthing.  But nll 
these sllppositions are contrky to  fact.  There 
are not two taxes which affect all the mem- 
bers of the state-  there is not one which af- 
fects them all equally.  Tbe  tax is paid a long 
time before the indemnification by the reduc- 
tion of  price  is received,  and  the expenses 
of this r~seless  circulation are always consi- 
derable. 
After all that can he said, it  is clear that a 
bounty upon  production  cannot,  in the long 
n~n,  produce an increased ahnndance of  the 
article  in  question,  whatsoever may be  the 
climin~~tior~  of price which may nssult from it. 
The profit l\+ich  the prodllcer will obtain is 
not greater than before-  the only difference 
is,  that it comes to him from another hand. 
It  is not individuals who give it  him in a di- 
rect manner -it  is the  government. Without 
the hountv, those who pay for the article are 
those who  enjoy it:  with the bounty,  they 
only pay  directly a  part  of  the  price -  the 
rest is paid  by the public in genernl;  that is 
to say,  more or less, by those tvho derive no 
advdrrtages from it.* 
Althor~gl~  a  bounty upon  prodr~ction  adds 
nothing  to tlte abundance  of  any article of 
general consumption,  it diminishes the price 
to the buyer.  Suppose  that,  in Scotland, 
there were a bounty upon the production  of 
oats, and that the bounty were paid by a tax 
upon beer brewed from this grain, oats would 
,lot  be more abundant than before ;  but they 
would be sol11  at a  less price to  the buyer, 
(though the merchant would make the same 
profit) whilst the beer brewed with this grain 
would be proportionally dearer: the  consumer 
of oats would not find himself richer than be- 
fore, but for the same price he would have a 
greater cjuantity of this grain in the form  of 
food, and less in the shape of drink. 
I speak here of relative abundance, in pro- 
portion to  the ordinary consumption: I speak 
of superfluity, compared with  habitual wants. 
The  lower this commodity is in price, corn- 
pared  with others,  the greater will be  the 
demand for it :  more will he prodwed in con- 
sequence of the increased demand,  but more 
will not be produced than is demanded;  the 
commodity, as it  respects abundance, will re- 
main upon the same footing as before.  ~f a 
.uPerflUity be required -  if a quantity be re- 
quired exceeding what is commonly produced, 
other measures must  be resorted  to than a 
bounty on production. 
If a bounty apon ptoduction  could  be jus- 
tified, it  would seem that it  ought to  be 90  in 
the case where the article thus favoured was 
an article  of  general consumption -  as corn  -- 
Adam Smith has made a mistake in saying. 
that a bounty upon  production was a means  of 
abundance,  on which account it was better than 
in England, oats in Scotland, potntoes in Ire- 
land,  and rice  in  India;  but it would only 
appear so as a  means of  producing equality, 
and  not under any other point  of  view.  In 
fact, this measure does not tend to prodr~ce 
abundance : what  it does,  is to  take  the 
money out of the pockets of  the rich, to put 
it into the pockets of the poor.  A commodity 
of  general  consumption is alwlps the most 
necessarv of all the articles of life -  it is nl- 
ways tha't of which the  poor make the  greatest 
use.  The richer n men is,  the more he con- 
sumes of other commodities besides this ~rni- 
versa1 commodity.  Suppose, then, a bortnty 
upon the production of  oats in Scoth1111: if 
nothing  be  consumed  there  but oats,  or if 
there  be only a tax upon oats,  the persons 
who reap the advantage of the bounty wo~~ld 
be  those who hear the burthen  of  the tax, 
and that in the same proportion,  inasmuch as 
the expense of levyirlg the tax would be the 
only result of this measure.  But commodities 
of  $1  kinds are consumed in Scotland,  and 
taxes are there levied upon a great variety of 
commodities.  Oats,  the commodity of  the 
poor,  being the object not of a tax but of a 
bour~ty,  and the articles consumed by the rich 
bei~tg  the object not of a bounty but of a tax, 
from the produce of which the bor~nty  upon 
the production of oats is paid, the result will 
be, that the poor will obtain the commodity 
of which  they make the greatest use at a 
lower price. 
1,  agree to this:  but  does  it follow that 
thew condition will be bettered 7 Not at  all. 
Oats will be sold to  the poor at  a lower price, 
but they will have less money wherewith to 
buy them.  All the means of subsistence in 
this class resolve themselves  into the wages 
of  labour ;  but the wages  of  labour  neces- 
sarily depend  upon  the degree  of  opulence 
which a coun?ry possesses ;  that is, upon the 
qnmtity of capital applicalrle to  the purchase 
of  labour,  in cortnexior~  with the number of 
those whose labour is for sale.  The  low price 
resultiw from the bounty will  produce  no 
advantage to  the labourers whilst the wealth 
of the country remains the same: if the  corn- 
modity be lowered in price,  they will he less 
paid ;  or, what comes to  the same thi~~~,  as 
they work for a ration of  oats,  they will be 
obliged to  give more labour for this ration if 
oats are at  a lower  rice. 
All thnt relates to  this mode of enconmge- 
ment may be summed up in a few words: - 
The  natural course of things gives a bounty 
upon the application  of industry to  the most 
advantageous branches -a  bounty of which 
the division will always be made in the most 
equitable manner.  If artificial bounties take 
the same cortrse as the natural,  they are su- 
pcrfluor~s -  if  they take  a  different course, 
they nre iIljurious. MANUAL  OF POLITICAL ECONOMY. 
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a disndvantageorls trade, which would  ccnse  5 13'  NOn-ngenda-Narrorr 
without it,  by forming  its sole  profit,  it is 
Example 4.  Exemptions from taxes on pro-  also possible that it rnav for a short time in- 
fj 14. Non-agenda -  Narrow measures. 
Example 5.  Bounties on Exportation. 
In  the case of bounties upon exportation, the 
error is not so palpable as in that of bounties 
upon prodtiction,  but the evil is greater.  In 
both cases,  the money is  equally  lost:  the 
difference is in  the  persons who receive  it. 
What yorl pay for production,  is received by 
your countrymen -  what you pay for expor- 
tation,  you bestow upon strangers.  It is  an 
ingenious scheme  for inducing a foreign  na- 
tiollto receive tribute from you without being 
aware of it ;  a  little like  that of  the Irish- 
man who passed his light guinea, by  cleverly 
slipping it between two halfpence. 
As a bounty upon prodaction  miry  sustain 
auction. 
An exemption from a tax capable of be~ng 
imposed upon any article in the hands of the 
maker or seller, is a modification of a bounty 
upon production : it is a disguised bounty. 
This kind of negntive  favoor  may be ex- 
tended  to every species of  tax upon  trade. 
The methods of  encouragement  in this way 
are ns numerous as those of discouragement. 
If,  of two rival  n~arlufactures,  the one  be 
weighed down by a tax,  and  the other free, 
that which  is  taxed  is,  in  respect  of  that 
which is not,  in the enme situation as if both 
were free from taxes,  and a bounty were he- 
stowed upon one. 
But each  manufacture  is a  rival to every 
other.  If this rivalry be not special,  it is at 
least general and indirect.  For what reason ? 
Because the power of' purchasing  is limited, 
as to every individual,  by his fortune and his 
credit.  Every article which is for sale,  and 
which he can desire,  is in a state of  compe- 
tition with every other ;  the more he expends 
for the one,  the  less  can  he spend  for  the 
others. 
Exemption  from  taxes upon  production 
cannot be blamed absolutely;  for it is to be 
wished, if the thing were possible, that there 
were no taxes.  But, relatively, any particlrlar 
exemption may be blamed, when  the article 
exempted  has  nothing  which  justifies this 
partici~lar  exemption.  If it were equally fit 
for taxation,  the favour granted  to it is an 
injury to other productions. 
That an object fit for taxation be exempt, 
is  an  evil : it renders necessary some  other 
tax,  which by the supposition is less proper, 
or it nllows some injurious tax to remain. 
Whilst,  as  to advantage,  there  is  none. 
If more of this untaxed merchandise be pro- 
duced, less is produced of that wvhichis taxed. 
The evil of an unjust tax is all the diffe- 
rence between a more or less eligible tax, and 
the worst of those which exist. 
he will  not pay more than  the lowest 
which will satisfy the exporter:  he need not 
give more ;  since, if  one merchant refuse  to 
supply him at this price, another will be quite 
ready to do it. 
Suppose an article of our manufacture,  al- 
ready purchased by foreign nations without a 
bounty upon its exportation ;  what will happen 
if a bounty be  given?  Solely the lowering 
of its price  to the foreigners.  A bounty of 
one penny for every pound in weight is given 
upon an article which sold for fivepence  per 
pound ; the manufacturer  would  not  have 
found it worth while to have sold  it for less 
than fivepence per pound ;  he will now, how- 
ever,  And  the  snlnc  profit  in  selling it for 
t'ourpcnce,  bccause his own govcrnme~~t  makes 
crease the profit  of  an- advantageous trade, 
which would  support itself without this aid. 
Does the bounty support a distldvantageous 
trade ?  It does  not produce  a  farthing of 
profit more than would have existed without 
it.  Left toitself, this trade woultl have ceased 
and made way for a better ;  and the commu- 
nity loses the profits of  a capital better eln- 
ployed in lucrative undertakings. 
Does the bounty support an advantageous 
trade ?  The evil, in the end, will be greater, 
because the extra profit drawing more rivals 
into this career, their competition will reduce 
the price so low,  that the bounty will con- 
stitute at last the whole profit of  this trade. 
However, till  the  price be  thus reduced, 
the bounty is a net gain  for the first  under- 
takers ; and the corisumers being our fellow- 
countrymen,  a part of  this ill-en~ployed  mo- 
ney turns to their advantage by the low price 
of  the commodity. 
But in the c;rsc of  a bounty upon exporta- 
tion, the nation  which pays it never receives 
any advantage : everything  is  lost,  as  if it 
were thrown into the sea,  or at least as if it 
had been given to foreigners. 
Without  this  bounty,  the article would 
have  been  exported,  or  it would  not : it 
would have been exported, if foreigners were 
willing to pay a price which would cover the 
expense of  the manufacturing,  of exporting, 
and the ordinary profit of trade ;  it  would not 
have been exported,  if  they did not  offer a 
sufficient price.  In the first case, they would 
have obtained the article by paving its worth: 
in  the  second  mse,  this  dkad~anta~eous 
commerce wo~~ld  not have been carried on. 
Suppose a bounty upon exportation :  what 
are its effects  ?  The foreigners who hereto- 
fore had  found  the article too dear,  become 
disposed to purchase it.  Why? Because you 
pay them to induce them to do so.  Themore 
government  gives  to the exporter,  the less 
need the foreigner give.  But it is clearthat 
BOUNTIES -  PROHIBITION. 
- 
de~v~)~~~~;~~~t~$~~,"~~~~~~  Ekr:,;; 
exam  I.,  by  giving a bounty to the first i!nporters. 
In  tries.  e#ect  is loinereare the price in fomgn coun. 
up the differcnce.  1Ic will scll at fonrpcncc, 
bemuse,  if he (lo not,  some other will ;  and 
because,  in this case,  instead  of  selling for 
fivepence, it may happen that he will not sell 
at all.  Thtis  the whole which  government 
gives is a  net saving  to the foreigners : the 
effect in the way of encouragement is nothing. 
The wllole which isexportcd withthe bounty 
is neither more nor less than would be with- 
out it.* 
Though a bounty do not  render  such a 
branch of trade more flourishing tlun it would 
otllerwise have  been,  it will  not  render it 
less  flourishing; but the more flourishing it 
becomes, the greater will be the loss to the 
nation. 
Disadvantageous  branches of trade are often 
spoken of.  People are unpasy-they  fear that 
certain manufactures,  left to  themselves, will 
be unprofitable.  It arises from error.  It  is 
not possible that any branch of trade, left to 
itself, can be disadvantapeous  to a nation: it 
may become so by the ir~terfere~lce  of govern- 
mellt, by  bounties,  and other favours of  the 
same nature.  It is not to the merchant him- 
self that it an  become disiidvantageous ;  for 
the moment he perceives there is nothi~lg  to 
be gdned,  he will  not  persevere  in it: but 
to the nation in general it may become so- 
to the nation,  in  its quality of  contributor ; 
and  the anlor~nt  of  the bounty is the  exact 
amount of the loss. 
The Irishman who passed his light guinea 
was very cunning; but there havebeerl French 
and English more cunning than he, who have 
taken  care  not  to be  impoaetl upon  by  his 
trick.  When a cllnnirlg indi~idual  perceives 
you have gained some point with him, his ima- 
gination tnechanically begins to endeavour to 
get the dvvltnge of you, without exanlining 
whether he \\rould not do better were he to 
leave  you alone.  Do you appear to believe 
that the matter in question is  advantageous 
to  you?  He is convinced by this circtlmstance 
that it is  proportionally disadvantageous  to 
him,  and that the safest line of  conduct for 
hi~n  to adopt,  is to be guided  by your judg- 
ment.  Well acquainted with this dispositiol~ 
of  the human  milid,  an  Englishmn~~  laid  a 
wager,  and  placed  himself  upon  the Pont- 
neuf,  the most public thoroughfare in Paris, 
offering tothe passengers a crown of six francs 
for a piece of twelve sous.  During half a day 
he only sold two or three. 
Since individuals in general are such dupes 
to their  self-mistrust,  is it rtra~rge  that go- 
vernments, having to  manage interests which 
they so little understand, and of which they 
are so jealous,  should  have  fallen  into the  -  -- 
same errors?  A government, believilrg itself 
clever, has given a bou~~ty  upon the exportn- 
tion of  an article,  in order to force  the sale 
of it among a foreign nation :  what does this 
other nation in consequence?  Alarmed at  the 
sight of this danger, it takes all possible me- 
thods for  its prevention.  When it has ven- 
tured to prohibit  the article,  everything  is 
do~le. It  hns refused the six-franc ~ieces  for 
twelve sous.  When it has not dared to pro- 
hibit it, it has balanced this bot~nty  by a coun- 
tcr-bounty upon some article that it exports. 
Not daring to  refuse the crowns of six francs 
for twelve sous, it has cleverly slipped some 
little  diamond  between  the two pieces  of 
money -and  thus the cheat is cheated. 
A strife of  this nature, painted in its true 
colours, and stripped of the ecllt which daz- 
zles by the magnitode of  the object and the 
dignity of the agents, appears too absurd to 
be  possible ;  but  for  one example  among a 
thousand, we may refer to what has happened 
between England and Ireland respecting the 
trade in line~~s. 
5 ''' Non-ayenda-NamOw  measures. 
Example 6. Prohibition  of  rival  produc- 
tions. 
This pretended  mode  of  encouragement 
can never be productive of good ;  but it may 
produce evil :-lturtful  or useless, such is the 
alternative. 
1.  I say useless.  It  is a particular privilege 
of  this exercise of  power, to be employed in 
certain  cases without doing  ally harm ;  and 
these cases occur when the branch of produc- 
tion or trade which  is prohibited  would  not 
have been introduced. even  had  there been 
no prohibition.  In former time#, it was de- 
clared  felony in England  to import pollards 
and crocards, a kind of base coin at that time. 
This prohibition is yet in existence, without 
producing any inconvenience.  If, with the in- 
tention of encouraging the  inereaseof poultry, 
or with any other similarly patriotic view, the 
importation  and  increase  of  phmnixes were 
prohibited, it is clear that the trade in poultry 
would neither gain nor lose much. 
An~or~g  1111  the species of manufacture which 
England,  with so much  anxiety,  has  prohi- 
bited to her colonies, there are many which, 
in comparison with @culture,  are no more 
suitable to the Americans than the breeding 
of phcznixes, the cultivutio~r  of pine-apples in 
their fields, or the manufacture of stuffs from 
spiders'  webs. 
Were the articles of  foreign  manufacture, 
loaded  with  the  expenses  of  importation, 
neither better in quality nor  lower  in price 
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of a favoured manufacture,  and  you at once 
create all the mischiefs of a monopoly.  You 
enable the monopolints to sell at  a higher rate, 
and you diminish the number of ettjoyments 
yo11 grant them the singular privilege of ma- 
nufacturing inferior articles,  or of ceasing to 
improve them !  you weakm the principle of 
emulation, which  exists  only when  there is 
competition; in short, you favour the enrich- 
ing of  a small number of  individil.als, at the 
expense of all those who would Esve enjoyed 
the benefit ;  you  give to a few bad manufac- 
turers an excessive degree of wealth, instead 
of supplying the wants of ten thousand  good 
ones; you also wound the feelings of the peo- 
ple, by the ~dea  of injustice and violence at- 
tached  to the partiality of this measure. 
Prohibitions  of  foreign manufactures are 
most frequently applied to those objects which 
foreigners can supply less expensively, on ac- 
count of some peculiar advantage arising from 
their soil or their industry.  By such prohibi- 
tions, you refiise to participate in this natural 
advantage which they enjoy; you prefer what 
costs you more capital and  labour;  you em- 
ploy your workmen and your capital at  a loss, 
rather than receive from the hands of a rival 
what he offers you of a better qttality or at a 
lower price.  If you  hope by this  means to 
support a trade which would otherwise cease, 
it may be supported,  it is trite;  but,  left to 
itself,  capital would  only leave this channel 
where its disadvantages  are unavoidable,  to 
enter upon others where it  would be employed 
with  greater  advantage.  The greatest  of 
all errors is to suppose, that by  prohibitions, 
whether of foreign or domestic manufactures, 
more  trade  can be obtained.  The quantity 
of capital, the efficient cause of all increase, 
remaining the mme,all the increase thus given 
to  afavoured commerce is so much taken from 
other branches. 
The collateral evils of this prohibitory sys- 
tem ought not to  be forgotten.  I? is a source 
of expense, of vexation,  and of crimes. 
The expense most evidently lost, is that of 
the custom-house officers, the inspectors, and 
other individuals employed ;  but the greatest 
loss is that of  labour -  both of  the unpro- 
ductive labour of the smuggler, and of those 
who are, or who appear to  be, employed in the 
prevention of smuggling. 
To destroy foreign  commerce,  it is  only 
necessary to sell everything, and to purchase 
nothing: -  such is the folly which has been 
passed  off as  the depth of  political wisdom 
among statesmen. 
Among  the transactions  between  nation 
and nation, men have consented, at  great ex- 
pense,  to support disadvantageous  manufac- 
tures, that they may not buy of their rivals. 
We do not see such monstrous extravagance 
on the part of individuals.  If a merchant were 
to  act thus, we should cay he wns hastening 
tation, is the restitution of  a tax already le- 
8 17. Non oqenda -  Narrow measures.  I  vied : -  from  the amount already levied  ill  to ruin.  But his interest  piides him milch 
better:  it  is only public fiinctionaries who are 
capable of  this mistake,  and they only when 
; they are ading on account of others. 
Covetousness desires to  possess more than 
it can hold: malevolence likes better to  punish 
itself than to  allow a benefit to an adversary. 
To have its eyes greater than its belly,  is a 
proverb which nurses apply to children,  and 
which always applies to nations.  An indi- 
vitlual corrects this fault bv experience : the 
politician,  when  once  afficted  by  it,  never 
corrects himself. 
When a child refuses phvsie,  mothers and 
nurses  sometimes  induce  it to take  it by 
threatening to give  it to the dog or the cot. 
How many statesmen -  children  badly edt~. 
cated -  persist in supporting a commerce by 
which they lose, that they may avoid the mor- 
fication of allowinga rival nation to carry it  on1 
The statesman  who believes he can  in& 
nitely extend commerce, without  perceiving 
that it is limited by the amount of capital,  is 
the child whose eyes are larger than his belly. 
The statesman who strives to retain a dis- 
advantageous  commerce,  because  he  fears 
another nation  will gain  it,  is the child who 
swallows the hitter pill, for fear it should be 
given to the cat or the dog. 
These are not noble comparisons, bot they 
are  just ones:-when  errors cover themselves 
with an imposing mask, one is tempted to  set 
them in a light which will  show them to be 
ridiculous. 
§  16- Non-a9enda-Narr0w  measures. 
Example 7.  Prohibition of rival imports. 
In  regard  to the prohibition  of  rival  im- 
ports,  simply inefficacious or mischievous  is 
here the alternative. 
If the foreign article cannot when imported, 
after payment of the expense of importation, 
be had as cheap in comparison of  its  quality 
as the home article meant to be favoured,  it 
will not be imported;-so  long as that is the 
case, a prohibition is put upon  it by nature. 
If, had it  not been forthe prohibition, it could 
have been sold here cheaper,  the prohibition 
is in point  of  burthen  a  tax upon us to the 
amount of  the difference in price.  I say,  in 
point of burthen :  for as to that benefit which 
it is  the  property of  a  real  tax to produce, 
viz.  asupply for expenditure, or a relief to an 
equal amount from the burthenof other taxes, 
it has no existence.  It  is upon the same foot- 
ing with a tax the produce of which  as soon 
as collected,  should be thrown into ;he  sea. 
As to the increase of wealth in general, the 
particular  encortragement  in  question is, for 
the general reason so often given, of no avail. 
The quantity of capital,  the efficient cause of 
c\.ealth, remainingthe same, whatever is addetl 
in consequence  to the favoiired trade,  is so 
much taken fipm the rest. 
icisteab of a worse-  harm, if it stand instead 
of orre less burthel~some.  I  8 20. h70n-agenda -Narrow  measures. 
Example I I. Non-importation  agreements. 
" -- 
Example 8. Taxation of  riv J  branches of 
home manufactures. 
The nati~ral  and only  original  object  of 
hxation is revenue :  but,  considered merely 
as confined to that object,  it does  not be- 
long  to our present  purpose.  Measures  are 
however to  be considered with regard to  their 
eventual effects of  all kinds -  as well those 
which were not designed (if thetee be any) as 
those which were. 
A tax upon  one of  two rival branches of 
trade can have no effect in favour of the other, 
but in so far as  it operates as a prohibition. 
If the same quantity of the commodity meant 
to be  discouraged,  be sold notwithstanding 
the tax, as woilld have been soltl without the 
tax, the advantage gained by the commodity 
meant to be favoured, amounts to nothing. 
So far as it operates as a prohibition,  we 
have seen that good it can do none -it  only 
transfers  capital  from  one  employment  to 
anot.i~er,  without producing  any  increase  of 
wealth:  harm it may do. and is likely enough 
§ 18. Non-agenda -Narrow  measures. 
Example 9.  Taxation of rival imports. 
Whether the article thus taxed in the view 
of  fnvouring another,  be  an  articlc of  home 
production or an article of  itnport,  miikcs it1 
point of advantage no sort of difference.  As 
hr  as it prevents the import, it has the effect 
way bf  a  tax, a man  is permittd to drat0 
loch so much of what he has disbursed. 
What a bounty an exportation is to a boun- 
ty on production,  a drawback is to a simple 
exemption from a tnx levied on produce.  In 
the first case of  each pair, foreigners come in 
for their share of  the  boon  indiscriminately 
with our own people ;  in the other case, they 
get the whole of it.  In all cases, the expected 
advantage is eqiially imaginary. 
In one point of  view, however,  the draw- 
back  is  a more expensive  way of  throwing 
awav money than the bounty.  In the case of 
drahack, the  money is  received  with  one 
hand in order to  be given back again with the 
other ;  and  each operation  is attended with 
a separate expense.  To this public expense 
is to be added the private expense, which the 
individual must be at to pay  the money, and 
get it back again-an  expense  of which the 
trouble  and loss  of  time  (which  in the ac- 
count of the financier go for nothing) always 
, form a very ronsideral~le  part, often the most 
 on- ikportatiori agreements,  as far as they 
extend,  have  the effect of  prohibitions : - 
happily they are not so extensive in their ac- 
tion, so frequent, so steady, so well executed. 
Good they do rtone:  happily, wanting the 
force of  prohibitory laws,  the mischief they 
do is seldom so extensive. 
to do-though  we have seen that it  may also  [ considerable:  instar~cest  have not been want- 
happen not to do any.  I 
ing, in wtich the value of the supposed favour 
As a tax, it [nay do good or harm according  has been  reduced literally to nothing by the 
to  its narticular nature :  + good,  if  it stand  troiible of obtaining it. 
of a  pr&ihition:  in which capacity we have 
seen, that with regart1 to the general ir~crease  I  § Q1.  Non-a!7enda-firr0~ 
of vrrealth, it is of  no use.  As far as it fails .  Example 12. Premiums forthe importation 
of  preventing the itnport,  it gives no enrou- 
ragement to the particuliir triide in question; 
nor consequently to the particular  portion  of 
wealth employed in that trade :  its  effect is 
to levy money on the subject, in quality of 
a tax;  but the persons on whom the money 
is levied are our own people, as much as if it 
were among the articles  produced at home. 
As such, it  may either be a good or a bad tax 
as it may happen ;  -though  in regard to its 
temporary consequences, it  cannot be produc- 
tive of  all the miicl~ief  of  which  a  tax on a 
home manufacture  is capable  of being  pro- 
ductive. 
1  19. h-on-agenda-  hrarrow measures. 
Example 10. Drawbacks on exportation. 
What is called giving a drawback on expor-  .  me- 
properties :  for in a general way,  no laws except 
those by which  other laws are repealed, can fail 
oi  doing harm, us being so rn~icli  lumber, by  the 
loail they add to thc byatc~n. 
of foreigrl arts and hands. 
Tllnt there nrc cases in which it would he 
extremely well worth the while of individuals 
to pay extraordinary prices to get workmen 
froni abroad,  is not to be doubted.  Meaning 
to  employ my  morley to the best account in 
the way of  trade or manufacture,  and looking 
round  as  far  as  my  reach  of thought,  and 
faculties andopportrtnities, will carry me, if I 
observe a branchof manufacture, for insta~~ce, 
new as pet to my conntry, rtnd which, if im- 
ported from some country abroad,  would pay 
me,  for example,  five per cent.  interest for 
my capital, more thnn any other branch I have 
been  to find, -this  five per cent. would 
he  so milch more Kained  to me,  and through 
the nation lbelong to, than if I had em- 
barked my capital in that one of the old-esta- 
bashed trades. which, of all that hare fallen 
+- The dr~wbnck  of the salt duty in favour of 
fisheries mny be mentioned as one which formerly 
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under my cognizance, would be the most ad- 
vantageous.  Extra expenses  there doubtless 
me, and difficulties, incident to  the businessof 
getting workmen from a foreign country, even 
if there are no laws  in  that country or  our 
own to add to the amount; but a11 difficulties 
and expenses of this nature I suppose provided 
for and surmounted, as in manyinstances they 
actually have been. 
Stili, then,  the same argument,  and still 
with undiminished force :  the more evidently 
advantageous for the individual t.he employ- 
ment  of  his  money  in this way,  the more 
evidently unnecessary is it for government to 
employ that of the nation in this way. 
In the first case,  the burthen  is borne  by 
him who receives the benefit -  in the other 
case,  by those who receive no part of it :  in 
the first case,  the probability of  success  in 
the project,  and  the security against  unne- 
cessary expense, are at their highest pitch- 
in the other,  at their lowest. 
On the part of  governments in general, 
the passion for getting arts and hands  from 
abroad does not appear so conspicuous as the 
dread of losing their own. 
fact, can only act upon the existing stock: this 
being sold at  a forced price, tlie merchant will 
take care  not to replace  it.  What can the 
law effect? Can it  oblige him to replenish his 
storehouse with the same commodities?  No 
legislator  has  ever attempted  it,  or at  least 
no one has  ever attempted it with  success. 
This would be to convert the officers of jus- 
tice into commercial  aeents :  it would be to 
give them a right to  dilpose bf  the capitals of 
the merchants,  and to employ the merchants 
themselves as their clerks. 
,  The most common fixation  has becn thnt 
of the rate of  interest.  It h~s  already been 
discussed.  (See Ch.  111.  $fj 6 & 7.) 
The fixation of  the price of  wages (espe- 
cially with  regard  to agriculture) has  often 
been  proposed,  and even carried  into effect, 
for  the most  opposite  reasons:  to prevent 
what is considered as an excess -  to remedy 
what has been regarded as a dejciency. 
In this latter  point of  view,  this measure 
is liable to great objection.  To  fix the mini- 
mum of wages, is to  exclude from labour many 
workmen  who would  otherwise  have  been 
employed ;  it is to  aggravate the distress you 
wish to  relieve.  In fict, all that can be done  5 22  Non-agenda-Narrw  measures.  is limited to  determining, that if they are em- 
Example 13.  Fixation of prices.  ploved they shall not receive  less  than  the 
cheaper. 
The first of these objects is least natural : 
so many commodities, so many means of en- 
joyment; to  put them within the reach of the 
largest number, is to  contribute to the gene- 
ral happiness.  This motive, however,  is not 
unexampled ;  and intoxicating liquors are an 
instance of its exercise. Legislators have often 
endeavoured,  and not without reason,  to  in- 
crease their price, with the design of limiting 
their consumption onaccount oftheir dearness. 
But imposing a tax upon them suffices to in- 
crease their  price;  there is no necessity for 
resorting to the method of  direct limitation. 
Is the design of these  limitations the ob- 
The  limitation of the price of commodities 
may have two opposite objects-  1. The ren- 
derin~  them dearer ;  2. The render in^ them 
taining of theirtide at  a low rate,-  the me- 
thod will scarcely answer its end.  Before the 
existence of the law,  the article was sold at 
what mny be called its average or natural price, 
that is to say, it was confined within certain 
limits -  1. By the competition  between the 
buyers and  the sellers;  2.  By a competition 
between the branch of trade in question, and 
that of other branches to  which the merchant 
might find it to his advantage to transfer his 
capital. 
Does the law endeavour to  fix the price at 
price fixed:  it is useless  to enact  that they 
shall be employed. Where is the farmer, where 
is the manufacturer. who will submit to ern- 
a lower rate than this average or naturhl price 
-it  may obtain a transient, success,  but by 
little and little  this  branch of  trade will be 
abandoned.  If  the constraint he i~~creased, 
the evil will grow worse ;  the  constrnint, in 
ploy labourers who cost them more than tiley 
yield ?  In  a word,  a regulation  which  fixes 
the niinimunt of wages,  is a regulation of  a 
prohibit,ory nature,  which excludes from the 
competition all whose labol~r  is not worth tlie 
price fixed. 
The fixation of the rate of wages, in order 
to prevent their excess, is a favour conferred 
on the rich at the expense of the poor-on  the 
master at the expense of the workman.  It is 
a violation, with regard to the weakest class, 
of the principles of security and property. 
Q 23.  Wealth  -Means  of Inmeose. 
If  we t,race the Droeress of  wealth  in its 
natural channel, we \ha% clearly perceive that 
the interposition of government is onlv bene- 
ficial and  necessary  when  employed'in  the 
maintenance  of  security, in the removal  of 
obstacles, or the dissemination of knowledge. 
Wealth may he increased - 
I. By increasing the efficacy of labour. 
11.  By increasing the number of labourers. 
111. By the more advantageous employment 
of capital. 
IV. By increasing the mass of capital. 
V.  Bv means of trade. 
I. ~i  inmensing  the e#cacy  of  lobour. 
This subject might furnish most interesting 
and instructive historic details :  we shall con. 
fine ourselves ta  R simple enumeration  of the 
means whereby it may be acconlplished. 
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The  efficacy of labour may be augmented - 
1. Hv  increase of skill and dexterity. 
2.  Bi  saving  the time occupied by super- 
flnous movements. 
3.  Rv the invention of marhines. 
beasts of bkhdn.  ' 
The two first advantages  are obttuned by 
the division of labour ;  the third necessarily 
results from it.  Adam  Smith has developed 
teetion of  the laws.  No other  circumstance 
speaks so highly in praise of  the British go- 
vernment, as the disposition of individuals to 
unite  in  carrying  on  great  undertakings  in 
canals, docks, ports, kc.  A disposition to un- 
4.  Bi  employing, instead of humanlabour, 
more powerful and less costly prime movers, 
-as  water.  air. fire. ex~losive  powders, and 
large extent. 
The advantage of machines consists in the 
increased  efficacy of  labour.  To reduce the 
n~unber  of men employed upon any species of 
dertake such works denotes thk prevalence of 
a feeling of security, which unites the future 
to the present,  and  embraces  an horizon of 
converting o  morsel of  brass wire'into  a pin 
requires eighteen operations,  and employs as 
many different workmen, of whom the greater 
part borrow  the assistance  of  machines ; - 
whereby,  although  ten workmen would  not 
separately have been able to make more than 
240  pins  a-day,  they are  enabled  to make 
4800.  It is hence  that this little branch of 
national wealth, which  affords a  more com- 
modious adjustment than the buckles of  the 
Romans and the skewers employed by Queen 
Elizabeth, has increased in proportion.  What 
our country people  throw away, would have 
been luxuries in the court of Darius. 
5.  By  the simplification  of  irltermed~ate 
processes. 
6.  By the saving of materials.  The exten- 
sion given to the quantity of  gold  employed 
in gilding silver wire, is an example  equally 
suited  to astonish  the  natural  philosopher, 
and to charm the political economist. 
Chemistry has  introduced a  multitude  of 
economical processes into a11 the arts :  it  has 
taught the means  of  economically applying 
fuel -  of  producing  great  effect  with little 
expense;  it has  s~~bstituted  less  costly for 
more  expensive  materials ;  it has imitated, 
and even rivalled, the productions of nature. 
this grand means of attaining perfection with 
great diligence,  and,  so to speak,  particular 
afFection.  He  relates.  that the  Drocess  of 
with  the &me  degree  of  efficacy as -before. 
That which  required two thousand  men for 
its performance, being performed by one thou- 
sand,  there remains  one thousand  men who 
may be employed either upon similar or other 
works. 
But this supposes  that the workmen,  no 
longer required in the production of  a given 
quantity of  labour,  are otherwise employed ; 
for  it'  they were  without  employment,  the 
quantity  of  wenlth  produced  would  remain 
the same after the invention as before. 
If a manufacturer found himself  thus in R 
co~~dition  to  execute, with one thousand work- 
men, what had heretofore required two thou- 
sand, it  appears, at  first sight, that the natural 
result would  be,  that he would  employ the 
two thousand workmen to produce a double 
quantity of  work.  But unless his pecuniary 
capital be augmented, it will be impossible for 
hi111 to employ the same number.  The new 
machines,  the  new warehouses  required  for 
this increase  of  produce,  require  a  propor- 
tionate increase of capital.  The most ordinary 
case,  therefore,  will be  the reduction of  the 
number of workmen; and, as it respects them, 
the consequence is a temporary distress. 
It is upon this circumstance that the popu- 
labour by half, witholit diminishing the quan- 
tity of  the product,  is in fact the same thing 
as  doubling the number  of  men  employed, 
.  . 
pottery of' former times : -  the potteries  of 
Wedgwood  and  Bentley  have  excelled  the 
porcelain of China. 
8. By the diminution of the expense of car- 
riage,  by the multiplication of  roads, canals, 
and iron railways.  The advantage which  the 
Low Countries have derived from their canals 
7.  By  the improvement  of  the products, 
that is to sav  in proportion to  the price.  It  is 
thus that Ddicelain has su~ola~lted  the coarse 
who'suffer,  whilst the benefit is,  in the firit 
instance,  for  the manufacturer,  and in per- 
petuity  for the public, who obtain  a better 
article at a less price. 
There are two kinds  of  countries  where 
this objection has no force -countries  badly 
neo~led.  and countries where the people are 
lar oppos~tion  to  the improvement of machilles 
depends.  It  is a very reasonable opposition on 
the part of  the handicraftsmen.  It is they 
is incalculable.  Governments may often use- 
fully interfere  in  respect to these objects, 
either by advancing  the capitals  and sharing 
in  the benefit,  or by granting to  the indivi- 
duals  interested  the  powers  necessary  for 
making arrangements among themselves,  and 
defraying the expense.  When, however,  it is 
necessary for a government to take charge of 
these works, it  is a proof that confidence does 
not exist ; I mean confidence in the stability 
of the actual order of things,  and in the pro- 
hies. 'DO you desire an increase bf popula- 
tion -  do you desire  children who  may be- 
come workmen in future, -  I give you full- 
grown  men -  workmen  actually  prepared : 
you would charge yourself  with the expense 
of their education,-  I relieve you of it :  you 
are willing to receive  foreigners,  and I give 
you natives.  Such is the language an inventor 
may address to a sovereign ;  whilst to  the in- 
dividual  proprietor he  may say, -  With one 
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certain qunntity horn your mines;  ~vitll  fifty 
you will ill future be  able to raise the same 
rluantity.  If it \\'ere necessary to support tlte 
others in idleness,  where would be the evil? 
In stationary or retrograde countries, where 
the dismissed workman  cannot  easily find a 
new employment  to which to apply himself, 
where there exists no capital ready to furnish 
him employment that suits  himfthis  ohjec- 
tion would not be without force.  It  is.  how- 
rvcr, a transient evil,  to which transient re- 
medies ought to be applied. 
I[.  By the  increase  of  the  number  of  In- 
borrern. 
I llnve  notl~ir~g  firrther  to add  upon  this 
suldect to what i3 stid in the chapter on po- 
pulation  (Ch.  IV. ;)  hut  I  shall  point  out 
those  things  whic*h, in  sn indirect  manner, 
tend to prod~tre  this effect. 
1.  By the banisl~ment  of all prejridices UII- 
Blvoltrable to labollr.  Honour  has  tied the 
Imnds of some-religion  of others.  Some have 
been kept in a state of perpetuul idleness - 
othcrs in n etate of  periotliarl  idlclless.  In 
some Cntllolic countries,  the s;rir~ts'  days oc- 
rupy more  than OIIC  hundred worki~lg  days. 
The  loss  of  these  duys  alone  ougl~t  not 
only to be considered,  hut also the bad habits 
which this idleness  encourages.  They have 
not worked upon the saint's dav; they do not 
work on the day following, because they were 
itttoxicated the day past. 
2.  The amount of laboar may oe mcreased 
by giving  productive  employments to those 
rlnsses of men who, o\ving to  their station in 
life, produce nothing-  to prisoners, beggars, 
r~lonks,  and soldiers.  It has bcen prctet~dcd 
that,  to make  a good  soldier,  an individnal 
ought to follo~r  no other trade :  nrl exception 
ought at least to he made in favour of  those 
kinds of  labour which may be useful in war. 
as the digging of ditches, the constr~lction  of 
bridges,  the tlrrowing  up  of  ernbanklncnts, 
and the formation and repair of roads.*  'fhese 
employments afford an inexhaustible means 
of increasing the most permanent part of the 
capital of a nation. 
3.  Substitute alluring for coerave motives 
-reward  for punishment; with suitahle pre- 
cautions, abolish all servicesin kind, all forced 
labour and slavery.  A country peopled with 
serfs will be always poor.  Pay for labour in 
money,  and the reward!  mingling drop after 
drop with the labour, wlll sweeten its bitter- 
ness: every free labourer is worth two slnves. 
This  reflection is often presented in this work, 
----- 
It is said that  the 8uCce~~  of  the American 
armies  employmene  was  partly  Cornwe$  owln  to their  entirely  skill in  of these  bur- 
bandmen, they excavated ditches and  formed 
entrenchments and other works connected  wit11 
clmps, with a facility which aatonial~ed  their ad. 
versanes.  The Russian armies possess the same 
advantage in a stdl higher degee. 
but it is so just and f~voor~blc  to Itl~manity, 
that it  cat~not  be toooften repented ;  weought 
not to be afraid to repeat it. 
111.  Tl~e  more advastageous employment of 
capital. 
We have alreutly seen, thnt rlnc!er  the grti- 
dance of individual interest,  capital of  itself 
takes the most advantugeous  direction -  at 
least certainly more udvurltageo~ls  than whe;~ 
under the guidance of  government. 
Of all employments of capitol, the most nd- 
vantageous for the state is the cultivation of 
the earth.  It is,  nt the anme  time,  as hit$ 
been clemol~strated  by Adam Smith, the most 
beneficial in itself,  and the most attarhed to 
thc atnte.  Most aclvantgeous: the capitalirt 
lntlst  iind  it nearly as advantageous  as  any 
other, since, unless this be the case,  he will 
not  engage  in  it; and this  after  he has dc- 
ducted the rent he pays to the landlord,  nnd 
which  often  amounts  to a third of  the pro- 
duce.  It is thus that the state gains by this 
employme~~t  more  than  it an  possibly gain 
by  nny other.  More  attarhed  to the sti~te: 
the rvork~n,m  may carry  away  his  i~~clustry, 
the tnoncy-lender  his  capital,  the me1.t-llsnt 
rrlay  rhattge  Itis warehouses,  but  the farmer 
can~~ot  carry away the land. 
For the encouragement of this most advan- 
tageous employment of capital,  what  ouBt 
government to do ?  Nothing : that is to  say, 
nothing in the  way of positive encoclragement ; 
for it cannot too completely remove the clogs 
and obstacles to the free alienation  of landed 
property t or too greatly favour  the conver- 
sioil of &ods held in common, into ilrdividual 
property.# 
The condition most favourable to  the pror- 
pcrity of agrici~ltnre  exists when there are no 
entails,  no unalienable endowments, no corn- 
mon ln~tds,  no right of redemption,  no tithes, 
or taxes or dues which punish industry,  and 
levy rrcontribution upon agriculture, incrcas- 
ing in proportio~~  to the expenses  incurred, 
and the greater care paid to cultivation. 
Generally spmking,  the great landed pro- 
prietors give themselves little care about the 
improvelnent of  their domains.  Some leave 
large tracts of country, sufficient for the main- 
tenance of hundreds of families, in a state of 
nature. that they may enjoy the pleuum  of 
the chase ; others,  prodigal in proportion  to 
their u7ealth, expend  everything  in  present 
enjoyme~its,  and trouble themselves but little 
with the firture.  Where the system of leases 
and  farms  is upon a good footing,  the evil 
is  not great;  but it is altogether otherwise 
when  the administration is in  the hands  of 
a  s~~eri~ltendent,  still  1.1s  interested than 
his "lasters  in the  increase of the rent.  Were 
t  Upon this subject, see Vol. I. Pn'ncipl~  o/ 
the Civil Code,  333. 
S Ibid. Vol. f  p.  341. 
large  properties  divided  into three  or  four 
part% the  proprieton  would  be  animated 
with an entirely different  spirit.  The spur 
of necessity  would  render  them intelligent 
md  industrious.  Where a nobleman employs 
tmnty gardeners in  raising pine  apples and 
taking care of  bowling greens.  Five  manu- 
facturers would  employ twenty husbandmen 
in prodncing corn  for themselves and a hon- 
dred workmen.  But  let it not be supposed 
that I recommend  agrarian  laws and  forced 
&visions : this would be to cut off an arm, in 
order to  avoid a scratch. 
In the scale  of  public  utility,  so far  us 
it depends upon  the  general  \vealth,  after 
qriculture come  those mn~ufactures  whose 
products are sold within the country ; after 
these,  the manufactures whose products are 
exported ;  and in the last place, the carrying 
trade.  Adam Smith tins demonstrated this. 
Thus much for theory:  it  does not follow that 
in  practice  it would  be  proper  to Fdvour  a 
branch of  industry higher in the srille, at  the 
expelrse of one which is placed below it. They 
1\11  cxcrrise  n reriprocal  irrflue~~re  II~OII  one 
mother, and benefits are divided among them 
with suficient equality.  If for a moment one 
branch become  more  advantageous than the 
others,  a greater number of  adrel~turerv  are 
soon drawn towards this side, and the equili- 
brium is not long in re-establishing  itself.  If 
any species  of  irldustry  be  more  constantly 
useful  to a nation,  it is because  the benefit 
more certainly remains-  because the wealth 
which it  produces is more secure. 
1V.  Bg increasing the mass qf  capital. 
The mass of  capital is increased when the 
products of labour exceed the amount of pro- 
ducts consumed. 
The trc!dition  made to the wealth of  a na- 
tion in one year,  is  the total amourit of the 
savings of  all the individuals comnori~~g  that 
nation ill that year : it i3  thc difference be- 
tween the values produced or imported,  and 
the values destroyed or exported in the course 
of the same year. 
The  addition made to  the pecuninry wealth 
of  a commu~~ity  is, in the same manner,  the 
dithence between the sum produced or im- 
ported,  and  the sum  destroyed or exported 
in the period in question. 
111  the  case  ot' an  individual,  increase of 
money is increase of wealth.  It hais fortune 
consist to-day of  one thousand gtuneas,  a11d 
he has two thousand to-morrow,  he will be 
twice as rich as he was  the day before:  he 
CAII command twice the cluantity of  the pro- 
ducts of all kinds of labo~ir. 
The cnse is not the same with a nation.  If 
its coin  be  to-day £1,000,000  sterling,  and 
to-morrow  it.  were  to be  £2,000,000  its 
wealth would not be  doubled as was tiat of 
the individual.  As it respects its internal con- 
dition,  the nation  would not  be  richer than 
before : instesd of  having at its commal~d  a 
double quantity of productions, it would o111y 
have the same. 
It is true,  that, in exporfing to other na- 
tions  this suddenly acquired mass,  the com- 
munity in question would obtain an addition 
to  the mass of its 11on-pecu~~iary  wealth: but 
in proportion  as this exchange is made,  the 
case which we have supposed  does not con- 
tinue the same; it ceases to possess the addi- 
tional million of coin. 
This apparent  contradiction  between  the 
two cases is easily removed.  When an indi- 
vitlual finds the quuntity of  coin  which  he 
pos~sses  si~dde~lly  doubled, the value of the 
coi~r  is not  diminished by this addition : the 
community to  which he belongs does not pos- 
sess  more  than  before,  supposing  that the 
amount  has not  been  received from abroad. 
The proporti011 between the amount of  coin 
and the things to be sold remains exactly the 
same. 
The value  of  all  the things sold  in  the 
course of a year is equal in value to the sum 
of the  coil^  givcn in exchnnge for them ;  that 
is, to the value of the actual quantity of  the 
eoil~,  multiplied by the number of times it has 
been  exchanged.  Each  of  these masses  is 
equal in value to the other; since, by the  sup- 
position, the one has been exchanged for the 
other. 
This equality exists, whatever may be the 
difference  in  quantity  between  these  two 
masses.  When the million of coin, circulating 
three times durir~g  the year, bas purchased the 
whole mass of  goods which were to be sold, 
it has given  to a!l  its successive possessors 
the enjoyment of  this mass.  When,  taking 
the same cor~rse,  the  two millions of coin have 
produced the same effects, they have only per- 
tbrmcd what the single million had performed 
before;  since, by the supposition, the mass of 
goods has not bcen increased.  In other terms, 
that is to say, the new mass of  coin is swal- 
lowed up in the general mass of coin,  and as 
much as it  has increased its quantity, so much 
has it diminished its value. 
The addition made to the coin of  the com- 
munity  produces  a  proportional  increase  in 
the price of all vendible commodities-in  the 
pecuniary price  of  all  commodities  not  pe- 
cuuiary ;  and consequently, it. may be,  in the 
price of  every article -it  may be, in that of 
the greater number of articles. 
If  an addition made to the coin of a com- 
munity be  employed in creating a portion  of 
wealth not pecuniary, which would not have 
bcen created withotit itif  it produced by la- 
bour or exchange an increase of  real wealth, 
the result is no longerthe same.  In proportion 
as the real wealth is increased,  the addition 
made to the coin ceases to produce a diminu- 
tion of relative value. 
In order to simplify the case, and render it 70  MANUAL  OF 
more  striking,  I have  supposed  a  large and 
sudden addition.  It is very seldom that an 
addition of  this nature takes place with re- 
spect to the precious metals ;  but it  has often 
happened with respect to paper money. 
Thus the increase of  the price of  commo- 
ditics, all other things remaining the same, is 
a proof of an addition to the coin, and a mea- 
sure of  its qnantity. 
This defalcation of  value  is equivalent to 
an indirect tax upon pecuniary revenues -  a 
taxwhich may continually increase in amount 
-a  tax which benefits  those who issue the 
paper money, and of which the weight presses 
entirely upon  the possessors of  fixed reve- 
nues.  There is a  cornpensstion for this tax 
to producers  and merchants,  who may raise 
the price  of  their commodities  to all  those 
who have part of this new money;  but those 
whose fortune consists in a pecuniary revenue 
which cannot be increased,  bear all the bur- 
then.* 
When  this  diminution  of  revenue  takes 
place gradually,  although it be an evil,  this 
evil may result  from the general prosperity, 
and may be compensated by a greater benefit. 
Losses which occur in the ordinary course of 
affairs, are experienced and hardly felt ;  they 
may  be  provided  against.  But  when  the 
government  itself  interferes,  hy  operations 
whose  effects  are as great  as they are snd- 
den, in order togive a sudden increase to the 
mass of pecuniary capital, whether metallic or 
otherwise, it confour~ds  all the calc~~lations  of 
prudence;  it ruins  one part  of  its subjects. 
and its imaginary wealth becomes the instru. 
~nent  of its destruction.  This is  what was 
experienced  in  France under  the  system of 
Law,  and  again under the reign  of  the as- 
signits. 
V.  By means of  trade. 
Some advantage  results  from  every  ex- 
change, providedit be made intentionally and 
withoutfraud: otherwisesuchexchange would 
not be made ;  there would  he no  reason for 
making it.  Under this point of view, the two 
contracting parties receive  an equal benefit: 
each one of them surrenders what  suits him 
less, that he may acquire what suits him more. 
In each transaction of this kind there are two 
masses of new enjoyments. 
Rut  though  all trade  be  advnntngcous,  a 
partici~lar  branch may be more advvntageo~~s 
to one of the parties than to the other.  It is 
rnore atlvantngco~ts  to  you thnn it is to  mc, if 
for at1 article wliich only costs you one day's 
labour,  you obtain from me an article which 
has cost me two.  The real balance of  trade 
It is not without distrust that I here give tlli* 
feeble extract.  frol?  a manusCIipt work  of  MI. 
Bentham's, On Prwes,and upon the cruses whrch 
rncrease Pgices  It ernbraces so  reat a nllnlbr.r 
of cluestions  rh;t  it is not  to  a coy- 
rect outline bf  the whole  in so short m abridg. 
1~lent-Notc bg Duwo~rt. 
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been times when  they have acted a4  though 
they were  delirions:  such were  the  periods 
of the Mississippi scheme in France, and the 
South Sea scheme  in  England.  The other 
classes of  people would have had ground for 
seeking to divert  their fellow-citizens  from 
the purchase of  the smoke  sold by Law,  or 
of  the  bubbles of  the South  Sea.  What  is 
here said, may be compared with the observ~ 
tions  in  5 8 of  the present  chapter,  upon 
emigration.  In laying  down  general rules, 
fortuitous and transient cases ought not to be 
forgotten. 
What has been said respecting the precious 
metals is true respecting every article of trade 
and commerce, considered as general wealth. 
There cnnnot be any incompatibility betaween 
the wealth of each and the wealth of all.  But 
the same  rule  does  not apply to subsistetrce 
and defence.  Individuals may find their indi- 
vid~aiprofit,  in commercial operations which 
may be opposed to the subsistence of  all,  or 
the defence of all.  This particularly may hap- 
pen to a small  community in the neighbour- 
hood of a large one.  Establish an unlimited 
freedom of trade in the small community, the 
grcnt one may ruin it by means of  gold.  In 
case of  famine, it might purchase all its pro- 
visions;  at  the npproach of war, it  might pur- 
chase all its arms. 
The conduct to be pursued,  to insure the 
possession  of  the  mcans  of  su1)sistencc and 
defence, are infinitely diversified by the situa- 
tion, the soil, the climate,  and the extent of 
the country to which it may rcfcr. 
The gent difficulty to be  overcome as it 
respects subsistence, is the difference betweell 
good and bad harvests.  If the produce be less 
than the consumption, the evil is evident:  if 
it  be greater. the abundance lessens the price, 
the farmer is ruined or discouraged,  and the 
vear  of  plenty  may  be  followed  by  one of 
;]earth.  For the production of equality, some 
have  established public  granaries for storing 
up  the superabulldance  of  years of  plenty ; 
others  have  encouraged  cultivation as much 
a9  possible,  depending  upon  foreigners  for 
drawing off the excess.  Were we to judge 
from abstract  reasoning alone,  the first plan 
would appear best calculated to prevent acci- 
dents ;  but, forming our judgments from facts, 
the second appears least subject to abuse.  It 
is from the adoption of this plan that England 
has enjoyed an abundance sufficiently regular. 
Freedom of trade, therefore, appears the best 
method  for  insuring  an  abundance  of  the 
means of  subsistence. 
In respect to  subsistence and defence, there 
is no better security than that which results 
from the  general prosperity.  A superabun- 
dance is the best security against want.* 
After  the  examination we have  given  to  .  vol. I.  Pnmiples  of  t,8c  Civil  code, 
Chapten  mace  and nbrindanrce.  IV. and V.  Laws  relaftua to subsist- 
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is the quantity of labour received, exceeding 
the quantity of labour given in exchange. 
It is not necessary in this place to  examine 
to what degree soil, climate,  situation, natu- 
ral circumstances,  &c. may give this advan- 
tage to one  state over  another;  since this 
knowledge  can  have  scarcely any influence 
upon practice.  It is of greater importance to 
observe,  that it may in a  certain degree  be 
acquired by art,  and  that the  superiority of 
workmanship or of instruments is a species of 
monopoly established  by fortune in favour of 
genius.  Time is saved  by  ingenuity.  The 
greater the  number of new inventions  in  a 
country whose  productions  are carried  into 
foreign  lands,  the more  favourable will  the 
real balance of commerce be to that country. 
The advantages belonging  to dexterity are 
more  permanent  than  those  resulting  from 
knowledge.  The discoveries of chemistry are 
speedily disseminated : the  skill of the Ben- 
galese workmen will remain peculiar to  them 
for ages. 
The great  politicians who so much value 
foreign commerce,  consider it as a  means of 
obtaining a balance in gold,  and they hasten 
to interfere to prevent those exchanges which 
require an expenditure of the precious metrrls. 
If a merchant wish to send coin from London 
to Paria, it is to make a payment  which  will 
cost him less in this manner than  any other 
or that he may obtain some kind of merchanl 
dise which he values more than the coin.  The 
politician is more clever than this.  He is not 
willing  that this gain  shoultl  be  mnde,  be- 
cause,  he  thinks,  thus  to gain would be to 
lose.  Preventing the profits of  every one, is 
the method he has discovered of  preventing 
loss to all.  He has therefore been employed 
in heaping one law upon another, that he may 
prevent the exportation of  the precious me- 
tals:  success  would  be  a great misfortune 
but it has never been obtained.  Want of sucl 
cess in diminishing the evil has only increased 
the folly:  I say in diminishing the evil,  for it 
never  entirely  disappears.  There  will,  for 
example, always be a greater or less expense 
011 the part of the government in endeavouring 
to execute the law ;  more or less vexation, 
more  or  less  restraint,  a  larger  or  smaller 
number  of  individuals  punished  for having 
rendered service to  the countrv (by the breach 
of the law.)  People will  be-accustomed  to 
elude the prohil~itions,  and to escape the vigi- 
lnnce of  government.  Money being more or 
less lowered in value,  the price of mannfac- 
tures will  be raised  in proportion,  and the 
exportation of manufactutes diminished. Such 
has been the folly exhibited in Spain and Por- 
tupl ;  yet are they too  happy only to have 
half  succeeded.  Grant to Midas hia wish, he 
die of hunger 'pan a heap of gold' 
In "comlnendiug  freedom of trade, I sap- 
pose  the minds of  mercl~ants  in their sound, 
that is, their ordinary state.  But there have 
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the  different  methods by  which  real wealth 
may be  increased,  we  see  that government 
mG  rely upon the intelligence and i~~clinotion 
of individuals for putting them in operation, 
and that nothing  is necessary to be done on 
its part  but to leave  them  in  possession of 
the power, to insure to them the right of en- 
joyment,  and to hasten  the development of 
general knowledge.  All that it can do with 
success may be ranged under this small num- 
ber of heads : - 
1.  To encourage  the  study  of  different 
branches of nat~rral  philosophy.  The difficul- 
ties of  science  form a barrier  between prac- 
tice and theory, between the artisan and the 
philosopber. 
2. To institute  prlzes  for discoveries and 
experiments. 
3.  To cause  the  processes  employed  in 
every branch of  trade to  be published.  The 
French government,  rising  above little jea- 
lousies,  has distinguished itself  in this man- 
ner,  and has  rendered itself  a benefactor to 
the human race. 
4.  To  cause everything of the same nature 
in foreign countries  to  be observed with at- 
tentiot~,  and to give the knowledge they ob- 
tain the same publicity. 
5.  To  cause the price of  different  articles 
of  trade  to be  published.  The price of  an 
article is an  extra reward  for whoever  can 
manufacture or furnish it at a cheaper rate. 
6.  To grant  patents for a limited number 
of  years. 
With respect to a great number of  inven- 
tions in the arts, an exclusive privilege is ab- 
solutely necessary, in order that what is sown 
may be reaped.  In new inventions, protection 
against imitators is not less necessary than in 
established  manufactures  protection against 
thieves.  He who has no hope that he shall 
reap, will not take the tror~hle  to sow.  But 
that  which  one man  has  invented,  all the 
world can imitate.  Without the assistance of 
the laws, the inventor would almost always 
be driven out of the market by his rival, who 
finding himself, without any expense, in pos- 
session of  a discovery which has cost the in- 
ventor much time and expense, would he able 
to  deprive him of all his deserved advantages, 
by selling at  a lower price.  An exclusive pri- 
vilege is of all rewards the best proportioned, 
the most natural, and the least bnrthensome. 
It prod~~ces  an infinite effect, and it costs no- 
thing.  "  Grant me fifteen  years,"  says the 
inventor, "  that I may reap  the fruit of my 
lnbours;  after this term, it shall be enjoyed 
by  all the world."  Does the sovereign say,  .' No, you shall not have it,"  what will hap- 
pen?  It will  be  enjoyed by no one,  neither 
for fifteen  years  nor afterwards:  everybody 
will he disappointed -inventors,  workmen 
ConsL~mrrs -  everything will be stifled, both 
be~~~l~~~~$$~~~$  favour of  inventions 72  MANUAL  OF POLITICAL  ECONOhlY.  [Ctr.  IV. 
have been long established in England.  An I  ner, taxes upon law proceedings have been ap 
abuse, however, has crept into the system of 
granting them, which tends to  destroy the ad- 
vantage derivable from them.  This p'rivilege, 
which ought to  be gratuitous, has afforded an 
opportunity for plundering inventors, which 
the  duration of the custom has converted into 
a right.  It is a real  conspiracy against  the 
increase of national wealth. 
We may picture  to ourselves a poor  and 
timid inventor, after years consumed in labour 
and uncertainty,  himself  at the 
Patent Office  to receive the orivilece which 
he has heard t,hat the law bekows ipon him. 
Immediately the great officers of the crown 
pounce upon him together,  as vliltures upon 
their prey :  -a  solicitor-general,  who levies 
four guineas upon him;  a keeper of the privy 
seal,  four  guineas and a  half;  a  keeper of 
another  seal,  four guineas;  a  secretary  of 
state, sixteen  guineas ;  the lord 'chancellor, 
who closes the procession, as the first in dig- 
nity, so also the first in rapacity, -  he  cannot 
take less than twenty-six guineas.'  Need it 
be added,  that in carrying on this process of 
extortion, recourse is had to  fraud -  that the 
individ~ial  a~olvina  for a  patent is referred 
from  ofice t'd its&,  that ilifferent pretexts 
may be afforded for pillage-that  not one of 
these officers, great or small, takes the  trouble 
to read a single mord  of  the farago of non- 
sense which they sign, and therefore that the 
whole narade of consultation is onlv a farce.t 
Suppose a law, granting  the patent as at 
present,without condition ;-suppose  unotl~er 
law,  prohibiting  the obtaining of  a  pittent 
under a  penalty of fifty  guineas : what  ex- 
clamations should we not hear  against such 
contradictory laws and such folly!  And yet 
this supposed folly is only half as great as the 
folly actually displayed.  People always allow 
the~nselves  to  be duped by words.  The law, 
or rather the customary abuse which has the 
force of law, instead of a permission, is, as it 
respects  the greater number of  inventors, a 
real,  although  masked prohibition.  If you 
wish to  strip off this mask, translate the lan- 
guage of each into the language of the other. 
These insults ar~d  oppressions have some- 
times  been  approved as tending to  repress 
the  temeritu of oroiectors:  in the ssme man- 
plauded as tending to  repress the temerity of 
suitors :  as if poverty were synonymous with 
temerity -  as  if the rich only had need of the 
assistance of tbe laws, or tbat they only were 
worthy of it -  ns if, indeed,  this reason  for 
only half opening the doors of  the temple of 
justice were not equally conclusive for closing 
them altogether ! 
7.  To  class with the crime of forperv the 
injustice done by the artisan who pitsvupon 
his own productions the mnrk of another. - 
In order  to  nrevent  the comn~ission  of this 
crime throtlgil  ignorance,  it would be neces- 
sary to establish a register,  in which  every 
artisan  might  make  nn  entry of his  marl 
This would tend to  secure the  privilege which 
nature has established in favour of skill, and 
which the legislator  ought to  maintain.  It 
can never be obtained without labour, and it 
can never be abused. 
CHAPTER IV. 
OF  POPULATION. 
WWH regard  to increase of  population  by 
births,$  everything may be left to  the spon- 
ta~~eous  actio~~  of individuals. 
§ 2.  Agenda. 
With regard to increase of population, next 
to nothing is required to be done by govern- 
ment :  all that  governments need do is to  pre- 
vent decrease by deperition. 
To  prevent deperition is to afford sec~lrity 
-  security against the extremity of all mis- 
chief,  the  destruction  of  mnn's  life.  The 
sources of danger are -  external  hostility, in- 
ternal hostilitv. and calamitv.  With rewrd to 
the two first, ihe interfereke of goverunrnent 
is required for the purposes  of  defence and 
oolice.  The followina are examoles of insti- 
tutions for  deperition  from  ca- 
lamity : - 
1. Hospitals for the use of curable sick and 
hurt among the  poor. 
2. Hospitals  for  the incurable  sick  slid 
helpless. 
3.  Establishments for the occasional main-  -- -  "  ..  -  ----- 
If a patent be taken out for each of the three 
Kin  doms  the expense is estimated at XI20 for 
~:ng?nnd,  kl00  for Scotland,  and f  125 for Ire- 
tenance  and employment of  the able-bodied 
among the poor,  viz. of snch by whom either 
the one or the other is unobtainable from the 
lana.  Vide Commons' Heport on Patents.-Ed. 
f It is scarcely necessary to remark  that in 
blaming the abuse  no reproach is intenaed to be 
cast u  on the indihdusls  who  finding it esta- 
blisheg,  profit by it T'hise  feis form as lawful 
a portion  of  their emoluments  as an  other.  It 
is, however, to be desired,  that in orier to put a 
stop to thia insult and o pression, an indemnifi- 
catron were granted at tfie public expense, equal 
to theaverage value of these fees.  If it be proper 
to levy a tnx  upon  patents,  it ought, instead of 
bein *  evicd in advance upon cap~tal  to be pt- 
pane%\ill the patent has procluced lime benefit, 
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+ Increase of population is desirable  as being 
antncreaseof -  1.  The  beings susce  the  of  en- 
joyment.  2.  The beings  capable  OF  being em- 
ployed & instruments of  defence.  It  results of 
course from  the increase of  the means  of  sub- 
sistence, and cannot be carried beyond them. 
Oftpoflation  nothin  is said by Adam Smith: 
yet o  w  at use 'is  weal%  but with reference  to 
population ? -  and how :an  either be considered 
111 any comprehensive point of view without  the 
o~her?  since,  rluantity  of  wealth being  given, 
,  degree of opulcncc is mrcaely as population. 
ordinarv sources.  By their maintenance, po- 
pulatioi is preserved ;  by their employment, 
weaith  mny he  increased  or not :  crimes of 
idleness are prevented. 
4.  Establishments  for  the prevention  or 
mitigation of contagious  diseases -  establish- 
ments  in former times for inoculation,  now 
for vaccination.  Much  may be done on the 
part of government under this head,  as well 
as so many  others,  by instruction :  more or 
less  requires  to be  done,  in  proportion  as 
by  the ignorance of  the people,  operations 
of this class are excluded from  the class of 
nponte  acta,  and  thence  placed  among  the 
agenda. 
$ 3.  Non-agenda. 
Institutions on the part  of  government, 
having for their end in view the causation of 
an increase of populatio~i  by births, may best 
be characterized by a  parallel  example :  In- 
stitutions punishing men for not eating,  or 
for eating food not sufficiently nourishing ;  in- 
stitutions paying all mankind for eating, with 
premioms  for those  who  eat most and of- 
tenest. 
I\fnl~y  volumes have been written upon the 
subject of  population,  because the means of 
promoting  its increase have generally been 
the subject of  examination.  1 shall be very 
short upon this subject,  because I shall con- 
fine myself  to  showing thnt all these means 
are useless.  I  If anything could prevent men from  mar- 
rying, it \vould be the trouble which is pre- 
tended to be taken to  induce them to  marry. 
So  much uneasi~iess  upon the part of the &- 
gislator can only inspire doubts respecting the 
happiness  of  this state.  Pleasures are made 
objects of dread when converted into obliga- 
tions. 
Would youencourage population,-render 
men happv,  and trust  to nature.  But that 
you  may iender men  happy,  do not govern 
them too much; do not coristrain them even 
in  their  domestic  arrangements,  and  above 
dl, in that wllich can  please only under the 
nuspices of liberty : in a word,  leave them to 
lire as they like,  under the single condition 
of not irljuring one another. 
Populntion  is in proportion to the means 
of subsistence and wants.  Montesquieii, Con- 
clillac, Sir James  Stewart,  Adam  Smith, the 
economists,  have only one opinion upon this 
Subject.*  According to this principle,  there 
The name of  Mr. Illalthus, who will forthe 
future occup  the post of honour in political em. 
nonly ur  tge subject of population, is ilot men- 
tioned  ere,  because this work was many years 
anterior to his.  This chapter  with  man  other 
fra~ments,  was communicnted to the autKors of 
the Uibliotkque Britannipue, published  nt Qe- 
rleva, anrl war insertcd in the 7th volume in 1598. 
If Mr.  Rlaltl~~a  had  known it  he rnifiht have 
e~tetl  it as an additional proof  that his piinci1,le 
is also a means of increasing population, but 
there is only one :  it  consists in increasing the 
national wealth, or, to  speak more correctly, 
in allowing it  to  increase. 
Young women,  says Montesquiea, are  sufi- 
cientIy ready to marry.  How should they not 
be?  The pleasures,  the avowed sentiments 
of love, are only permitted in this condition: 
it is thus only that they are emancipated from 
a double subjection, and that they are placed 
at the head of n little empire.  It  is the young 
men,  he adds, who need to be encouraged. 
But why 7  Do  the motives which lead men 
to marry want force 7  It  is only by marriage 
that a man can obtain the favours of the  wo- 
man who, in his eyes, is worth all others.  It 
is only by marriage that  he  can live freely ant1 
publicly  with an honest and respectable wo- 
man, and who will live only for him.  There 
is nothing more delightful than the hope of 
a family, where proofs of the tenderest affec- 
tions  may  be given  and  received-  where 
power blended with  kindness  may be exer- 
cised -  where  confidence  and  security  are 
found -where  the consolations  of  old age 
may he treasured up -  where we may behold 
o~irselves  replaced  by other selves -  where 
we may say,  I shall not entirely die.  A man 
wants an associate,  a confidant, a counsellor, 
n steward, n mistress,  a nurse,  a companion 
for all seasons :  all these may be found united 
in a wife.  What substitute cnn be orovided? 
It is not among the poor that thke is any 
aversion to  marriage ;  that is to  say, it  is not 
among the labourers -  that class,  in the in- 
crease of which alone  the  public isinterested- 
that class which constitutes the strength and 
creates  the wealth  of a  nation -  that class 
which is the last in the senseless vocabulary 
of pride, but which the enlightened politician 
regards as the first. 
It is in  the country especially  that  men 
seek to marry.  A bachelor  does not there 
possess the resources he can find  in a town. 
A husbandman,  a farmer,  require the assist- 
ance of R wife, to  attend to  their concerns at 
all the hours of the day. 
The population  of the productive classes is 
limited only by their real wants ;  that of the 
unproductive  classes is limited by their con- 
ventional wants. 
With regfrd to  these,  instead of inducing 
them  to marry by invitations,  rewards,  and 
menaces,  as did Augrlstus,  we ought to  he 
relatin  to  population  war not a new paradox. 
But wfat was new  was to make a rational and 
connected applicati)on of  it;  to deduce  from it 
the solution  of so many historical  problem.  to 
survey Europe with  th~a  principle  in his  hand- 
and to prove thnt  it cannot  be resisted nithoui 
producing great  confusion in social order :  and 
this is what Mr.  fifalthus has accomplished,  in 
a nlanner as  conclusive as respects his ar  umentr. 
as interesting in  respect of his  style an!  his de- 
tails.-Notc  by Dunront. diminished, Yvhethkr by celibacy or their con- 
version into labourers.*  Convents have been 
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The author is consistent,  and Dlontes  uieu 
appears to me not to be so.  Book xxxiii. I%.  x. 
he has well explained the true principle,  but he 
has not followed it. 
His elogium  upon  the regulations of Aups- 
!US  respectin  marriage, is extremely  singular. 
rhey have pfeased  Montesquieu by some va we 
idea of the protection  of  morals.  They viokte 
every principle of  reward and punishment :  they 
are nelther analogous nor proportional.  they pu- 
nish a man because he is unhap  y or Gudent- 
they reward him because  he is fappy or impru- 
dent:  they  corrupt marriage by mercenary and 
political views.  and  after all  the object aimed 
at  is missed.  ~iiontes)ouieu  acinowlednes the im- 
well pleased when they live in celibacy.  The 
increase of  the purely consumptive classes is 
r~eitl~er  an advantage to  the state nor to  them- 
selves : their welfare is exactly in the inverse 
ratio of their numbers.  If they should insen- 
sibly become extinct,  as  in Holland, where 
there  is  scarcely one citizen who does not 
exercise  some  occupation,  where  would  be 
the evil?  A workman may in a  moment be 
co~~verted  into an  idle consumer.  A good 
workmarl is not so soon made:  he needs skill 
and  practice.  Habits of  industry are slowly 
acquired, if,  indeed, after a certain age they 
can  ever be acquired.  On the other hand, 
when a consumer passes into the class of la- 
bourers, it is generally owing to a reverse in 
fortune,  and  he is in  a  state  of  suffering. 
When a labourer is transported into the  class 
of  consumers,  he is exalted in his own eyes 
and in the eyes of others,  nnd his happiness 
is increased.  On all these accounts, it  is de- 
sirnble  that  the class  of  idlers  be not in- 
creased : their own  interest requires it, and 
it is  also a  great good when their number is 
potence of these laws..  The  benefit of ihe remedy 
eing null,  there remains only the evil. 
He blames  Louis XIV.  (ch.  xxvii.)  for not 
havin  sufficiently encouraged marriage, by only 
rewargin  rodi  ies of fecundity. 
Louis %v.  fid too much by  his establish- 
ments for the poor nobility, and he has been too 
frequently imitated.  Humanity was  the motive 
of  these  foundations;  but  this  humanity  was 
e ually productive  of evil  as it respected  those 
w\o  bore the expense,  and  as it respected  the 
class whom it was intended  to  relieve,  and who 
were not relieved.  On the contrary,  the more the 
indigent  of  this order  were assisted,  the more 
they increased.  In  fact, every individual requires 
a certain  quantity of wealth  to be in a  state to 
marry.  Does he marry imprudently,  his distress 
is without  doubt an  evil.  but it operates  as a 
warning to  other pelaons'of  the same class.  If 
you  oppose this natural effect,  if  you institute 
foundations for families, if  ou grant pensions or 
other favours on account  of  marriage,  what fol- 
lows ? It is no longer an establishment submitted 
to calculation -  it is a lottery,  in.which hope  is 
constantly  accused  of  hurting  population. 
Poor  convents,  and the mendimnt  orders, 
injure it, without  doubt,  since they add to 
the number of  idle consumers.  It  is not SO 
with rich convents; they add nothing to  this 
number.  He who possesses the rent of  land 
can  command  labour without working him- 
self;  but what matters it whether a  fund, 
destined to the support of idlers,  be trans- 
mitted from father to son,  or from stranger 
to stranger  ? 
Large  cities  are  decried:  they  are  the 
gulphs, it is said, in which the population of 
the country is lost.  That which is furnished 
to  the towns is visible to  all the world: what 
is received  from them,  is  less apparent.  It 
is the ancient quarrel of  the belly  arrd  the 
members.  Cultivation increases in proportion 
to  the consumers.  People live longer in the 
country; but that a  greater number of  per- 
sons may be born there,  it is necessary  that 
the capital of  the towns,  which animates la- 
bour, should be sent thither. 
This imaginary evil, the  increase of towns, 
consulted rather than prudehce.  many veniure, 
but few succeed.  You intended'to  give su  port 
and  you  have laid n snare.  What you  i~d  i; 
order  to diminish  the evil,  has only served  to 
has excited the most extravagant fenrs.  Ab- 
surdity has been carried  so Tar,  as to mnke 
rules for limiting their bounds :  they should 
rather have been  made  for extending them. 
Contagious disorders woi~ld  thus have been 
prevented;  the air would have been rendered 
more salubrious.  The oaposite renulations do 
not diminish the nnmbe;  of inhagitants,  but 
oblige  them  to heap tl~emselves  up  within 
close hitbitatio~~s,  and to build one city upon 
another. 
Are emigrations disadvantageous  to  a state? 
Yes,  if the emigrants could have found em- 
ployment at home ; -  no,  if they could not. 
But it is not natural that labourers should 
exile tl~ernselves.  if they conld live at home. 
Howcver, if thci  desire so to  do, ought they 
to  be prevented?  Cases must be distinguish- 
ed.  It is possible that this desire may have 
heen produced by some momentary distaste, 
by some false idea,  some whim,  which  may 
mislead a multitude of men before they have 
leisure to  undeceive themselves.  I will  not 
therefore affirm,  that circumstances may not 
happen  in which emigration may not be for- 
bidden  by a law of  short duration :  but to 
convert this prohibition into a perpetual law, 
is to  change the  country into  a prison-is  to 
publish,  in the name even of the  government 
itself, thqt it is not good to live there.  It 
make it worse.  In pity to these unfortunate per- 
sona  they ought not to be encoura  ed to marry. 
~hin  they no longer aredeceived %y  hope, they 
will no longer be unhappy. 
In England there is ne~ther  restriction nor en- 
couragement  and there is no dread lest the stock 
of  nobilit  should  fail-  there is no dread  lest 
celibac  slould be  hurtful to population.  The 
shamefYul and sad misfortune is not known there, 
of  the existence of  a class of  ersons set apan  to 
idlencss and poverty.-Nofe  Durnfnt. 
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wonld be proper that such a law should com- 
mence thus - We, &c., ignorant of the art 
of  rendering  our  subjects  happy,  and  well 
assured that, if we give them an opportunity 
to escape, they will go in search of countries 
less oppressed,  hereby prohibit,"  &c. 
Would not this be to  aggravate the evil? 
Could all the frontiers of a grent country be 
guarded? Louis XIV. with all hie authority, 
could he accom~lish  it  ?  As manv versons as 
were thus enchained,  so many discontented 
and unhappy  persons,  who would be  looked 
upon with  distrust-whom  it would be ne- 
c;ssary  perl~aps  to repress by violence,  and 
who would become enemies when they found 
themselves  treated  as  such.  Others.  who 
had never thought of  qnitting their c&ntry, 
\vo111d become uneasy when thev found them- 
selves obliged to remain; whils't  others, who 
might have thought of establishing  themselves 
there,  ~vould  ttrke  care not  to do it.  For 
those individuals retained  aeainst their will. 
you lose those who would hGve  come among 
you voluntarily. 
England has sustained temporary losses of 
men and capital,  by emigrations to America. 
But what has happened ?  She has received 
from  that  country,  a  mass  of  productions 
which have more than compensated the loss. 
l'he men and capitals carried au7ay,  employed 
11po11  new  lands,  have  produced  a  benefit 
more cor~siderable  for Et~gland  itself, thart if 
they had 11cen employed  upon her own.  To 
exhibit this clearly,  would  require a  multi- 
tude of facts and calc~dations;  but it may be 
prcsumed to be the case, from the vast extent 
of this new commerce. 
On the subject  of emigration,  the wisest 
part, then, is to  do nothing.  Under the gui- 
(lance of liberty, the benefit is certi~in  ;  under 
the guidn~~ce  of constraint, it is uncertain. 
After this, the advi~ntnges  of  immigration 
are easily estimated.  111  ortler  to people  n 
country us  yet  u~ltilled.  it will  be advisable 
to invite thitl~er  strangers wl~o  depeud  up011 
their labour alone.  It may cvcr~  bc advanta- 
geous to mnke them advances  for their sup- 
port, in order to  establish them. 
In reapect to methods of  preventing  the 
destruction of the species, they belong to  that 
branch of police which is en~ployed  ahout the 
lrlcans of subsistence nnd  the public  hriilth. 
We  mily  be  trar~quil,  therefore,  upon  the 
?;111,ject  of pol~~lation.  There \\rill be every- 
where iln  al~trrrcl;~nce  of  men,  proridcd  they 
are  not deprived,  by  n  hard  and  tyrannical 
~over~~met~t,  of \vl~at  is necessary for subsist- 
c,rlre a~~d  e~~joynlent,  of  which contentment 
cor~stit~~tcs  a pclrt." 
I have under my eye3 a lar  e  litical work 
of  hl. ~eaclsobre,counaelIor  to tfe  Gngof Prus- 
sin, in which, at the,artirle  Popi![rr(ion,  he gives 
ro less  than twetlty rerilres tor ~ncrraqing  it. - 
The ninctccnth is 3s Collcu~s: -  "  It is proper to 
CHAPTER V. 
OF  FINANCE. 
$ 1.  General Observations. 
UNDER  the head  of  snonte  acta.  there  is 
nothing except by  accibent : theie remain, 
therefore,  agenda  and non-agenda.  Finance 
oaerates in toto in diminution of wealth : the 
object or end in view, should be to  render the 
diminution as small as possible,  and as pure 
as possible from collateral vexation and incon- 
venience in every shape. 
The  operations of finance are reducible to 
receipt and disbursement, or say expenditure. 
Receipt may be-  1.  Without condition of 
return ;  2.  On condition of return; i. e. on the 
footing of a loon. 
Disbursement is accordinclv-1.  Dishurae- 
rnent at large ;  2.  ~isburse'imknt  in discharge 
of loans.  Expenditure supposes; in all cases, 
previous receipt ;  and in cases of loans,  ne- 
cessitates  future receipt  for  the purpose of 
replacing the money borrowed. 
Receipt and expenditure are either-1.  Of 
money ;  2.  Of particular articles for service. 
Every sum expended supposes therefore a 
correspondent  amount  already raised,  or to 
be raised. bv taxes. 
The praAical rule which  ought to be ob- 
served  in judging  of  the expediency  of any 
branch of exper~diture  is,-compare  the bene- 
fit of it with the burthen of a correspondent 
portion  of the produce of the most  burthem- 
some tax.  By striking off so much expendi- 
ture, you may save so much tax. 
watch during  the fruit  season  lest the  people 
eat that which  is not ripe."  he  ought to have 
1)rovided the means  for carrying this regulation 
Into execution ;  to have indicated the number of 
inspectors who  should judge  of the ripeness of 
fru~t,  the watchmen who should be stationed over 
it, and the magistrates who were  to judge of its 
int'ractions. 
Another method  consists in "  hindering men 
from marrying very disagreeable  women."  He 
neither says to what judge  he would  remit this 
delicate  inquiry,  nor  upon  what  principles  he 
would have the ugliness  of women proved;  nor 
the degree of  inquiry which ought to be permit- 
ted, nor the fees that ought to be paid.  rhe  re- 
mainder is ver  nearly in the same taste. 
Hindering tge marriage of old men with youn 
women-that  of  young men with women mucf 
older than thenlselves-  hinderin  r the marriage 
of persons not likely to have chilken:  there are 
other recipes of this political pharmacopoeia little 
less ridiculous, but not less useless. 
His complaints respecting prostitution are nr- 
sonable, if they had tbr their object the misev of 
the clans of  courtesans  victims of a conrtmned 
celibacy  *  they are of A force  as respects po  u- 
lation, which suffers nothing.  I refer to what Iaa 
been said upu  this subject in Vol. I. Pinci  &a 
qf  Penal Lam,  lDartIII.  Ch. V.  p. h41, ~rob.f,to 
nluke SIIC!I  arrangements that a given desire may 
be  s:ltis;ied ,without prejudice, or with  the least 
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(supposing  public opinion to  admit of it,) as  contrivance of  the taxation  laws,  in respect 
well as the most COP~OIIS. seems to be  that I  of the obligations imposed on the contribu- 
which gives to  the p;blic.a  share in property  tors for the  preventionof evnsion ;  the ampli- 
become vacant  bv death.  on  failure of near I  tude  or  scantiness, the ~ood  or bad  choice 
relations.  The Eormatio'n  of counter-expec-  (  made, -of  the powers giien to the collectors 
tations  being  prevented  by  pre-establiihed  for  the  prevention  of  evasion ; -  and  the 
law,  receipts  from  this source need  not be  apposite or inapposite construction ofthe sys- 
attended with that vexatious sense of  priva- I  tem of judicial-procedure  on this subject, in- 
tion which is the inseparable accompa~imer~t  cludinithe rub of evidence. 
of a tax.  I  The  limits thus  set to indirect taxation, 
The worst is that tax called  direct or in- 
direct,  which,  as often  as it acts as a pro- 
hibition,  deprives  a  man  of  everything,  by 
depriving him of justice -  the tax,  I mean, 
upon law proceedings,  by which the  poor, that 
is,  the bulk  of the community -  especially 
the oppressed  and afflicted  part of  it  -are 
put out  of  the protection of  the law. 
Abstractedly considered,  the tax upon me- 
dicine rnight be  stated as still worse : -  the 
prohibition  in  this case bearing more  imme- 
diately andexclusively, as  well as extensively, 
upon health and life.  But the tax is not apt 
to  be so heavy upon medicine as upon justice. 
There are. moreover.  hospitals and dispensa- 
are set -11ot  by the nature of things, but by 
the imperfection of  the laws.  It is to this 
imperfection that men  ure  indebted  for the 
inequality and vexation  attendant  on  direct 
taxes, in comparison with indirect ones. 
3 3.  Taxes -  Efects  on Production.  , 
Taxes ought to havc no other end than tl;e 
productionof revenue, with nslight a burthen 
as possible.'  When it is attempted to  employ 
them as indirect means of encouragement  or 
discouragement  for any particular species  of 
industry,  government,  as we  have  already 
seen,  only succeeds in deranging the natural 
course of  trttde,  and in giving it a less ad-  -  - 
ries for thk relief  ofthe poor who want me-  var~tageous  direction. 
dicine :  but there  are none for the relief  of  1  The eff'ects  of particular taxes may amear 
-  -, 
poor and helpless suitors who want justice. 
Indirect and direct taxation are limited by 
the patience of the people.  The  ne plus ultra 
is  variable  and  unascertainable,  depending 
upon  events and  the temper of the times. 
Not knowing how soon it  may arrive, govern- 
ments are anxious to pay off debt-because, 
very complicated'and  difficult to trace.. '  By 
considering the suhject in a general point  of 
view,  and distinguishing the pernrancnt from 
the temporary effects of taxes, this complexity 
will be  diser~ti~r~gled,  and  the ditficulty dis- 
appear. 
First questton : Wllat  are the effects  of  a 
in proportion as debt' is paid off,  taxes,  bi  tax imposed by  a foreiyn  nation  upon the-ar- 
which the interest is oaid.  mav be taken off; I  ticlcs of our niauufacture P 
and being taken off,  &ay in cise of need  be 
laid on again.  A tried tax will always be n 
more secure dependence than an untried one. 
In the case  of  indirect  taxes,  a  common 
notion considers the ratio of the tax to  the 
price of  the article as limited to  a maximum; 
-  limit.ed,  viz.  by the effect  of smuggling. 
If the ratio be increased,  it is supposed that 
more will be  lost by the quantity that escapes 
the tax,  than will be gained  by the addition 
to  the amount of the tax on  the quantity that 
pays it.  This notion,  supposing it just,  as 
applied to  the aggregate of taxable  articles, 
will be apt to  be illl~sive,  as applied to this 
or that sort of article,  considered  by itself. 
In respect  of difficulty of  evasion  and faci- 
lity  of  collection,  the scale  of  variation is 
stretched to  a great latitude by the  bulkiness 
of the article.  bv the local  circ~~mstances  of 
the place at  &hi;h  the tax is collected,  and 
by  a  variety  of  circumstances.  But other 
causes of variation,  and these very powerful 
ones, are,-the  organization of that part of the 
financial system which concerns the  mode of 
collection ;  --and  thence the  vigilance or re- 
missness -  the sufficiency  or insufficielicp  in 
number.  and t,he ~robitv  or improbity of the 
~er&anent  co~sequences  : -  1.  If the ex- 
portation be  not diminished,  the tax makes 
no difference with  respect  to  us:  it is only 
paid by the  consumers in the state which im- 
poses the tax. 
2.  If the exportation  be  diminished,  the 
capital which was employed in this branch of 
manufacture withdraws itself and passes into 
others. 
Temporary  consequences : -  This  aimlnu- 
tion of  exportation  occasions a  proportional 
distress among the individuals ir~terested  in 
I  this species of industry.  The workmen lose  1  their occupations ;  they are obliged to  under- 
take lnbours to  which they are unaccustomed, 
and which yield them less.  As to  the master  1  manufacturer,  a  part of his  fixed  capital is  1  rendered useless;  he loses his profits in pro- 
portion as the manr~facture  is reduced. 
I  Second question :  What are the eflects  of  a 
tax imposed by  ourselves,  upon the manufac- 
1  tures we  ourselues consume ? 
,  Permanent consequences: -  1. If the con- 
* This principle  may admit some exceptions, 
but they are very rare:  for example,  a tax may 
be  imposed upon intoxicatin*. liquors  with the 
desicn of  Ai!ninishine  their &nsumpdon  by  in-  -  - 
functioriaries  emiloyed-; --the  good or bad 1 crea'6ng their price.  - 
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sumption be not diminisltcd( no other diffe- 
rence  is prod~~ced  than the disadvantage of 
the tax to  the consamer,  and a proportional 
advantage  for the pultlic. 
2.  If the consumption be diminished, indi- 
viduals are deprived  of that portion of  hup- 
piness  which  consisted  in  the  use  of  this 
particular article of  enjoyment. 
3.  Capital,  in tl~is  as in the  preceding case, 
retires  from  this  branch,  ar~tl passes  into 
others. 
Temporary  conserluences : -  If the  con- 
sumption be not diminished,  the tax makes 
no difference : if  it bc  diminished,  similar 
distress, in proportion, as in the case above. 
Third question :  JVIiat are the consequences 
of  a tar imposed  by  ourselves,  upon the ma- 
nufactures  of  our  own  country consurned  by 
jbreigners Y 
Permanent consequences: -  1. Whilst the 
consumption is not diminished, the  operation 
produces  so much clear  gain  for  us.  The 
burthen of the tax is borne by the foreigner, 
and the profit is reaped  by ourselves. 
If the cons~~mptiort  be diminished,  the ca- 
pital which loscs this employmet~t  passes into 
others. 
Temporary consequences: -  Consumptio~l 
not  diminished,  no difference  to us : con- 
sumption diminished,  similar distress in pro- 
portion,  as in the former cases. 
It rcsr~lts  from Ilcltce,  tli;lt the permnnent 
cffects of  these taxes are always of little irn- 
nortance as to commerce in ceneral :  and that  ". 
their temporary effects are evil in proportion 
to  the diminution of the consumption.  The 
evil is greater or less, according as it is more 
or less easy to  transfer cupital and labour from 
one branch of industry to  another. 
The least hurtful of  these taxes are those 
which  bear upon our own  productions  con- 
sumed by foreigners.  lf the same quantity he 
exoorted after the tax as before.  so far fiom 
being prejudicial,  it  yields us a flear benefit : 
it is a tribute levied upon them  precisely as 
if  it were  raised  out of  the bowels of  the 
earth. 
The tax imposed  by us upon  foreign im- I 
portations is paid by ourselves,  and burthen- 
some as any other tax would be to  the same 
amount.  If  the consumption  be  not  dimi- 
nished,  it  would be better that the tax upon 
this article should be imposed by us, that we 
might profit by it, rather than by the country 
which  produced  it, and  which  would  then 
enjoy the benefit. 
A nation which has a natural monopoly of 
an  article necessary to  foreigners, has a natu- 
ral means of  taxing them for its own profit. 
Let us take tin for an example : England is 
the only  country  which  has  mines of  this 
metal -  at  least, all others are too inconside- 
rable to satisfy the demand.  England  rnight 
therefore lay a considerable tax upon the ex- 
portation of tin, witl~or~t  danger of smuggling, 
because it  might be levied at the mine, or at 
the foundry.  Prance  could  not impose  an 
equal tax, because it  would give too grent ark 
allr~rement  to  the smugglers. 
These principles are easy of application  to 
commercial treaties.  Everything  whichis per- 
manent, whether it  be called encouragement 
or discouragement,  has but little effect upon 
trade and commerce  in general ;  since trade 
and  commerce are always governed  by the 
c;rpittrl which can be emploved on them.  But 
international  precautions ;nay  be  taken  tor 
the prevention of  rapid changes, from wliicll 
temporary distresses result.  Let every nation 
make a silcrifice by refusing to  impose taxes, 
or to augment them, upon articles of its own 
exportation : every  nation  would  then re- 
ceive indemnification hy a reciprocal sacrifice. 
Commerce would thus acquire stability; and 
that petty fiscal warfare would  no longer be 
carried on,  which produces a  dangerous irri- 
tation among the people, always greatly dis- 
proportioned to  the importance of the object. 
The  object of the first chapter of the com- 
mercial  code  ought to be to show the reci- 
procity of  international  interests,  to prove 
that there is no impropriety, during the con- 
ti~~uance  of peace, in favouring the opulcnce 
of  foreigners -  no merit in opposing it. 
It may hnppen t.o be a misfortune that our 
neirllbour is rich:  it is certair~lv  one that he 
be poor.  If lie be rich,  we ma;  have reason 
to fear him;  if he be  poor,  hk has little or 
nothing to  sell to, or to buy of, us. 
But that he  should  become  an object of 
dread by reason of an increase in riches,  it  is 
necessary that this prosperity should  be  his 
alone.  He will  have no advantage,  if our 
wealth  has  made  the same  prog~ess  as his 
own,  or if this progress  has taken  place ill 
other nations equally well disposed with our- 
selves to  repress him. 
Jealousies  against  rich  nations  are only 
founded upon  mistakes  and misunderstand- 
ings:  it is-with these nations that the most 
profitable commerce is carried on ;  it  is from 
these that the  returns are the most abundant, 
the most rapid, and the most certain. 
Great capitals  produce the greatest  divi- 
sion of labour, the most perfect machines, the 
most  active  competition  among  the  mer- 
chants, the most extended credits,  and con- 
sequently the lowest prices.  Each nation, in 
receiving  from the richest everything which 
it furnisbes, at  t,he lo\vest  rate and of  the 
best quality, would be able to devote its ca- 
pital  exclusively to the most  advantageoua 
branches of industry. 
Wherefore do governments give so  marked 
a preference  to export trade ? 
'1.  It is  this  brhnch which  exhibits itself 
with the greatest show and eclat : it is this 
which  is most under the eyes of the gover- I  2100 cxrrvinr an-annuitv of thee  per cent.. 
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nors, and which therefore  most strongly ex- 
cites their attention. 
2. This commerce  more  particularly np- 
pears  to them  as their work:  they imagine 
they are  creators ;  and inaction  appears to 
them a species of  impotence. 
All these  pretensions,fall before the prin- 
ciple,  that production  is subordinate  to capi- 
tal.  These  new  branches  of  trade,  these 
remote  establishments,  these  costly  encou- 
ragements,  produce  no new creations ;  it is 
orlly a new employment of a part of one and 
the same  upital which was  not idle before. 
It  is a new service,  which is performed at the 
expense of  the old.  The sap which by this 
operation is strained through  a  new branch 
being diverted from another, gives a different 
product,  but not an increase of produce. 
so,  but by  instalments  as above,  this would 
require a further addition on the score of the 
correspondent  retardations. 
On this  supposition,  it is evident that a 
nation could never be put by reimbursemer~t 
in a plight  exactly as good as what it would 
have  been  in  had  there been  no borrowing 
for unproductive purposes. 
But,  in  point of fact, a circumstance  at- 
tending  the borrowing system  is,  that  the 
money paid  and  given to productive  capital 
at  the period of  reimbursement.  is upon the 
whole  considerably greater  than the money 
borrowed and spent, and taken frorn produc- 
tive  capital  at the period  of  expenditure. 
Wl~en  money is borrowed in three per cents. 
at six per cent.,  that is, when for every £100 
borrowed of the individual, government gives 
him a nominal  capital of  E.200  stock,  each 
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to  dischaige ;his  annuiiy of f  6 in the way 
paving off (bn~ing  in under par  sup- 
posed out of the question,)  d200 must at  the 
time of reimbursement be put into his hands. 
THE  establishment of an effective and ~tndi- 
vertible sinking fund,  has been product,ive of 
effects in respect of increase of wealth, such 
as  to  judge from any indications I have met 
wik)  had not presented themselves to those 
by whom the plan was adopted, or by any of 
those by  whom it had been proposed. 
Mo~tey  borrowed  for  and  applied  to war 
expenses,  is so much  taken from productive 
capital and growing wealth.  Money employed 
in discharge of euch debt (whether by paying 
it off  at par, or by buying it in, at an under 
price,)  is so much given to  productive  capital 
and growing wealth. 
If in a season of  reimburscmerlt, viz. peace, 
the space of  time employecl in  t,he discharge 
of the debt were no longer than the space of 
time employed in  the contracting of  it.  and 
the money employed  in the  reimbursement 
were no greater  than the rnoney borrowed, 
the qttantity added to wealth wot~ld  be equal 
to the quantity taken from it, hating only the 
loss of the interest at  compound inkrest upon 
the several years' instalments during the ex- 
penditure of it: as, if ten millions were bor- 
rowed every year for four years of  war,  and 
ten i nil lions were paid off every year for the 
four succeeding years,  being  years of  peace, 
there  would  be  forty  millions  taken  from 
wealth, forty millions added to wealth:  but 
to put the nation into the same plight in re- 
spect of wealth, as if there had been no money 
raised for the war, it wo111d require the inte. 
rest of  the first  years'  ten  millions  for  the 
fonr years,  plus  that of  the second  for the 
three years, plus that of  the third for the two 
years,  plus that of  the fourth  for one year, 
supposing the whole  debt to be  paid off  at 
once on the first day of the year of peace; and 
aa by the supposition it would be paid off not 
OPERATION  OF A 
In the course of the late wars, greater in- 
terest  than this has  act~~rllp  been  given  by 
the British government.  If, t.hen, the circtrm- 
stance of  time were laid out of  the acco~~nt, 
the consequence would  be,  that in so far as 
mere wealth were concerned, a nation with s 
fixed sinlzing fund might be -and,  in a word, 
that Britain wonld be, a gainer by a war to a 
very considerable  degree.  If,  for  example, 
in the first year of a war,  ten millions  were 
borrowed on these terms, and on the first day 
of the second year,  being a year of peace, the 
money borrowed were repaid at par, for which, 
on the above terms,  twenty millions would 
be necessary,  the gain  to wealth  would  be 
t,en millions, minus a year's  interest upon ten 
millions. 
Theabovesupposition is givenonly for illur- 
tmtion;  for,  as everybody knows, neither is 
money on the first year of a war borrowed on 
terms of  such disadvantage, nor is it so soon 
repaid. 
It  may, however, serve to  show thus mtrch, 
viz.  that the more disadvantageous the terms 
are on which money is borrowed.  the greater 
is the restitution made to wealth. 
This would not, in my  view of the matter, 
be any recommendation of war, or borrowing 
for  that or  other purpose*  upon  disadvan- 
tageous  terms;  because  comtbrt,  including 
security,  is  the immediate  and  only  direct 
object in any estimate with me -  and wealth 
only in so far as it contributes  to conrfort, 
which, without due provision made for secu- 
rity, it cannot do. 
But in a view of the matter, which to me 
appears  much  more  common than my  own, 
this consideration should be a very important 
one,  and  should go a great way towards re- 
conciling men to  war and bad bargains. 
The answer to  it is, that if it  be wealth - 
future wealth, you want, atld you are willing 
to  pay the price for it in present comfort, you 
have no  reason  to seek for  it through any 
such disadvantapeous measure as that of war: 
raise the money; and instead of  spending it in 
war,  spend  it in any other way, -you  will 
have still more wealth. 
If this be just,  it will enable us the more 
clenrlv to  appreciate two opinions which have 
been 'advanced  on  the  subject  of  national 
debts. 
One is, that a national debt is, to  the whole 
amount of it, or at any rate to a certain part 
of it, not a defalcation, but an addition to  the 
mass of wealth. 
The other is.  that admitting  the debt to 
be  a  defalcation  from  the  mass  of  national 
wealth, yet the discharge of it would be, not 
an addition  to that mass.  but a defalcation 
from it.  -..  -  -. 
Both thcse opinions  have had their parti- 
sans ;  for in the w.llole  field of  national eco- 
nomy,  there is not a proposition,  how clear 
soever,  the  contrary of  which  has  not  had 
its partisans. 
AS  to the first opinion,  one way  in which 
it is maintained is, by  looking exclusively to 
one side of  the account -  bv looki~lc  at, the 
income coming in to the an&ritants,~tnd  not 
looking at the income going orrt of the hands 
of  those by whose  contributions  the money 
for the  payment  of  these  annuities  is  sup- 
plied. 
Another way is, by imagining the existence 
of a capital equal to the capital borrowed and 
received by government in  exchange for the 
nnnuitics granted -  borrowed,  and spent as 
fast as it is borrowed, not to say faster still. 
This being a new capital created,  goes,  ac- 
cording to  the reckoning of these politicians, 
in addition  to whatever  may  have  been  the 
amount of the old one. 
This notion  appears  to have had  for  its 
ground and eflicie'it cause, the language used 
by  the man of  finance and  the man  of  law, 
in describing transactions ofthis nature.  Can 
a thing have heen created, and yet never have 
existed?  Fict.ion is the parent of confusion 
and error in all its aha1,es.  False conception 
generates false language : false language fixes 
false conceptions,  and  renders them  prolific 
and immortal.  Such as opinions have been, 
s~tclr  is Ii~ttguage  :  sucl~  as  lartgu;lgc is,  will 
opinions be. 
Would not  the nation  be the poorer,  if a 
sponge were passed over the national debt ? 
Would not there  he  so  mnch  property  de- 
stroyed?  Not an atom more th:m would be 
produced at the same instant.  Wor~ld  not the 
nation  he  less wealthv?  No : not,  at least 
at the instant  of  the change.  ~6u1d  it be 
less happy?  Yes : wretched  in the extreme. 
Soon  would it be less wealtlly ?  Yes : 
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to a frightful degree,  hy reason of the shock 
given to security in respect to property,  at~d 
the c~nfusion  that would ensue.  Thirty mil- 
lions a-year that used  to be  received by an- 
nuitants, no longer received -  thirty milliorrs 
a-year that used  to he  paid  in taxes by  all 
classes,  and all individuals together.  for the 
payment of those annr~itants,  no longer paid. 
National wealth would no more be diminished 
by the sponge, than it is when a handkerchief 
is transferred  from the pocket of a passenger 
to the pocket of a thief.  Sum for sum, how- 
ever, the enjoyment produced  by gain is not 
equal to the suffering produced  by  loss.  In 
this difference,  traced thror~gh  all its conse- 
quences,  lies the mischief,  and the sole mis- 
chief, of  bankruptcy or of theft. 
Annuities  paid  by  government are  paid 
with a dcgree of regularity  (not to speak of 
certainty)  which  would  in vain  be  looked 
for to any extent in annuities paid out of par- 
ticular ft~nds  by  intlividual hands.  In the loss 
of  this  species  and  degree of  convenience, 
consists the wllole of  the loss that \vould be 
incurred  by  the  complete  discharge  of the 
national debt.  This convenience is certainly 
worth somethinp it1 the scale of wealth :  but 
it can scarcely bYe  considered as any reai tan- 
gible addition to tl:e  milss of  those  tangible 
thi~~gs,  of  the nlass of  which the matter of 
\vealth  is  composed.  There is also  incon- 
venience attending  the payment of  taxes- 
(those  taxes  by  the  produce  of  which  the 
matter of  these  annnities is supplied) -an 
inconvenience superadded to that which con- 
sists merely in the privation attendant on the 
parting with the money paid in taxes. 
On this convenience attending the receipt 
of  the annuity,  is grounded  another conved 
rlience in respect of the facility attending the 
purchase and the  sale of  it -  attending the 
process of convertina caoital into income. and 
reconverting income inio capital,  when capi- 
tal happens again to be the thing wanted. 
As to the aroilnd  of  the other o~inion  -. 
it appears to  ke,  that if  the money'taken in 
taxes, to be applied in discharge of  the debt, 
had not been so taken,  but had been left in 
the  pockets of  those  to whom it belonged, 
it would have been spent by them, each in his 
own way, and by that expenditure an addition 
would have been made to the Inass of national 
wealth -but  not so if  applied in  discharge 
of  debt.  But the fact is, that whatever is no 
i~pplicd  is given,  received, and employed ; - 
the whole  of  it in  the  shape  of  capital;- 
whereas, had it been left with the parties by 
whom it is paid in taxes, it wotrld have been 
employed,  more  or less of  it, as  income is 
employed, when it  issaid to  he spent, withotrt 
retur~l  or hope of return.  Wh:~t  the propor- 
tion may amount to between  the  part spent 
ns income.  and the part elrlployecl as capital, 
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addition to  the mass of  nationd wealth, will 
be considered prcsently.  For the present, it 
is something,  not  to say sufficient,  that in 
the one case it is o111y  a part that is employed 
in making an addition to  the mass of wealth, 
and in the other case the whole. 
The support given to  this opinion is niven 
in two wnys.  One is, by thinking nothrng of 
what becolncs of the money taken in taxes, 
and mrcle over to  the annuitants in discharge 
pru tnnto of the national debt, but consider- 
ing it as annihilated or thrown away. 
The other  is,  by  considering  the  labour 
paid  for by the money when  spent  by the 
proprietor,  instead of being taken  from him 
in taxes, as being employed,  all of it,  in the 
shape of  pecuniary capital,  in making a cor- 
respondent  addition  to real  capital -just 
as would have really been  the case with the 
labour peid  for by that money,  had  it been 
been  made  over to annuitants in  discharge 
of so much debt. 
That a part of it  would really have been so 
employed,  does not admit  of  doubt: -the 
error consists in considering what is true onlv 
of this part., as if it were ;rue  of the whol;. 
Let us observe the difference  betwecn  this 
part and the wholc. 
Admitting an increase of wealth, and that 
a gradual and regular one, the productive ca- 
pital of the coulitry,  taken together with the 
growing  mass  of consumed  and reproduced 
wealth  continunlly produced  by it, must  be 
considered  as increasing  at compound  inte- 
much to  believe.  The half,  or thereabouts, 
of the aggregate wealth, will be that which is 
shared among individuals of the  poorest class: 
-and  in the case of that class, the wealth of 
an average individual appears, within the pe- 
riod in question,  to have  rather diminished 
than increased. 
I take therefore two per cent. for the rate 
of accum~~lntion-not as the true rate, but for 
a rate which, though considerably too high, is 
near enough to the trqe rate to answer the 
purpose of illustration.  Taking, then, 20 per 
cent. as the  gross ratio of the real income pro- 
duced by that real capital,  to  the real capital 
by the employment of which it is produced,- 
this two per cent. would constitute one-tenth 
part of the gross income: -  and the part out 
of income added to  capital every year is one- 
tenth part  of  the whole  mass,  of which the 
other nine parts are partly consumed for main- 
tenance, partly employed  in keeping up the 
real capital in statu quo:  that  is, in a condition 
to  give birth to  the same quantity of real in- 
come in each subsequent as in each preceding 
year. 
Tlre wltole income, thcn, of an average in- 
divitlual, may for this purpose be co~~sidered 
as divided  into ten parts:-of  which  nine 
parts go for present  mai~~tcnancc.,  added  to 
the  expense  of  providing  for  rcprodr~ctiorl 
without decrease or increase,  and the other 
tenth to positive increase. 
This being the case with the  wholc illcome 
of  the average individual,  the same division 
rest.  The rate of  intirest  can'scarcely  be 
taken as so high as 2 per cent. ;  for at 2 per 
cent.  compound upon the capital, whatever it 
than an avera6e  individual at an anterior pe- 
riod-  so far as wealth has gone on increasing 
faster than population.  That wealth has gone 
on increasing faster than population, is what I 
shouldexpect to find to  be the  case ;  but that 
the increase should be anything like as mnch 
as double, i. e.  half as much again, seems too 
in idea may be  made of  any part of that in. 
come ;  and, for instance, of that part which he 
is made to pay  in taxes:  if he had had none 
may amount to  in-any  year,6he  quantity of it 
would be rather more than doubled in thirty- 
five  and  a  half years.  The most  sanguine 
estimator will not,  I imagine, regard the in- 
crease of national wealth to have been, even 
for the last thirty-five  years,  increasing  at 
nearly so rapid  a  rate.  If the quantity and 
value of productive capital have gone on in- 
creasing at this rate, the quantity of growing 
income must have gone on increasing at the 
same rate ;  since it is  only from the income 
of that or the preceding year, that the addi- 
tion made to the capital of  any year can  be 
made.  If the  quantity  of growing income have 
gone on increasing at this rate,  the mass of 
population  must have gone on increasing at 
the same rate, save and except in so  far as  an 
increase has taken place in the degree of re- 
lative opulence, i. e.  so far as an average indi- 
vidual of the posterior period has been richer 
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of  it to piy  In taxes,  one-tenth is  the part 
which would have been employed by him in 
making  a  net  addition  to the capital,  and 
thence to  tbe growing wealth of the country, 
as above. 
On this supposition, the addit,ion made to 
wealth  by a  million  tiken from national in- 
come by taxes, and employed in the discharge 
of the national debt, is to the addition that 
would be made  to it by the same millior~  if 
left in the pockets of those to  whom it  comes 
in the shape of income,  arid left to be  em- 
ployed by them, each in his own way, as ten 
to one.  I  say,  for  illustration,  as  ten  to 
one ;  but twenty to  one is the proportion I 
should  expect to find  come  nearest  to the 
truth. 
CHAPTER VII. 
Noscenda:*  by this term I understand those 
matters of  fact,  forming the  subject of the 
Of noscenda, the most instructive indication 
I know of is that given by Bf. Necker, Admin. 
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science, termed statistics ;  -including  data '  use to  the legislator-and the public, reducing 
and danda.  between which the field of  nos- I continually.  and finally keeping to its mini- 
cendn is divided,  in portions which of course 
would be found different as yet in each com- 
munity, and in each portion of time. 
Statistical matter being food for curiosity, 
many derive amusement  from the perusal of 
it-some,  cor~scquently,  a profit from the fur- 
nishina  of  it.  On  this account.  so far  as 
depen8s upon inclination, the  operation of fur- 
nishing  it belongs  constantly,  and,  so far as 
depends upon knowledge and  power,  occasion- 
ally,  to the head of sponte acta: -agendum, 
therefore,  on  the part of  government,  the 
completion  of the  requisite  stock  of  knoto- 
ledge and power,  by  furnishing  the data to 
individuals,  or even  collecting  them itself, 
whensoever that operation can be performed 
without prcpondernnt vexation and expense. 
In every walk of  life,  public and private, - 
public more especially,-publicity-publicity 
-is  the best guardian of virtue. 
The collection  and publication of statis- 
mum, by successive i&provem&ts,  the qum- 
tity of  injustice in both shapes,  collateral as 
well as direct.t 
The  expense of registration will be amply 
paid for, by the first of the uses to the legis- 
lator,  added  to  the two uses  to the judge. 
The expense  of publication  might be  much 
reduced,  as wellas the utility cn the way of 
instruction increased,  by throwing the matter 
into a tabular form,  abridged in bulk, and di- 
gested under heads. 
11.  Births, marriages,  and deaths.$ 
Use to the judge :-Use  of  the several 
documents in the character of evidettces con- 
stituting  the basis  of  the most  important, 
because  most  extensive,  class of  rights and 
obligations-rights  of property derived froin 
succession -  rights and obligations of various 
sorts derived from condition in life. 
Use to  the legislator :-Indications  of the 
state of population,-increasing,  stationary, 
tical  facts being atten&d  with  erpense,  no  or declining ; -  thence, in case  of  check or 
institution should be set on foot for the fur-  I  decline.  general  or local.  indication  of  the 
nishing any such articles, without a previous 
indication of  the benefit derivable from such 
knowledge, and a conviction that it will pay 
for the expense.  The expense neccssary  for 
one  purpose,  may however be  sufficient  for 
the accomplishment  of many purposes. 
The follo\vir~g  are among the subjects on 
which the aidof government appears desirable 
in collecti~~r!  the facts : - 
I. ~orenic  steps, documents and costs, i.  e. 
the steps taken -  the documents  exhibited, 
in each  cause,  with  the expenses regularly 
attendant upon each. 
Uses to the ndministrator, the judge:-  1. 
S1:owiniz  thc around afforded  for each suc- 
cessive "step  41cl  documcnt  by  the several 
preceding oi~cs  ;  2. Costs to  be stated, -  that 
in  each instance.  so far as justice  requires, 
and  ability  extends,  the  Grthen  may  be 
thrown upon the party in the wrong. 
- 
Uses to  the lecis1ator:-  1. Bv the opera- 
tion of publicity. :heck  upon irijuitice, aiwell 
collatcral as direct, on the part of the  judge ; 
-2.  In the  mav of instruction,-view  of the 
price paid for direct justice,  in the shape of 
collateral,  aud in some degree unavoiduble  in- 
justice;  viz. in the triple shape  of  vexation 
pecuniary expense,  and delay, -paid  in each 
case individually,  and thence in each class of 
causes collectirely,-the  causes being for this 
purpose  divided  into classes ;- 3.  Ultimate 
dcs Finances -but  without reference to parti- 
cular uses as hetermined bv   articular agenda or 
non-agenda. 
The most instructive bod  of data the world 
ha. yet seen, is that furnishelduring Mr. Pittls 
administration, princi  ally by the House of Com- 
mons' Committee of  fiinance.  of which the pre- 
&dd ;eimpression  is but a mutilated extwit 
extent  the causcs  ant1 the remedies ;  in- 
dicatio~~s  of the amount of  profit and loss by 
war,-loss  real in  every case-net  profit, 
seldom  more than ideal (wealth  taken into 
the account,)  from  the most successful  war. 
In every line  of  management,  private or 
public, a necessary guardian to  good economy 
is good hook-keeping. 
Mode of publication abridged, digested, and  -  - 
tabular,  askbove. 
To the ecclesiastical  function,  wherever 
established, the business of  registering  and 
transmitting noscenda  of  this class  (not  to 
speak of  others) seems a natural appendage. 
How can the shepherd  feed  his flock,  if he 
know them not?-how  know them.  if lie 
cannot number them? 
111.  Contracts of all sorts ;  viz. such as by 
their importance are worth registering.  Mode 
of registration, in some cases, transcription ; 
-  in others,  abbreviation-  in others,  sim- 
ple mention of existence. 
Use to  the  administrator, the  judge :-Uses 
of these  documents  in the character of  evi- 
dences, as above. 
Uses to another sort of  administrator - 
the collector  of  the revenue-in  the case 
where documents of this sort have been taken 
for  the subject of taxation : -  I. Check  to 
t  In this line  an interesting example has been 
lately set by the)~anish  government  on the occa- 
sion of the tribunals lately instituted under some 
such name as that of  Recohciliation  Qfices.  I 
speak of  the  desi.qn:  materials  for judging of 
the execution have not reached me. 
$ U  6 & 7,  \V.  IV. c.  06,  a general register 
of birtgs, marriages,  and deaths, was established 
in I+:nrcland.  A sinlilar measure for Scotland has 
been &ore  Parliament, but hasnot yet (0ctol;cr 
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fraud on the part of the intended contributor; 
2.  Check  to pecculation  and negligence  on 
the part of the sub-collectors. 
Uses to  individuals at large : -  1. Preven- 
tion of fraud by forgery-whether  in the way 
of  fabrication  or alteration;  2.  In the case 
of  contracts  of  conveyance,  viz.  of  specific 
articles of  immoveable  property inter  vicos, 
prevention of fraud, viz. of fraud commissible 
by the repeated  sale of  the same  article to 
different purchasers. 
Uses to  the legislat,or  :-Various,  according 
to  the nature of the contract.  Examples : - 
1.  For the purpose of finance, see above, uses 
to  the collector of the revenue ;  -2.  In the 
case of  contracts  circulating as money,  and 
constituting a species of paper money,-view 
of the quantity of it,  in comparison with the 
quantity of metallic money;  thence of its in- 
fluence on the aggregate prices of goods, and 
on public, or say rather general, credit; i. e. 
view of the actual depreciation of money, and 
the danger of general bankruptcy ;-3.  View 
of  the state of  the nation in respect of im- 
provement -  progressive,  stationary, or de- 
clining-in  the several lines of action which 
constitute the subject of the several classes 
of contracts, and the number of contracts of 
each sort entered into within a give11 period 
of time, compared with the several preceding 
periods of the same length. 
Mode of publication,--abridged,  digested. 
and tabular, as above. .  In  the case  of  such 
contracts as are considered  as proper to be 
kept secret, the publication may extend to  all 
points  but the particular ones in respect of 
which the secrecy is required ;  and aggregate 
quantities may be given at  any rate 